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RENMIN RIBAO on Yeltsin Disarmament Plan
HK1202084192 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese
30 Jan 92 p 6

[By correspondent Zhou Xiangguang (0719 6272 0342): "Yeltsin Puts Forth New Disarmament Proposal"]

[Text] Moscow, 29 Jan (RENMIN RIBAO)—Russian Federation President Yeltsin made a statement on television today, putting forward a new proposal on arms limitation and reduction.

Yeltsin said that Russia will dismantle 600 active-duty ground- and sea-based strategic ballistic missiles, or 1,250 nuclear warheads, destroy or plan to destroy 130 silos for launching intercontinental ballistic missiles, plan to dismantle the devices for launching missiles from six submarines, and cease development and upgrading of certain types of offensive strategic weapons.

Yeltsin declared that an agreement has been reached with Ukraine on dismantling the strategic nuclear weapons in Ukrainian territory within the shortest period of time.

Meanwhile, Yeltsin announced that Russia will suspend manufacture of To-160 and To-95MC model heavy bombers, stop production of the available air-based and sea-based long-range cruise missiles, and is ready to destroy all the sea-based long-range cruise missiles on a reciprocal basis. Russia will abandon all the large-scale military exercises which involve over 30 heavy bombers, reduce the active-duty submarines loaded with ballistic missiles by 50 percent, and is ready to totally abandon the submarine patrols on a reciprocal basis.

Yeltsin said that Russia will reduce within three rather than seven years the active-duty strategic offensive weapons to a level proposed in the former Soviet-U.S. agreement. Yeltsin said that he did not want to see the strategic offensive weapons retained by Russia and the United States used to target each other.

Pakistani Prime Minister Cited on South Asia NFZ

OW0702071992 Beijing XINHUA in English
0633 GMT 7 Feb 92

[Text] Islamabad, February 7 (XINHUA)—Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has reiterated his country's firm commitment to a complete denuclearization of South Asia for the establishment of ever-lasting peace and harmony in the region.

He said this can only be achieved on a regional basis which called for a willingness by India to work with Pakistan and other countries of the region to move towards a nuclear-free zone [NFZ].

The prime minister made these remarks during a meeting with former U.S. Senator Charles Percy who is now on a visit to Pakistan on Thursday in Lahore, 265

kilometers southeast of the capital city, according to the official news agency APP [Associated Press of Pakistan].

Pakistan's nuclear program was used by the United States as an excuse for suspending all military and economic assistance to the country in October 1990, which resulted in damage to bilateral relations between the two countries.

The United States stopped aid to Pakistan under the provisions of a U.S. foreign assistance law "the Pressler Amendment" which links foreign aid with the nuclear issue.

During his meeting with Charles Percy, Nawaz Sharif called upon the U.S. leadership to appreciate Pakistan's constraints and not to use the Pressler Amendment only against one country in the region.

He said it would be fair and in fact more useful if the United States worked with all the countries of the region to ensure an early complete denuclearization of South Asia.

The prime minister proposed in June last year a five-nation conference involving the United States, the Soviet Union (now Russia), China and India and Pakistan itself be held to work out a mechanism to make South Asia a nuclear-free zone [sentence as received].

The United States, which supports the proposal, has been demanding a roll back of Pakistan's nuclear program which is officially stated time and again to be not weapon-oriented.

Pakistan Foreign Secretary Shahryar Mohammed Khan is currently in the United States and had talks with the U.S. officials during the last three days, focusing on the nuclear issue, according to press reports here today.

But the two sides are still deadlocked over the issue, Shahryar Khan was quoted by today's THE NEWS as saying.

The visit of the Pakistan foreign secretary to the United States was one of the recent efforts from both sides to improve their relations.

ACDA Report Cited on U.S., USSR Arms Budgets, Exports

OW1302230992 Beijing XINHUA in English
2119 GMT 13 Feb 92

[Text] Washington, February 13 (XINHUA)—The United States and former Soviet Union were the world's largest military spenders and arms transfers in 1989, according to a U.S. governmental agency.

In a publication released today, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency said (ACDA) said the U.S. military expenditures fell 0.3 percent in 1989 to 304.1 billion dollars while the Soviet spending fell for the first time in decades to 311 billion dollars, a drop of 6 percent in real terms.

The publication, entitled "World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1990," also said in 1989, the Soviet Union and the United States were world's first and second largest arms exporters, respectively, together accounting for close to 68 percent of world arms exports.

The Soviet Union exported nearly 20 billion dollars in arms in 1989, or 43 percent of the world total, while the United States exported 11.2 billion dollars, or 25 percent of the total, the ACDA said.

From 1985-1989, the Soviet Union was the number one arms supplier to the Middle East region, supplying roughly 24 billions dollars in arms, or nearly one-fourth of all Soviet arms exports during this period, the publication said.

The United States was the second largest arms exporter to this region in 1985-1989, providing 15.4 billion dollars in arms to the region.

In 1989, the world military expenditures was slightly over 1 trillion dollars in current dollars, the publication said. While nearly all of the decline occurred in the developed countries, military spending in developing countries also fell slightly in 1989, continuing a downward trend which began in 1984, it added.

Military expenditures in the Middle East region reached their lowest level of the decade, 53.2 billion dollars in 1989, representing a drop of 36 percent from the 1983 peak level of 82.8 billion dollars, the ACDA said.

But this region is still the world's largest importer of arms, importing 12.1 billion dollars in arms in 1989, nearly 27 of the world's arms import market, it said.

South Asia, one of the smallest arms importing regions in 1979, was the second largest in 1989, the ACDA said.

NORTH KOREA

Editorial Urges 'Faithful' Implementation of N-S Accord

SK2102053792 Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in Korean 0014 GMT
20 Feb 92

[NODONG SINMUN 20 February editorial: "Let Us Faithfully Implement the North-South Agreement and Joint Declaration To Open a Decisive Phase for the Independent and Peaceful Reunification of the Country"]

[Text] At the first-day session of the sixth round of North-South high level talks held in Pyongyang on 19 February, the North and the South confirmed and exchanged the information and documents on the North-South Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Cooperation and Exchange and the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula for which the necessary procedures for effectuation had been completed, declared their effectuation, and adopted and effectuated the Agreement on the Formation and Operation of Subcommittees of the North-South High Level Talks.

Truly, this is a great victory attained in the struggle process of the entire nation to implement the three principles of fatherland reunification—independence, peaceful reunification, and great national unity—and a historic event that brought forth a new landmark on the way to the realization of the independent and peaceful reunification of the fatherland. This gives great joy to all the fellow countrymen who yearn for peace in the country and its peaceful reunification and to the peace-loving people of the world who desire peace and stability on the Korean peninsula.

That the historic North-South agreement and the joint denuclearization has been officially effectuated and that the subcommittees of the North-South high level talks are to be formed and operated is a festive event for the entire nation that has opened a new breakthrough for peace and peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula.

Our people regard the effectuation of the historic North-South agreement and the joint denuclearization declaration as an epoch-making event that gives hope for and belief in reunification to the entire nation yearning for the reunification of the fatherland, and actively support, welcome, and warmly congratulate it.

The great leader Comrade Kim Il-song has taught: Along with the 4 July North-South Joint Statement, the North-South agreement which has been adopted is the most just program for the reunification of the fatherland that correctly reflects the consistent demand of our nation who wish to reunify the fatherland independently and peacefully and the trend of the present times heading for independence and peace.

The North-South agreement, which has been effectuated, is a historic document of practical significance in realizing national reconciliation, preventing encroachment and conflict by force of arms, easing tensions and ensuring peace by ending the state of political and military confrontation between the North and the South and promoting common national interest and prosperity and accelerating the peaceful reunification of the country by realizing multi-faceted cooperation and exchange. The North-South joint denuclearization declaration is an important document of agreement eliminating the danger of nuclear war on the Korean peninsula, providing advantageous conditions and the environment for peace in the country and its reunification, and contributing to peace and security in Asia and the world.

With the effectuation of the North-South agreement and joint denuclearization declaration, it is possible to end the danger of nuclear war and ensure peace on the Korean peninsula, to promote national unity between the North and the South on the basis of mutual trust, to realize unified development and the coprosperity of the country, and to reach a turning point in independent and peaceful reunification.

With the birth of the subcommittees for discussing and resolving specific measures concerning the faithful implementation of the North-South agreement, it is now possible to deepen discussions in various fields—political, military, economic, and cultural—to promote mutual trust and harmony and to open an advantageous phase for the fatherland reunification.

That the legally guaranteeing [popchok tamborul kajin] documents of the North-South agreement and joint denuclearization declaration were exchanged and their effectuation was proclaimed at the sixth North-South high-level talks is the shining result of the wise leadership of the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song, who has devoted his life to giving our nation a reunified fatherland, and to Comrade Kim Chong-il, the sagacious leader of our party and people, who is determined to bring forth the dawn of the fatherland reunification by all means in the 1990's, the times of our leader [suryong-nim]. With an earnest desire to open a decisive phase for fatherland reunification in the 1990's—which the entire nation is determined to greet as a decade of reunification—the great leader and the dear comrade leader personally put forward the North-South high level talks headed by the premiers of the North and the South and took great care that the talks progressed successfully in conformity with the nation's will and expectations.

By upholding the profound ideas and intention of the great leader and dear comrade leader to successfully achieve the North-South high-level talks at any cost, our side's delegation put forward the most realistic and reasonable proposals, including the issue of nonaggression and denuclearization. Before the justness of our side's independent, patriotic, and reunification-pursuing position and sincere efforts, the South Korean side had

to respond by adopting the joint documents of agreement [kongdongui habui munkon] and by declaring their effectuation.

The North-South agreement and joint declaration on denuclearization, which came into force this time, reflect the three principles for national reunification on independence, peaceful reunification, and great national unity which the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song expounded at an early date. They also contain the one-Korea line, the antiwar, antinuclear peace line and anti-outside forces line for independence which the Korean Workers Party [WPK] and the government of the Republic have consistently maintained.

The adoption and effectuation of the North-South agreement and the joint declaration for denuclearization is the first historic event since the publication of the 4 July joint statement and is a driving force which will vigorously encourage the nation's grand march for reunification in the 1990's.

The North and the South took the initial step toward the nation's peace and reunification in conformity with the desire of the fellow countrymen aspiring to reunification. What is left for the North and the South is to prove the practical worth of the agreement and joint declaration by respecting and faithfully implementing them.

The North-South agreement and the joint declaration for denuclearization are sacred agreements for the North and the South to resolve the issue of the nation's peace and reunification based on the driving force of the nation by uniting their strength. They are precious designs for opening a new chapter of reconciliation and peace.

The North-South agreement and joint declaration on denuclearization are a joint document of national agreement which thoroughly reflected the principle of national independence. Therefore, we should firmly maintain the nation's independent position, not the position of depending on outside forces.

Those who are striving to open the door of the nation's peace and reunification by implementing the North-South agreement and joint declaration should thoroughly reject the idea of relying on outside forces and should maintain the independent position which relies on the nation's independent forces.

The South Korean authorities should actively support and encourage the patriotic people who are striving to independently reunify the nation by opposing the interference of outside forces. They should no longer repress them.

It is a most urgent task which the North and the South should resolve with priority for the independent and peaceful reunification of the nation to ensure a durable peace on the Korean peninsula.

Only when the question of peace is resolved at an early date, can the nation be rescued from the danger of

nuclear war and only when one throws away the sword embraced in the bosom and removes military confrontation, can national reconciliation and unity be attained on the basis of mutual trust and can cooperation and exchange be successfully realized.

The North and the South pledged nonaggression and jointly declared the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Therefore, they should discard the idea of confrontation so that this agreement and declaration can be faithfully implemented. They should abandon the use of armed force and peacefully resolve the confrontation of opinions and issues of disputes through dialogue and negotiations. They should realize disarmament in compliance with the spirit of the agreement and joint declaration, should ease tension, and should urgently take steps for turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone.

The question is for the North and the South to faithfully observe the pledge of nonaggression. We will respect the agreement and joint declaration and will make, in the future, all efforts to prevent the danger of nuclear war and ensure peace on the Korean peninsula.

The South Korean authorities should faithfully implement the agreement and the joint declaration in active response to our consistent efforts for peace and should take the measures to suspend military buildup and war exercises which may aggravate the situation on the Korean peninsula. What is urgently required for the independent and peaceful reunification of the country is to realize reconciliation and unity between the North and the South.

The North and the South have agreed to recognize and respect the system that exists on the other side, not to interfere in the internal affairs of the other side, and not to abuse and slander the other side. These agreements are aimed at inspiring reunification, respecting the other side, and achieving reconciliation and unity as one nation. The reconciliation between the North and the South and the unity of the entire nation will lead precisely to national reunification to which we have aspired.

For the North and the South to achieve reconciliation and unity, it is important to do away with the deep-rooted consciousness of confrontation. The North and the South should discuss and take practical measures not to abuse and slander the other side but to recognize and respect the system that exists on the other side as promised in the agreement. Now that the North and the South have agreed to open the road of reunification through reconciliation and unity, the persons in authority of South Korea should rapidly take the step of abolishing antinational, fascist evil laws, such as the National Security Law, which regards us with hostility and which regards the patriotic reunification forces in South Korea as criminals, and should make a resolute decision for releasing, without delay, those reunification figures who visited the North.

The multilateral cooperation and exchange between the North and the South is of important significance in linking the severed national ties, in achieving the country's unified development, and in providing conditions favorable for national reunification. The cooperation and exchange between the two parts of our one nation, which was divided by foreign forces, should contribute to achieving national reunification. For this end, it is imperative to give priority importance to removing the state of political and military confrontation between the North and the South and, along with this, to adhere to the principle of developing cooperation and exchange.

Insisting on giving priority to exchange, apart from removing the state of political and military confrontation, is tantamount not wanting the exchange itself. To realize the multilateral cooperation and exchange between the North and the South, it is imperative to pull down the barrier of division built in South Korea to block cooperation and exchange and to eliminate all kinds of legal and institutional devices, such as the National Security Law, which constitute an obstacle to realizing free travel and total openness.

The reunification question in Korea is closely related to international relations. Therefore, cooperation from the countries concerned with the Korean question is necessary in implementing the North-South agreement and the joint declaration of denuclearization for peace and reunification of Korea. Now that the North and the South have promulgated before the world through the agreement and the joint declaration the firm will to solve the country's peace and reunification with the nation's own strength and, thus, have agreed to denuclearize the Korean peninsula, the countries concerned should be (faithful) to the joint declaration and provide active cooperation so that the joint declaration can be (smoothly implemented).

The implementation of the North-South agreement and the joint declaration of denuclearization will affirm the [words indistinct] and will of the two sides before all fellow countrymen and the world.

The North and the South should form and operate the subcommittees of North-South high-level talks and the joint nuclear control committee in a substantial manner and, thus, should faithfully implement the agreement and the joint declaration. Thus, they should open with certainty a turning point for reunification in the 1990's. By faithfully implementing the North-South agreement and the joint declaration in response to the expectation of the nation and the people of the world and by thoroughly fulfilling the reasonable reunification line of our party and the policy of North-South dialogue, we will make all possible efforts to guarantee a durable peace on the Korean peninsula and to expedite national reunification in the 1990's.

U.S. Said Seeking To Use CIS Nuclear Experts in SDI

*SK2102063692 Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in Korean 0025 GMT
21 Feb 92*

[NODONG SINMUN 21 February commentary: "U.S. Ambition for Nuclear Monopoly"]

[Text] U.S. ambition for exclusive possession of nuclear weapons is being more undisguisedly revealed. This is clearly shown by the fact that the United States is attempting to accelerate the Star Wars plan by using nuclear experts from the former Soviet Union while giving lip service to the need to prevent the movement of these experts overseas.

According to the broadcast of the Voice of America, the United States proposed to offer jobs to nuclear experts of the former Soviet Union with a view to preventing their moving to hostile nations.

As is known, many nuclear experts of the former Soviet Union lost their jobs and have been discarded because of their country's collapse. They want to maintain their livelihood even through employment in other countries.

Taking advantage of this opportunity, the United States and other Western countries are scheming to drag them to their countries with a view to using them for producing nuclear weapons.

Concerning this, a Romanian paper wrote that today's situation reminds one of the time when the United States and other countries welcomed nuclear experts from fascist Germany immediately after World War II.

The U.S. remarks about preventing nuclear experts of the former Soviet Union from moving abroad, offering jobs and so forth, are not designed to remove nuclear threat and to sympathize with them.

THE NEW YORK TIMES reported that the United States wants to obtain the former Soviet Union's advanced missile defense technology. Foreign news reports also said that, in order to actively push ahead with the plan for exclusive nuclear possession by controlling nuclear experts of the former Soviet Union, the United States is opposed to the overseas movement of the former Soviet Union's nuclear experts so that other countries cannot introduce nuclear technology. The reports commented that the United States is attempting to satisfy its own desire by dragging these experts to only the United States.

It is not an accident that voices resounded in the United States calling for bringing the former Soviet Union's nuclear experts to its side so that manufacturing of nuclear weapons by some countries, which desire to manufacture them, can be prevented.

The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, in actuality, began to investigate the real situation in the nuclear field of the

former Soviet Union. U.S. Secretary of State Baker expressed the intention of hiring nuclear experts while making a junket to member nations of the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS].

Progressive mankind wants to see the removal of the nuclear threat from the earth at an early date. For this, nuclear disarmament must be realized and nuclear weapons should be completely abolished.

Besides, the achievements in science and technology attained by mankind should be used only for peaceful purposes. Nevertheless, the United States is attempting to expedite the Star Wars plan by hiring foreign experts. This is indeed a vicious challenge to peace.

The U.S. imperialists' nuclear frenzy is increasing daily. The reactionary U.S. ruling circles should clearly realize that their maneuvers will evoke fiercer denunciation and rejection by the world's people.

SOUTH KOREA

President Signs Inter-Korean Nuclear-Free Accord

SK1702030592 Seoul YONHAP in English 0224 GMT 17 Feb 92

[Text] Seoul, Feb. 17 (OANA-YONHAP)—South Korean President No Tae-u completed the final step for putting the inter-Korean basic agreement and nuclear-free declaration into effect by signing them Monday.

No stressed, however, that the agreements were meaningless unless they were fully implemented, and called on North Korea to ratify and fulfill the nuclear safeguards accord as soon as possible.

The two pacts will be exchanged by the South and North Korean prime ministers when they meet for their sixth round of talks in Pyongyang Feb. 19, the last step to putting them into full force.

The basic agreement, signed Dec. 13 at the fifth prime ministers' talks, contains terms for inter-Korean reconciliation, nonaggression and exchanges and cooperation.

The nuclear-free declaration calls for abandoning possession of nuclear arms or reprocessing capabilities for nuclear weaponry and formation of a joint nuclear control committee for mutual inspection on each other's military and civilian facilities.

North Korea signed the nuclear safeguards accord with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna Jan. 30 but did not specify when it will ratify it or accept IAEA nuclear inspection.

"If implementation of the agreements are not followed through, the pacts will only add to serious distrust," No said.

"North Korea must realize that the nuclear problem is the most serious one and therefore it must ratify the nuclear safeguards accord and appease our concern," he said.

Korea was divided by foreign powers, but Koreans could and must achieve national unification on their own, No said on signing the agreements.

He denied claims that his government was abusing unification issues for domestic political gain and said: "Such times have passed."

North-South Nuclear-Free Agreement Put Into Effect

Prime Ministers Exchange Documents

SK1902020992 Seoul YONHAP in English 0151 GMT 19 Feb 92

[Text] Pyongyang, Feb. 19 (OANA-YONHAP)—South and North Korea effectuated three agreements Wednesday on basic relations and a nuclear-free Korean peninsula at the sixth prime ministers' meeting here.

Premiers Yon Hyong-muk of the North and Chong Won-sik of the South, in a nationally televised ceremony, exchanged the agreements in the opening session of the talks, showing that both sides had completed the domestic procedures for putting them into force.

Chong arrived Tuesday with a 90-member delegation for the premiers' talks, which began in September 1990 and which Seoul and Pyongyang alternately host.

The three are the agreement on reconciliation, nonaggression and exchanges and cooperation, the joint declaration for a nuclear-free Korean peninsula and the agreement on formation and operation of inter-Korean subcommittees.

South and North Korea signed their first basic agreement since national division when the prime ministers met in Seoul for the fifth round of talks on Dec. 13.

They also struck an agreement on New Year's Eve for a nuclear-free Korea, with both sides abandoning possession or introduction of atomic weapons and reprocessing and enrichment capabilities.

With the effectuation of the basic agreement, South and North Korea will negotiate replacing the 1953 Armistice with a peace formula, install a liaison office at the truce village of Panmunjom within three months, establish political and military exchanges and cooperation subcommittees within one month, and form military and exchanges and cooperation committees within three months.

The nuclear-free declaration says the two sides will form a Joint Nuclear Control Committee (JNCC) for mutual inspection of military and civilian facilities designated by the other side.

The declaration says Seoul and Pyongyang will form the JNCC within one month of the declaration's effectuation, but officials are expected to agree on its formation and operation at this round of talks.

The agreement on subcommittees says six people from each side will sit on the three subcommittees. They will meet once a month at the truce village of Panmunjom but they can arrange more meetings at different locations if both sides agree.

The subcommittee meetings are closed-door sessions and the results will not be announced unless both sides agree to it.

'Black Cloud' Lifted

SK1902025492 Seoul YONHAP in English 0231 GMT
19 Feb 92

[Text] Pyongyang, Feb. 19 (OANA-YONHAP)—The three inter-Korean agreements are the result of the people's will to overcome their own misfortunes cast on their nation by outside forces, South Korean Prime Minister Chong Won-sik said Wednesday.

Officially effectuating the agreements on basic relations and a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, Chong said he was sure 1992 would be the first year for the establishment of a commonwealth on the Korean peninsula when the agreements were fully implemented.

North Korea, he added, needed to relieve concerns that it was developing nuclear weapons by immediately accepting mutual inspection with South Korea.

Chong and his North Korean counterpart, Yon Hyong-muk, at sixth inter-Korean high-level talks here exchanged documents effectuating the agreement on reconciliation, nonaggression and exchanges and cooperation, the joint declaration for a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, and the agreement on formation and operation of subcommittees.

Yon, speaking first at the opening session, said that the agreements marked "historic progress" on the road to national unification.

The agreements would be faithfully implemented through sincere efforts by both sides according to the people's will for national unification, he said.

"We have lifted the black cloud of war and conflict from the Korean peninsula with these agreements, and we will build peace free of nuclear weapons, nuclear threat, foreign military troops or bases," he said.

Reporters Note Optimism

SK1902121892 Seoul CHOSON ILBO in Korean
19 Feb 92 p 3

[By reporters Yi Sang-chol and Pyok Wan-sik from Pyongyang and Panmunjom]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Approximately 20 North Korean reporters appeared in front of Panmungak, the North side's area of Panmunjom, at around 0815 on 19 February and exchanged greetings and talked with reporters from the South.

In connection with North-South summit talks, North Korean reporters generally were optimistic, saying: "If the upcoming round of talks brings fruition, such talks can take place easily." Pak Chun-min, an editorial writer for MINJU CHOSON, said, however: "The South must release Yim Su-kyong, Rev. Mun Ik-hwan, and other people who have been detained for their visits to North Korea to promote an atmosphere for such talks."

North Korean reporters also said: "The focal point of the talks will be the nuclear issue." They expressed their interest in the South Korean military's opinion by saying: "The South side is strongly insisting on a trial inspection because the South side's military is critical of the North-South agreement and denuclearization declaration, is it not?"

Asked whether Secretary Kim Chong-il would inherit the presidency early, NODONG SINMUN reporter Kim Kwang-chin said: "It has been said in South Korea that Secretary Kim's appointment as supreme commander of the military is a violation of our constitution. This is an incorrect interpretation of our socialist constitution." He also said: "Secretary Kim exerts real power in all domains. Therefore, the early transfer of the presidency is not necessary."

Spokesman Answers Reporters' Questions

SK1902063692 Seoul YONHAP in English 0611 GMT
19 Feb 92

[Text] Pyongyang, Feb. 19 (OANA-YONHAP)—South Korea hopes for an early agreement with North Korea on the formation and operation of a Joint Nuclear Control Committee (JNCC), Yi Tong-pok, spokesman for the Seoul delegation to the sixth round of inter-Korean high-level talks, said here Wednesday.

In a briefing that followed ceremonies effectuating three inter-Korean agreements, Yi said the two sides should sign a JNCC agreement before the Southern delegation left for Seoul.

Following are questions and answers between Yi and some of the 80 journalists at the press conference.

[Reporter] Among the various topics in the agreements that went into effect today, the issues of nonaggression and arms control are deemed to be most crucial. What does South Korea plan to do concerning arms control?

[Yi Tong-pok] Article 12 in the inter-Korean Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation exemplifies measures on arms control through military confidence-building. Such issues will be discussed at the military subcommittee and military committee which will be formed soon. We hope they will

be formed at the earliest possible date. Especially, we hope the military committee will be formed in April, although the deadline is set for May 19.

[Reporter] What are the relations between the military subcommittee and military committee?

[Yi] The military subcommittee will deal with practical matters on detailed issues in the inter-Korean agreement. The military committee will handle not only such issues but also various other military problems between South and North Korea. The subcommittee will continue to exist even if the military committee does its role.

[Reporter] The inter-Korean agreement did not pass the National Assembly in South Korea. Were there any internal problems?

[Yi] The agreement defines in its preamble that inter-Korean relations constitute a special provisional relationship geared to unification, not a bilateral relationship. In the South, the National Assembly ratifies treaties and agreements signed with other countries and the inter-Korean agreement does not belong to this category.

[Reporter] At the second round of inter-Korean high-level talks in Pyongyang, chief Southern delegate Kang Yong-hun said he could not make any decision on the proposal for nonaggression because the matter would require National Assembly ratification.

[Yi] At that time, we in the South tried to include in the agreement that both South and North Korea would abide by the United Nations Charter as U.N. members. If done so, the agreement might have become the object for National Assembly ratification, but the North then argued that such words should not be included in the agreement. There is a difference between our proposal made at the second round of talks and the agreement that has just gone into effect.

[Reporter] Are there no problems in the legal effects of the agreement even if it did not pass the National Assembly?

[Yi] All procedures have been completed as the two sides have fully taken steps for effectuation. North Korea has accepted the fact that we have completed internal procedures.

[Reporter] What do you think is the most difficult problem that remains to be solved at this time?

[Yi] There are problems concerning the formation of the three subcommittees and the schedule of the talks. But the most important thing is to adopt an agreement on the formation and operation of the joint nuclear control committee. We hope the issue will be resolved in tomorrow's session. If it is not resolved in the on-going talks, it will take a considerable time with all the contacts at (the truce village of) Panmunjom and the two prime ministers' signing. The agreement on JNCC should be signed before our delegation leaves Pyongyang at the latest.

[Reporter] What will be on the agenda at the seventh round of talks? What problems are likely to appear in the course of implementing the inter-Korean agreement on basic relations?

[Yi] The two prime ministers should sign and effectuate a subsequent accord to the agreement on basic relations because a liaison office, a military committee and an economic exchange and cooperation committee should all be established within three months from the effectuation of the agreement. It is difficult to predict problems that may emerge in the course of the agreement's implementation. Problems, if any, will be discussed at each subcommittee. It will not be easy to implement the agreement, but I am optimistic as the two sides have already produced the agreement itself.

No Tae-u Urges Forming Joint Nuclear Committee

*SK2102131892 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean
1100 GMT 21 Feb 92*

[Report by (Hong Song-kyu)]

[Text] After hearing a briefing on the results of the sixth round of the South-North high-level talks by a delegation that included Prime Minister Chong Won-sik, President No Tae-u rated the effectuation of the South-North agreement and other documents as a historic event of having taken the first step on a long national march toward peaceful reunification.

President No Tae-u, however, said that it is indeed regrettable that no progress at all has been made in the settlement of the separated families during the just-concluded talks and that it has once again greatly disappointed the 10 million separated families, and then noted that if North Korea remains indifferent to the humanitarian exchange, the question of economic cooperation will not be smooth.

President No Tae-u repeatedly stressed: Reaching an agreement between the South and North is important, but more important is for the two sides to be faithful to the agreement.

President No Tae-u continued: If the formation of the joint nuclear control committee, which is expected to be formed before 18 March, is delayed for one reason or another, North Korea will provoke a great misunderstanding.

He then instructed that since it will have a serious impact on the activities of other subcommittees, this point must be made clearer to the North Korean side in the next Panmunjom contact between the delegations which is scheduled for 27 February.

At the same time, President No Tae-u said that reunification will not be achieved right away simply because we rashly try to achieve it and that it can be achieved somewhat earlier when we patiently make an effort as part of a long national march. He urged the delegation to adhere to the fundamental posture of dealing with South-North relations flexibly in the future, based on unshaken principle.

POLAND

CIS, Polish Generals Clash Over Troop Withdrawal
PM1102165692 Wroclaw GAZETA ROBOTNICZA in Polish 27 Jan 92 pp 1-2

[“CH” report: “Generals Clash: Dubynin Versus Ostrowski”]

[Excerpts] Yesterday afternoon a vast edifice situated in downtown Legnica and previously used to host the so-called Soviet Army Officers Center was finally restored to Polish ownership. With full observance of the required protocol, Viktor Dubynin, commander of the Soviet troops in Poland, formally turned over the facility in question to Andrzej Glapinski, voivoda of Legnica, who in turn transferred it to the care of Wroclaw Metropolitan Bishop Cardinal Henryk Gulbinowicz. [passage omitted]

Later, a press conference was held for Polish and foreign correspondents. During the conference a particularly sharp exchange took place between General Dubynin and General Zdzislaw Ostrowski, the Polish Republic's government plenipotentiary for the Soviet Forces Northern Group's stay in and withdrawal from Poland. General Dubynin accused the press (including *GAZETA ROBOTNICZA*) and “certain politicians” of publishing “non-objective” information on his troops' withdrawal. “If you continue to placidly accept such disinformation,” General Dubynin warned, “one day you will wake up and find the Soviet troops gone.” At the beginning of 1989 there were 58,000 personnel of the Soviet Forces Northern Group stationed in Poland. Since the launching of the withdrawal process, 23,000 troops have left Poland; in the fourth quarter of 1991 alone, 1,740 railroad truckloads of equipment left Poland, as did 266 tanks. General Dubynin stressed that the Russian troops continued to leave Poland despite the failure to sign the final agreements on the matter. By 15 November 1992 all combat units will have left Poland, and all the payments owed to the Polish side for the troops' transit from Germany will have been paid.

In reply, General Ostrowski expressed surprise that there was a need to call the press conference at all. He also questioned the procedure whereby the Officers Center was handed over to the Polish side. “You cannot officially transfer a facility which you only leased from the legal owners,” he said. As regards the numbers of troops being withdrawn, General Ostrowski pointed out that the border guard services could only record the numbers of troops crossing the border by land routes, whereas additional troops could be leaving the country by air or sea routes. There were no border crossing control posts at the airports used by the Russians. This was the reason for the discrepancies in the reported numbers of troops leaving the country. Unless the Soviet Forces Northern Group volunteered the information themselves, the

numbers would be reported according to the figures available to Polish observers.

The Russian side owes Poland huge sums for the lease of premises, for the transportation of troops, and for the power and food supplied to the forces stationed here. In reply to Dubynin's accusation that the Polish side was deliberately delaying the financial settlement of accounts for the costs of stationing the Soviet Forces Northern Group in Poland, General Ostrowski commented at length on the matter, stressing the Polish side's readiness to negotiate the many contentious issues and to settle the whole matter fairly and squarely.

General Dubynin declared that by 1994 the last soldiers of the Soviet Forces Northern Group will have left Poland. He also asked for two to three months in which to repay the debts. “Do not play up those millions—no, billions,” he corrected himself—“which we owe you. After World War II we fed you, which also cost us billions, and no one claimed credit or asked to be repaid for that help.”

The conference was conducted in a tense atmosphere. General Dubynin insisted that the decision to leave a 6,000-strong group of the military in Poland in 1993 to service the transit of troops did stem from his mistrust of the Polish Government or people, but from the fact that there will be 250,000 tonnes of stocks waiting to be transported out of the country and also that it would be necessary to provide communications links for the troops withdrawing from Germany. Finally, both generals appealed to the reporters present to show integrity and objectivity in their accounts of the meeting.

Transport Official Interviewed on Soviet Pullout
AU1902202792 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 13 Feb 92 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Witold Chodakiewicz, vice minister of transportation and the maritime economy, by Roman Przeciszewski; place and date not given: “Behind the Scenes of Negotiations”]

[Text] [Przeciszewski] In a *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* interview several days ago, Colonel General Viktor Dubynin, commander of the former Soviet Army Northern Group of Forces still stationed in Poland, discussed the transit of the Western Group of Forces from Germany via Poland. He accused the Polish delegation, and therefore you, since you belonged to it, of “inexplicable stubbornness,” and political opportunism.

[Chodakiewicz] Instead of commenting, I will cite facts that have been little known until now. When the FRG and former USSR agreed about the pullout of Soviet forces from the territory of the former GDR, they forgot that Poland lies between Germany and the Soviet Union. We learned later that the Soviet side had pledged to brief us on the issue. However, they continued to think in the old way and believed that one way or another they would succeed in imposing some optimum solution on Poland

on the basis of former documents. Of course we could not agree to that. Previous agreements between Poland and the USSR concluded between 1956 and 1958 concern only transport of supplies; therefore they could not possibly be applied to the evacuation of the biggest army in Europe. Ministers Skubiszewski and Makarczyk made that very plain. In this situation, the Soviet side proceeded to negotiate with us.

[Przeciszewski] As far as I know, these negotiations encountered a major obstacle right at the start. Apparently Poland wanted to make the transit of Soviet forces from Germany conditional upon the pullout of the Northern Group of Forces from Poland, but the Soviet Union disagreed. Is that true?

[Chodakiewicz] Yes. We said at the very outset that as long as Poland is not treated as an independent country, there is no possibility of a transit of Soviet forces through our country.

[Przeciszewski] General Dubynin reckons that as a result, Poland forfeited around 4 billion marks.

[Chodakiewicz] There are certain things that cannot be calculated in zlotys, rubles, or marks. There are things of supreme importance for every country. The government's opinion that the pullout of Soviet forces from Poland is more important than the transit of forces from Germany is part of the Polish *raison d'état*. There is no political scheming hidden behind that.

[Przeciszewski] Later there were several instances of transports of the Western Group of Forces being detained by us. Was that necessary?

[Chodakiewicz] Please remember that the supply transports that were previously reported to the Polish Army General Staff, and the management of Polish State Railways passed through Poland without any hindrance. However, we did detain trains that had not been previously reported and that carried false registration numbers. One of these trains got as far as Tucholice. We even discussed the possible steps we could take with the interior minister, but because the trains contained the families of soldiers, we adopted a humanitarian approach and abandoned official procedures.

On another occasion, a Russian military transport from Germany got as far as Szczecin and was turned back. I was in Moscow at the time, attending international talks. General Kleymenev, deputy chief of staff, and General Dubynin asked me to let the train through. I contacted Warsaw and said we should let that transport pass through Poland. We did not mean to seal our border, but to demonstrate that we are a sovereign country and that decisions in this sphere should be left to us.

[Przeciszewski] That is the precise moment people began to say that these transports did not have to pass through Poland at all, and that if Poland did not want to earn any money from these transports, other countries certainly would want to do so.

[Chodakiewicz] Do not forget that there is no better route than Poland. The Czechs could offer only one route, an inconvenient one with restraints on the number of trains and cars and on axle weight. It is no coincidence that a major part of the Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia left that country via Poland. Last year there was yet another route—by sea. The German railways transported Western Group of Forces personnel and equipment free of charge to three ports, from where they were shipped to Klaipeda in Soviet ferries. However, political conditions have changed. Lithuania has declared independence and assumed a major portion....

[Przeciszewski] But Poland was blamed for the initial delays in withdrawing the Soviet Army from Germany. Is that surprising?

[Chodakiewicz] When we grew determined and made the transit through Poland of the forces stationed in Germany conditional upon the pullout of the forces stationed in Poland, the Soviet side launched a propaganda offensive in Germany and in the USSR. That is all history now. Last April we agreed that in a situation where talks on the pullout of Soviet forces have reached an advanced stage, the transit of forces may take place according to generally accepted international principles.

[Przeciszewski] What principles?

[Chodakiewicz] Transportation charges are based on the international transportation tariff that applies to the whole of Europe. This tariff is the point of departure for all talks on the subject of the Soviet pullout, and served as a point of departure on this occasion, too. Representatives of Polish State Railways agreed with the former Soviet Ministry of Transportation on a rate of 0.71 Swiss francs per kilometer. That was a decent rate, considering the fact that the trains were virtually empty in the return direction. Apart from that, transit shipments were restricted mainly to supplies, and there were up to two trains travelling through Poland per 24-hour period.

[Przeciszewski] Let me ask you again. Did we earn any money from these transports, or did we lose, as General Dubynin claims?

[Chodakiewicz] General Dubynin is the last person who should talk about losses. He has not even paid for his transports last year, and the sum of money involved is not trivial. He still owes us 28 million Swiss francs for military transports from Poland to Russia and vice versa, 7.7 million francs for the transit of forces from the CSFR to Russia, 2.1 million francs for the transit of forces from Russia to the FRG, and almost 2 million francs for the deployment of a special passenger train. That makes a total of about 40 million Swiss francs!

[Przeciszewski] What will the Russians pay for shipping their troops out of Germany?

[Chodakiewicz] We met representatives of the Western Group of Forces in Gdansk on 4-6 February, and we agreed to maintain the rate of 0.71 Swiss francs per

kilometer if we let through two trains a day. However, if there are more trains, we will reduce the rate to 0.585 francs per kilometer. The Germans have pledged to cooperate with us, and the money we are owed will be paid via the German Railways. Money transfers will not take longer than six weeks, which is excellent considering the fact that documents used to take three months to get from one place to another.

[Przeciszewski] Why do you think General Dubynin accused you of political opportunism?

[Chodakiewicz] Opportunism? In that case, how would one explain the fact that last year, despite our difficult economic situation, we exempted so-called humanitarian transports to the Soviet Union, worth \$1 million, from all charges? Our principle is to maintain the best possible relationships with the countries of the former USSR, and this is visible at every state. Vice Minister Suvorov, my counterpart in the Russian Ministry of Transportation, and I are succeeding in solving really difficult problems.

[Przeciszewski] I beg your pardon, but that almost sounds hard to believe. In Moscow PRAVDA, General Dubynin spoke about a deadlock in Polish-Russian talks. What is the truth?

[Chodakiewicz] I have already noticed the differences between what General Dubynin says and what other members of the Soviet negotiating team say. His dislike of Poland is well known. We have never played tit for tat, because we are concerned with honest, tactful talks, involving prospects for future cooperation. Yet the commander of the Northern Group of Forces guides himself purely by his own personal values. He did not attend the Moscow ceremony initialing the agreement on the pullout of Soviet forces, even though he attended the talks the previous day.

[Przeciszewski] Might that affect the entire process of Polish-Russian talks?

[Chodakiewicz] I should tell you what the talks are about. There is not the slightest problem with the transit of Soviet forces out of Germany, and a date for the pullout of the Northern Group of Forces from Poland has been set. Therefore, there is only one subject left to discuss, financial matters concerning the assets left behind by the Soviet forces. It is necessary to add up Poland's costs and Russia's costs and draw up a balance sheet, but General Dubynin is clearly afraid of that. Why does he not want any assessment to be made of the environmental damage in Poland caused by the Russian forces? General Dubynin's mouth is full of empty phrases.

Sometimes it looks as if he is still living in the time of martial law. He would like to extend the martial law era, but when he fails to do so, he creates all kinds of trouble. Nevertheless, General Dubynin will not succeed in spoiling Poland's relations with Russia. History cannot be turned back now.

[Przeciszewski] General Dubynin is also aiming blows at your ministry. He claims it is not possible to pull his forces out any faster because the technical capabilities of Polish State Railways prohibit it.

[Chodakiewicz] That is surely a misunderstanding. The Polish State Railways possess an enormous potential because while we were still in the Warsaw Pact, our country possessed the role of a supply infrastructure. I do not think there is any other country so well equipped with the ways and means to transport military men and equipment. Yet all this is despite our will and paid for out of our own money. If General Dubynin wants, I can immediately give him 60,000 railway carriages that are standing idle this very minute.

[Przeciszewski] General Dubynin is also the Russian Government's plenipotentiary for the pullout of the Northern Group of Forces from Poland. Do you not think that whatever he says may be considered the official stance of his government?

[Chodakiewicz] General Dubynin occupies a serious post that exerts influence on our relations, but we do manage to agree with the Russians despite the difficulties. This is not easy, but it does provide results. To illustrate the Polish authorities' alleged attitude toward the Northern Group of Forces, General Dubynin quoted the saying whereby even a monkey can catch a dead lion by the tail. Listening to what he says, another saying comes to mind—the dogs are barking, but the caravan continues on its way.

GAZETA WYBORCZA Claims Soviet Troop Withdrawal Halted

LD2002121692 Warsaw PAP in English 1202 GMT
20 Feb 92

[Text] Warsaw, Feb. 20—Not even one Soviet soldier has left Poland since last September when the pullout of former red army troops from Poland was halted. Moscow has also stopped to withdraw the military equipment of its army. Soldiers and equipment from liquidated (Soviet) units are transported to larger garrisons in Poland instead to the former Soviet Union, GAZETA WYBORCZA reported on Thursday [20 February]. According to the paper only supply transports leave Poland. Last January 71 such transports, that is 81 per cent of the planned number, which carried combat and personnel carriers, radiolocation stations and trucks, headed for the former Soviet Union.

In January the first operational transport was supposed to leave Poland but it was cancelled by the Soviet side for unknown reasons, GAZETA WYBORCZA said. However, according to PAP information the transport left the northern garrison of Borne-Sulinowo in mid-February.

GAZETA quotes Colonel Stefan Golebiowski, spokesman for the plenipotentiary for stationing Soviet troops in Poland, as saying that the Soviet side, despite numerous promises, had not provided yet a timetable for

the withdrawal of former red army troops. "We are informed about handing over a Soviet army building to Polish authorities or pulling out a unit only when General Dubinin (commander of the Soviet troops in Poland) thinks it right," the colonel complained.

Under the agreement of October 1991, all combat units of the former red army are to leave Poland by November 15, 1992. A few thousand soldiers from logistics units are to remain by the end of 1993 to supervise the transit of Soviet troops from Germany.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Brazil, Argentina Seek Changes to Tlatelolco Treaty

PY1502223292 Rio de Janeiro *O GLOBO*
in Portuguese 15 Feb 92 p 4

[Text] Brasilia—Brazil and Argentina have sent to the Organization for the Proscription of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America [Opanal—which functions as a secretariat of the Tlatelolco Treaty in Mexico and controls the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean—a joint statement with proposals to change that document. One of the amendments to the Tlatelolco Treaty involves improving the system of information supplied by the signatory countries in order

to prevent the duplication of explanations already given to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The statement was sent to Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari, who will chair the Opanal conference that will be held to mark the 25th anniversary of the treaty.

In the text, President Carlos Menem and President Fernando Collor reiterate the actions of the two countries in the field of nuclear control such as the creation of the Brazilian-Argentine Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials Agency [Agencia Brasil-Argentina de Contabilidade e Controle de Materiais Nucleares], the agreement on safeguards, and compliance with the rules outlined in the Tlatelolco Treaty.

INDIA**U.S. ABM's Seen Countering Third World Missiles***BK1002131292 Delhi PATRIOT in English**1 Feb 92**p 1*

[Article by Cecil Victor under "Analysis" column entitled:
ABM: Pointer of True intent]

[Text] In the midst of the euphoria generated by announcements of nuclear arsenal reductions between the U.S. and Russia and American troop withdrawals from Europe, the meaning of the redefinition of the roles of remaining weapons technology is being overlooked.

The emergence of the Commonwealth of Independent States has become a new excuse to impose discriminatory conditionalities on new emerging nations, including those like India that have a mature nuclear energy programme but no weapons.

Yet, the extent of discrimination is only vaguely appreciated. It is only an analysis of why the U.S. wants the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to die a natural death in 1992 that a truer picture of what is intended for the world will emerge.

(The Anti-Ballistic Missile system is meant to knock out enemy nuclear warhead-tipped missiles in a shield mode to allow oneself the opportunity to launch one's own missiles in retaliation. The deployment of the system was banned by treaty between the erstwhile Soviet Union and the U.S.).

(The Patriot system which was deployed in Israel to counter the Iraqi Scud missiles was one of the forms of ABM. Refinements lead to longer range interception leading further to the realm of Star Wars in which a nuclear tipped missile can be destroyed a few minutes after launch causing destruction to the home country itself. The missile can also be intercepted in space before it re-enters the atmosphere or, as a last resort over one's own territory but the consequences of that will be far worse than what Israel suffered even after intercepting the Iraqi Scuds)

The U.S., while cutting down on its arsenal, is bent on pursuing the Star Wars programme even though the Soviet Union, the main enemy, has disappeared. And therein lies a tale. The new logic for the continuation of the programme is that many Third World nations have acquired missile technology. High on the list is India.

It so happens that Israel too has an ABM programme which is in an advanced stage and there has been U.S. collaboration in the project. By bringing the concept of anti-ballistic missile defence into legitimacy the U.S., is, in effect, underscoring the regional pre-eminence of its protege in West Asia.

The West Asia peace talks have already demonstrated how weighted is the diplomatic leverage in favour of Israel and against Palestinians in particular and Arabs in general. The emergence of an ABM system in West Asia will tilt the balance of forces irrevocably in favour of Israel.

In the final analysis, the ABM system is a counter to the emergence of missile technology in the Third World. Taken in conjunction with Star Wars, it opens up a scenario of devastatingly accurate surgical strikes against nations that have the temerity of deploying their missiles against any of the U.S. hegemonies in any region.

In this context, studies by U.S. arms manufacturers portraying India as the next likely target after Iraq are no exercises of an idle mind.

ISREAL**Syria Said To Reject U.S. Regional Arms Control Proposals***92P40128Z Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew**5 Feb 92 pp 1-2*

[Excerpt] Syrian Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shar', at a conference of nonaligned foreign ministers in Larnaca, said yesterday that the Arabs will not accept American proposals on arms control in the Middle East. In his words, the proposals tilt toward Israel and harm vital security interests for the Arabs. He demanded that Israel first dismantle its nuclear weapons in the framework of each arms control initiative.

In his speech, Faruq al-Shar' attacked Western countries as a whole because of their support for Israel's acquisition of nonconventional weapons of every type while the Arabs are still prevented from arming themselves with weapons of mass destruction. He claimed that the Arabs need weapons for purposes of self-defense. Al-Shar' said it is inconceivable that the West can allow Israel to be armed with nonconventional weapons while at the same time Israel is settling in the territories and refuses to withdraw from them.

Similarly, Syrian commentators said yesterday that the Arabs will not sit idly by while nuclear weapons are in Israel's hands. Syrian television commentator Yahya al-'Aridi said that "Israel is not the only country which has nonconventional weapons" and that it should be cautious in this regard when carrying out a policy of force toward the Arabs. He pointed out that the borders Israel determined for itself following the Six-Day War, which it considers to be secure, will not be immune to missiles in the hands of the Arabs. If war breaks out in the future, it will be more destructive than all past wars. [passage omitted]

RESPONSE TO BUSH, YELTSIN INITIATIVES

Kravchuk: Yeltsin Failed To Consult on Arms

PM0602093192 Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian
4 Feb 92 Morning Edition p 2

[ITAR-TASS report on interview with Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk by LA STAMPA; place and date not given: "Yeltsin Did Not Consult With Me," Ukrainian President Stated Apropos Russian President's New Disarmament Initiatives"]

[Excerpt] The Italian newspaper LA STAMPA has published an interview with Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk under the headline "Russian Disarmament Does Not Concern Us." Speaking about the Russian president's initiatives in the field of disarmament, he stated in particular:

[Kravchuk] Yeltsin did not consult with me, he acted autonomously. His decisions are provoking considerable concern here and are giving rise to serious questions. First: He stated that strategic missiles no longer are targeted on America and the West. The question arises: On whom are they now targeted? We would like to know what the new targets are. Second: On the issue of space-based defense [kosmicheskaya obrona] with the United States, the question arises: Against whom will this be directed? Against France, Britain, or the Ukraine? Third: Whereas we decided to establish a national army, Russia did not. The strategic weapons belong to the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS]. So how can the Russian president cut weapons he does not have? I fully agree with the cuts in principle, but it is essential to discuss everything with everybody, and not act unilaterally. We will talk about all this at the meeting of CIS heads of state in Minsk on 14 February.

[LA STAMPA] What problems will you raise?

[Kravchuk] First: Why is Yeltsin speaking on our behalf without consulting us? This is not right. Second: Before taking any initiative affecting the other republics, he should discuss it with us; only then may he go public with it. I do not recognize facts accomplished. I do not recognize the things he stated and discussed at that time. Our strategic potential may not be very great, but it is not up to him to decide its fate. The Ukraine has its own policy: To eliminate all tactical nuclear weapons by this June and all strategic weapons in the course of 1994, thus achieving nonnuclear status. [Kravchuk ends] [passage omitted]

Velikhov Explains Yeltsin Proposals

MK0602111592 Moscow *MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS* in Russian 5 Feb 92 p 1

[Interview with Ye. Velikhov, Russian presidential counselor, at the United Nations in New York by MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS special correspondent Ravil

Zaripov; date not given: "Friendship Is Friendship, But Warheads Are Something Else. What Is Mutual Defense"—first two paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] A key point in Russian President Boris Yeltsin's statement at the UN Security Council session was his proposal to form a global world defense system. "It could be based on reorienting the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative and using advanced technologies developed by Russia's defense complex."

Our special correspondent Ravil Zaripov met Academician Yevgeniy Velikhov, the Russian president's counselor, at the UN building and asked him to comment on the president's initiative.

[Velikhov] I think that it is a question of our coming to the negotiating table and being able to agree among ourselves what is rational and what is irrational. The situation in the world has changed. When we were suspicious of one another and were preparing destruction within half an hour, any kind of defense was destabilizing. If we are now coming to a point where we become allies and cease targeting one another, mutual defense is sensible then. But there is the question of what kind of defense.

If we are talking about ground-based defense, this should be discussed, and we have been successful in this area. We are now advertising for sale the once-secret S-300 system developed by Academician Bunkin.

The situation with space is different. I think that the use of monitoring and joint early warning of the possible appearance of a delivery vehicle in the atmosphere, let alone in space, is very useful. There is indeed a paradoxical situation now: Russia itself no longer has an early-warning system since many of the elements of the system are located in other independent states. Thus this system has already become an international one, and it is worth developing it to full international status.

If we are talking about putting weapons into space, I take a negative view of this. As of 1983, for almost 10 years now, we scientists and parliamentarians have been restraining the military from putting weapons in space. Incidentally, Boris Nikolayevich's proposals talk about destroying all antisatellite weapons. This proposal should go hand in hand with a corresponding treaty.

[Zaripov] But if we destroy antisatellite weapons, the above system will be only a warning and not a defense system. Yet ground-based weapons [sredstva] are not that effective.

[Velikhov] Why do you think that? Ground-based systems have long since proved their limited, but definite capabilities. Space-based weapons have as yet demonstrated nothing. In my view, we should refrain from developing a space-based system. It is not only a question of cost. It is always hard to tell when we start filling

a new medium with weapons how this will end. One can see very well today how hard it is to get rid of weapons on land, in the air, and at sea. We have produced 100 times more weapons than we need and we are now confronted with the question of how to destroy them. Many countries today are in practice capable of putting installations into space, and if we start putting weapons into space we will not be able to straighten it out [razobratsya] later. Mutual mistrust among nations will increase.

[Zaripov] The British have said that they cannot cut back strategic nuclear weapons, abiding by the principle of reasonable sufficiency. Did you take part in those conversations?

[Velikhov] I spoke to Boris Nikolayevich about this and told him that his reaction was the right one. At this stage events should not be complicated. We can agree with the British and let them think it out for themselves.

[Zaripov] Is this a political decision or the effective state of affairs?

[Velikhov] There are differing views even within Britain. My view is that Britain does not need the Poseidons or Tridents at all. In my view, there is a somewhat different question here. There is still a political aspect to this—the fight for the title of nuclear power and permanent member of the Security Council.

[Zaripov] You may think my question couched in the Cold War spirit, but are we not losing our political image and clout in the international arena by embarking on global cuts?

[Velikhov] From the viewpoint of common sense, we are not saying that we will cut weapons to zero. However, one must bear in mind here that given the real situation neither Britain, nor we, nor the United States can use nuclear weapons. These weapons are needed to ensure that some country cannot terrorize and put political pressure on the world community. That is, they are needed until a reasonable world order is established and emotions subside. It is hard to predict. Perhaps nuclear weapons will become extinct all of a sudden. Today there is consensus that some level of weaponry is needed. We are suggesting 2,000-2,500 warheads. I think that there could be even fewer if they were correctly structured. The Americans still do not agree with this. They are suggesting something in the region of 4,700 warheads. It is no coincidence that I am talking about warheads rather than missiles, because a state of stability is defined by an equal number of warheads. And we need to move in this direction.

Further Reaction on Yeltsin, Bush Proposals

Navy Chief Compares Initiatives

*LD0502190592 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1705 GMT 5 Feb 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Roman Zadunayskiy and Andrey Naryshkin]

[Text] Moscow, 5 Feb (TASS)—“The January disarmament initiatives by the Russian and U.S. Presidents are directed toward radically reducing nuclear confrontation, and I think that such steps are both right and sensible,” Admiral of the Fleet Vladimir Chernavin, commander of the Commonwealth of Independent States Navy, declared today at a briefing for Russian and foreign journalists.

He pointed out that “while the possibility of military conflict remains, such radical changes in the Armed Forces must be carefully weighed and planned, and the economic consequences must be assessed.”

The admiral pointed to the substantial difference in the Russian and U.S. presidents’ approaches to disarmament problems. Russia’s principled stance amounts to observing the need for the complete destruction of all nuclear arsenals through gradual and parity-based reductions. The U.S. stance is different. “In essence, the question is: If the Commonwealth of Independent States abolishes all land-based ballistic missiles with multiple warheads (MIRVs)—and that, unlike the United States, is the basis of our strategic forces—then Washington will carry out a number of individual measures to reduce its strategic offensive weapons development programs,” the admiral explained.

As for the problems of the Black Sea Fleet, Vladimir Chernavin noted that he “could not call successful” the talks on its fate. He went on to say that the question of transferring the Black Sea Fleet’s main base and splitting it up had not been posed. As part of the Commonwealth’s strategic forces, the Fleet must be ready to ensure the security of all the independent states. “This does not mean that Ukraine cannot have its own naval forces, and we are ready to help with resolving the practical tasks involved in creating them,” the admiral emphasized.

As far as the oath of allegiance is concerned, to date, about 90 percent of young recruits for the Black Sea Fleet have voluntarily taken the oath of loyalty to the Commonwealth of Independent States. Most of the sailors are Ukrainians, Vladimir Chernavin stressed.

The commander of the Commonwealth of Independent States Navy noted the constructive and principled position of Russian deputies with regard to the fate of the Black Sea Fleet, and their help with resolving this complex problem at an interparliamentary level.

Military Spokesman Comments

*LD0502100292 Moscow TASS in English
0940 GMT 5 Feb 92*

[By ITAR-TASS military writer Andrey Naryshkin]

[Text] Moscow February 5 TASS—“A perspective, unordinary and audacious moves” are the latest disarmament

initiatives of Russian President Boris Yeltsin, according to a Commonwealth military spokesman. [sentence as received]

The idea of creating a global anti-missile defence system, which was discussed by the Russian and U.S. Presidents in Camp David, is very interesting, Valeriy Manilov told TASS on Wednesday [4 February]. If implemented, it can give better world security guarantees than any other national programme, including the U.S. SDI initiative. "In case the U.S. and CIS strategic missiles, after their bilateral equal cuts, are no longer aimed at each other's cities and peaceful targets, if all the nuclear states will agree to drastically cut their nuclear arms until their complete elimination, the world will become a better and safer place for all", Manilov said.

But time is needed to make this large-scale political initiative a reality, according to the spokesman. "The search for concrete forms of implementing the moves, of their legal grounds and of verification mechanisms will be carried out at negotiations of all levels—from heads of state to military experts", Manilov said.

The CIS main military command and the general headquarters are thoroughly studying the U.S. peace proposals at present, Manilov disclosed. "An all-round and objective assessment of the proposed U.S. nuclear arms cuts should precede any decisions", but the assessment is sure to be influenced by the fact that the United States is no longer viewed as an enemy, but as a partner and a country with which "we shall, evidently, join efforts in creating a new global defence system, based on the priority of political means and trust", the spokesman said.

'Counter Plans' Compared

PM0402145592 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 31 Jan 92 p 3

[Observer Aleksandr Golts article under the "Topic of the Week" rubric: "Presidents Adopt Counter Plan—Arms Cuts"]

[Excerpts] Until today, I was firmly convinced that word collocations like "counter plan" and "heightened pledges" had disappeared from newspaper pages for ever. But here I am, writing them myself. I am fully justified in doing this. After all, now we are not talking about partner enterprises but about the presidents of the two great powers—the United States and Russia—adopting an actual "counter plan," and making "heightened pledges." In the matter of arms cuts. [passage omitted]

Of course, whatever the motivations behind the presidents' disarmament initiatives, they are guided by a desire to ensure more reliable security for their peoples. At the same time, when putting forward their own proposals and announcing unilateral steps, G. Bush and B. Yeltsin often pursue parallel policies in fact. First and foremost, this applies to the cessation of the production

and development [razrabotka] of expensive arms systems. Both presidents declared that work on new strategic missiles would be halted and the production or procurement of cruise missiles and strategic bombers will cease.

However, at the same time there is something else which cannot be ignored. The different domestic political situations and different status in the world have also determined the difference in the presidents' approaches to the most important questions of military policy. Take strategic arms, for example. Russia's position is this: We will reduce the number of such weapons on combat alert to the level stipulated in the START Treaty within just three years instead of the proposed seven.

The data cited by B. Yeltsin confirm that, contrary to Soviet tradition, this initiative is perfectly feasible. It appears that two-thirds of sea- and ground-launched missiles and just under one-third of the nuclear munitions scheduled for elimination were taken off combat alert within just six months. Russia intends to propose far more extensive cuts, aimed at leaving each side with no more than 2,000-2,500 warheads, at the forthcoming talks with Western leaders.

For his part, G. Bush intends to completely give up the MX missiles and replace the MIRVed warheads of "Minuteman" missiles with single warheads. There are also plans to cut back the number of warheads deployed at sea by one-third. Of course, the fact that Washington finally intends to cut state-of-the-art rather than obsolete technology can only be welcomed. However, let us not forget: These cuts which, according to my calculations, will leave the Pentagon with around 2,700 warheads on sea- and ground-launched missiles, will only be implemented by the United States if the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] states satisfy the conditions laid down by it. Washington demands the complete elimination of our land-based MIRVed missiles. In other words, the weapons which comprise the basis of our country's strategic defense potential. Bearing in mind that the Russian president is proposing to halt nuclear submarine combat patrols on a reciprocal basis, G. Bush's counter pledges are clearly inadequate.

Today, of course, there is no longer any question of our Armed Forces' being in a state of global confrontation with the United States. We do not need military might equivalent to that of America and, more importantly, we do not have the potential to achieve it. B. Yeltsin's initiatives are proof of truly radical changes in our military doctrine (we will not linger upon the inept word collocation "reasonable minimum sufficiency"). To call a spade a spade, we are putting an end to military rivalry with the United States not only on the level of political declarations but also in practical military activity.

However, it seems to me that this reorientation in military policy will not just entail political dividends, but will also engender serious problems, and not just in the technical sphere. In the new situation, the military

are entitled to demand from politicians both apartments and tolerable living conditions, as well as clear-cut strategic planning. After all, in a situation without an obvious potential adversary, it is necessary to be able to foresee potential dangers. I hope our political leaders will forgive me, but I am far from convinced that they possess the full capacity to cope precisely and rapidly—like their Washington counterparts—with a crisis like that in Iraq.

Analysts draw attention to yet another consequence of the reduction of the United States' and Russia's nuclear missile potential. As the might of the two giants is being cut back, the value of nuclear weapons at the disposal of other countries increases. This situation could stimulate further still certain regimes' ambitions to get hold of the nuclear death. Therefore, the Russian president's proposal to create an international agency to monitor all technological processes linked with the use of radioactive materials warrants close attention. Another important means of maintaining strategic stability in current conditions could be the development [razrabotka] and deployment by Russia and the United States of a global system of defense against nuclear attack to replace SDI (admittedly, the opinion of the Americans on this score has yet to be learned.)

Finally, the last and perhaps the most important aspect. The initiatives by Russia and the United States are very important. They will become the topic not only of the week but, I think, of the whole year. Of course, they will be closely studied in other countries' capitals, and will evidently be discussed at the Security Council. However, these initiatives require not just a simple approval but specific measures to cut back other countries' nuclear arsenals. Moreover, they will create preconditions for shaping a system of international security, already proposed by Moscow in the past. Bearing in mind the existence of a number of conflict situations in the world, including the complex relations between CIS states, the need for such a system is only too obvious today.

'Wholesale Disarmament' Resisted

PM0502122592 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
1 Feb 92 p 4

[By Tomas Kolesnichenko "View From Moscow" under the rubric "Now That The Cold War Is Over": "Question Left At Home"]

[Text] Leaders come up with staggering foreign policy initiatives whenever things are not going too well, to put it mildly, at home. This political axiom was confirmed again the other day. The U.S. and Russian presidents, whose ratings, according to a public opinion poll, are on the slide, exchanged new initiatives in the nuclear disarmament sphere, on a scale that would have been inconceivable before.

One need not bother to use the old analytical criteria, but, instead, cite a large selection of world press reactions, which include such epithets as "historic," "massive," "revolutionary," and so on and so forth. It has to be said that the radical reduction of nuclear arsenals fully merits them. There is also the fact that this topic is now at the center of world public attention, pushing all other issues into the background. And this is just the start. Today sees the meeting at Camp David, traditional capital of "personal diplomacy," where the leaders start to use one another's given names and talk in familiar terms. Let us hope "George" and "Bahrис" [original reflects conventional non-Russian pronunciation of Boris] have further surprises for us...

But for all the euphoria, it is hard to get rid of the slightly bitter aftertaste. Washington and Moscow are not playing on equal terms. The stakes in the game are also different. "They" are grappling with temporary difficulties (without the quotation marks we now place these words in), whereas "we" are fighting for survival. They have a minor recession, which is still enough to dent the President's prestige, while our economy is in free-fall, with no end in sight.. Washington is celebrating victory. But Moscow?

We have heard it at last (here it is—the moment of truth): "The cold war did not 'end,' it was won." That is what Bush said in his Congress address. Not so long ago they were telling us that there were neither winners nor losers in the cold war. Reagan said so. But there is no need to stand on ceremony anymore. Particularly now that, as Bush said, the United States "is able to stop making the sacrifices we had to make when we had a sworn enemy, the former superpower. Now we can get on with things at home and put right what needs to be put right." Bush praised the U.S. taxpayer, who, apparently, was the chief victim of the cold war, who bore the brunt of it, and therefore deserves the accolade.

But here is the paradox: All Bush has to do is adopt Yeltsin's "counterplan" and the heroic taxpayer will be even better off. Incidentally, this is pointed out by many observers. One of them in THE WASHINGTON POST actually writes: "The rivals from the Democratic Party and others will probably point out that Bush could secure more radical cuts—and faster ones—both in the nuclear arsenal and in the military budget as a whole." Why is he not doing so? Why does Washington's reaction to the Russian proposals remind us so much of days gone by? They are "interesting," "promising," "being studied"... no more than that. Finally, why are our proposals not being accepted, why will Washington not agree to wholesale disarmament, even though this is entirely possible from the military viewpoint, since there is no threat from the former USSR any more?

The U.S. strategic plan resides in the answers to these questions. America, which won the cold war, is prepared to pay to remain the sole superpower. Not just today, but on into the 21st century.

At the moment possession of nuclear weapons is the hallmark of a great power. The first in Europe to realize this was De Gaulle. Now Kravchuk and Nazarbayev have started to realize this. But that is not enough for superpower status. It requires a nuclear advantage. Washington will never accept, for example, the Russian president's proposals concerning sea-based missiles, because it has significant superiority there. Bush would not say that publicly, of course. In diplomatic language the rejection would go something like: The United States will keep a "reasonable sufficiency" of these missiles, ensuring the "requisite balance."

But, one might say, the classic example is the attitude toward the SDI program. One of Yeltsin's "surprises" was his declared willingness to embark on the joint development of a space defense system with the United States to replace the strategic defense initiative program. Moscow's proposal sounds very logical. Remember that even Reagan promised sincerely to share with us the successes in the creation of a "space shield." And that was in conditions of confrontation. Now that Russia and America are becoming partners this collaboration could be a very important element in the formation of the new world order.

However, scarcely anyone today takes Reagan's promises seriously, as one might expect. The idea of a new world order, based on cooperation between the two superpowers, is also undergoing a metamorphosis. Today U.S. security is based not on a nuclear balance, but on control of the nuclear forces of a Soviet Union which is disintegrating in an untidy manner. The danger stems not from our strength, but from our weakness. I am sure it is only a matter of time before the United States pulls out of the ABM treaty. That will happen as soon as it is ready to deploy SDI elements in space. But the motives are already in place: Protection against uncontrolled use of nuclear weapons from the territory of the former USSR.

That is why the U.S. Administration intends to top up budget appropriations for SDI in fiscal 1993 by at least \$1 billion, to bring the total sum to more than \$5 billion. That is on top of the \$1 billion increase in expenditure on SDI that was obtained last year as a result of the Patriot missile's successful actions.

I wonder how Russian diplomats and the leaders of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] will take all this. Of course, it is pointless to get involved in a space arms race, indeed we are not up to it. But there are political means, after all. Or are we going to remain silent and dance to the tune of the "elder brother," of the new "center," now shifted to Washington?

We could learn a lot from the SDI affair: Note that the United States really is cutting its military expenditure sharply. Above all, this is expenditure on the expensive upkeep of servicemen. But military production is being curtailed too. In other words, they are carrying out conversion, as we are. However, in their case it does not

lead to the destruction of the production and scientific potential, to a brain drain, involving people who are valuable to the nation. They are not being forced to switch to designing pressure cookers or refrigerators.

The fact that a foundation is being set up in the United States to recruit our nuclear scientists is highly indicative. There is not only the fear that they will go and work for, say, Iran or Libya, but a direct interest in their "brains," which will attract the very highest salaries. The SDI program also involves the creation of high technology programs for the 21st century and the preservation of an advanced and powerful production potential. And that is costly. But when a superpower needs a "victory," it will not balk at the price.

Against this background our wholesale conversion program—"seven-year plan in three years"—gives rise to many questions. Will it not cost us more than a sensible switch to less complex and progressive production? But, clearly, it is our destiny—"to catch and overtake America." This time we will overtake it in terms of disarmament, but what will that do for us?

As you can see, there are more questions than answers. Some of them will be clarified in the course of the president's trip. For example—how to survive when thousands of nuclear missiles in the CIS and the United States are aimed at one another.

The president left the main question at home: How to survive when these missiles are no more?

Other Nuclear Powers' Role Viewed

PM0502134792 Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian
1 Feb 92 Morning Edition p 5

[Report by Aleksandr Sychev: "The Nuclear Forces of Britain, France, and China Remain Inviolable"]

[Text] Britain, France, and China, members of the so-called "nuclear club," while welcoming the plans of the United States and Russia to radically reduce their nuclear arsenals, have nevertheless decisively rejected Russian President Boris Yeltsin's call to join in the disarmament process.

In principle, no other answer should have been expected. The stance of these three nuclear powers is well known, and its main features have undergone no substantial changes since the first nuclear systems entered into service. In response to Russia's call, spokesmen of these countries justified their objections in absolutely identical fashion, as if they had held preliminary consultations. The size of our arsenals cannot even be compared with those possessed by the United States and Russia and, consequently, our participation is premature, they declared.

According to available data, with the creation [sozdaniye] of the fourth "Trident" nuclear submarine, Britain will have approximately 130 sea-launched multicharge [mnogozaryadnyy] ballistic missiles in service.

Intermediate-range missiles on 14 launchers and about 400 airplanes capable of carrying nuclear bombs should be added to this. "This is an insignificant fraction, approximately one-fifteenth of the U.S. and Russian arsenals," British Prime Minister J. Major declared.

France has at its disposal 18 intermediate-range missiles, 40 tactical missile launchers, 96 ballistic missiles stationed on six submarines, and more than 200 airplanes capable of delivering nuclear bombs to their target.

Little is known of the Chinese arsenal. This sphere is closed to outside eyes by an impenetrable curtain of secrecy. However, the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies estimates China's nuclear forces as follows: Eight ballistic missiles with one warhead each (stationed on one "Xia" class submarine), and 60 intermediate-range missiles.

In his message to UN Secretary General B. Ghali, which outlines the main avenues of Russia's policy in the sphere of arms reduction and disarmament, B. Yeltsin points out in particular that China, Britain, and France should not remain on the sidelines and uncontrollably build up their offensive nuclear arsenals which could, in our president's opinion, destabilize the international situation in the future.

Of course, such a threat cannot be entirely ruled out. There is full justification for assuming, in view of these states' expressed intention to continue to improve and build up their arsenals, that they will ultimately have to resolve the problem. But it is also indisputable that both Russia and the United States, even with the proposed scale of disarmament, will possess for a long time to come forces adequate for maintaining stability.

I think that the Russian leadership harbored no illusions in appealing to the governments of these three nuclear powers. The aim was different—to give a signal that the current proposals from Washington and Moscow are viewed only as only the next phase. China, France, and Britain must perceive this long-term perspective and begin mentally preparing themselves today for the need to join in this process. By the way of a first step, in some experts' opinion, they could pledge not to exceed the fixed quantitative and possibly qualitative level of arms which might be agreed in the course of talks.

If it was indeed this goal that the Russian Government set itself in addressing London, Paris, and Beijing, then it should be admitted that it has achieved it. President F. Mitterrand, on an official visit to Oman, declared: "France will take part in discussions on disarmament problems with great pleasure as soon as the U.S. and Russian nuclear potentials are comparable with the French." China will, of course, take part in the process when the remaining members of the "club" halt the testing, production, and deployment of their nuclear weapons, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Duan Jin declared. Only Britain has kept silent, promising, however, to put pressure on its "G-7" partners on the issue of setting up a ruble stabilization fund.

Seen as Imperiling Deterrence

*PM0602111592 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 4 Feb 92 p 3*

[Article by Professor Dr. of Technical Sciences Lieutenant General Ye. Volkov, retired; "Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction Is Both Necessary and Possible, But... While Observing Certain Conditions"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] B. Yeltsin's statement and G. Bush's message to Congress have posed in a new way many key questions in the sphere of limiting and reducing arms. Although, in principle, the proposals of both Russia and the United States have been set forth quite clearly, their practical realization will undoubtedly give rise to serious problems. Hero of Socialist Labor Ye. Volkov, military scientist, discusses some of them in his article.

The recent initiatives of the Russian and U.S. presidents have once again drawn public attention to strategic offensive arms—the most powerful and complex type of modern weapons. The use of strategic offensive arms in a military conflict would threaten every living thing on earth. Therefore the desire to reduce and maybe even eliminate them altogether is perfectly valid and understandable. However, there is also another side to the coin. While any threat whatever of military conflicts in the future remains, all changes in armed forces, including reductions in their armaments, must be carefully assessed and weighed.

Modern strategic offensive arms embrace three components: ground-launched ICBM's, submarine-launched ballistic missiles [SLBM's], and heavy bombers. Both the missiles and the bombers can carry several nuclear charges each. The table cites data characterizing the strategic offensive arms of both sides as of the time the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms was signed in 1991:

	ICBM's		SLBM's	
	Number of Missiles	Number of Warheads	Number of Missiles	Number of Warheads
USSR	1,398	6,612	940	2,804
United States	1,000	2,450	672	5,760
		Heavy Bombers		Total
	Number of Aircraft	Number of Charges	Number of Carriers	Number of Charges
	162	855	2,500	10,271
USSR	574	2,353	2,246	10,563

According to generally accepted views, strategic offensive arms are not a means of waging war but one of the most important means of preventing it. To prevent war from being unleashed against some state, that state must be able to inflict unacceptable damage on an aggressor—in other

words, the armed forces of a given state must be capable of resolving the task of deterrence in a guaranteed manner under any conditions. For obvious reasons (peculiarities of location, existence of allies, possession of military bases, etc.) the potentials of the Armed Forces of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] and the United States, for example, for resolving the task of deterrence are far from identical. Whereas the United States can inflict substantial damage on the Commonwealth states with the help of nonnuclear means, strategic offensive arms are the only possible means of influence for us. I wish at once to make a proviso. Both we and the United States are ceasing to consider each other probable enemies. But as long as the strategic offensive arms of both sides remain targeted on Russian and U.S. installations respectively, it seems to me that further arguments are not only of a theoretical nature.

In accordance with our well known pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, the only way to utilize strategic offensive arms is to use them in retaliatory operations. This is why, in the event of war being unleashed, the destruction of our strategic offensive arms will be the enemy's most important task.

In general, action against strategic offensive arms in the course of combat operations can include the use of conventional means during the nonnuclear period of a war, the use of nuclear means at the stage of nuclear war, and the mobilization of ABM systems. Varying assessments are made of the number of charges needed to resolve the task of deterrence. Most frequently, however, it is measured in hundreds of charges. This is considerably fewer than exist, as we have seen. It follows from this that most of them (of the order of 90 percent) are not needed at all to fulfill a combat task and might be needed only to compensate for possible losses in the event of an attack. Hence the possibility in principle of very deep reductions in strategic offensive arms, but only if an obligatory condition is observed—a simultaneous reduction in their possible losses. In this connection decisive significance attaches to the question of what the losses depend on and how they can be reduced.

Losses of strategic offensive arms in a conventional war will mainly be determined by the operation of high-accuracy aircraft weapons. As the war in the Persian Gulf showed, arms of this type have attained a very high level in the United States and other NATO countries and are continuing to be improved. Consequently, losses of strategic offensive arms can be substantial even during a nonnuclear period of war.

In a nuclear war possible losses of strategic offensive arms are determined mainly by the characteristics of the other side's ballistic missiles. The fact that high accuracy MX ICBM's and Trident II SLBM's with powerful combat equipment have entered the arsenal and been introduced into the grouping of strategic weapons has sharply enhanced its potential. Even after their reduction, as envisaged by the Treaty on Strategic Offensive

Arms, and the implementation of G. Bush's latest initiatives U.S. ballistic missiles will be able to hit a considerable number of highly hardened targets by the year 2000. It also should not be forgotten that, whereas the French and British strategic missiles do not at present pose any special threat to our strategic offensive arms because of their relatively low numbers and poor characteristics, such a threat could emerge in the future, after modernization.

Thus we should conclude that the development of arms systems in the United States and other NATO countries is still objectively aimed at increasing losses of our strategic offensive arms in the event of a military conflict.

But what of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms, concluded in 1991? Does it not, probably, improve the situation in a sphere of interest to us? The treaty provides for a reduction in the number of charges on each side's strategic offensive arms to 6,000 units. This is considerably more than is required to fulfill the task of deterrence, and so the treaty would in no way hinder its fulfillment if... if, when it was concluded, care had been taken to ensure that possible losses of strategic offensive arms had been reduced accordingly. However, this was not done.

The treaty is not associated at all with a reduction in conventional arms, and so everything that was said about losses of strategic offensive arms during the non-nuclear period of a war remains in force. Moreover, if conventional arms are not reduced in conformity with the reduction in strategic offensive arms, losses from them will even increase.

Let us add to this that some of the treaty's provisions are aimed at lowering the combat potential of our strategic offensive arms. An example of this is provided by the fact that a ceiling has been set on the number of warheads on ICBM's and SLBM's at 4,900 units, or approximately 82 percent of their total number. In 1991 this percentage stood at more than 91 percent for our strategic offensive arms. Thus, the proportion of ballistic missiles, which are precisely the main weapons of deterrence, in our country's strategic offensive arms must be reduced appreciably. G. Bush's new proposals change nothing here. Moreover, their implementation is made dependent on the CIS' abandonment of MIRVed ICBM's, which are one of the main components of our strategic offensive arms.

As regards possible losses of charges on ABM systems, things are still worse here. Those people who prepared the treaty evidently understood the catastrophic consequences for our strategic offensive arms that will result from the creation of ABM systems in the United States. Therefore repeated mention was made at the initial stages of the need to stop work on ABM defense in the United States—which, in particular, is prohibited by the 1972 treaty. However, in 1989 the USSR foreign minister, who was in charge of concluding the treaty,

declared that we were ready to sign and ratify the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms even if an accord was not reached on ABM problems. True, it was added that, if one of the sides created ABM systems, the other could pull out of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms. However, nothing was said about the fact that after its realization it would be too late to "pull out" of it. There would be insufficient funds and time to reinstate what had been destroyed. Let us note that, in addition, a reduction in our strategic offensive arms makes it easier for the United States to create ABM systems because, the smaller the number of attacking missiles or their warheads, the easier it is to intercept them.

So what conclusions do we reach? The danger exists that strategic offensive arms will lose their deterrent ability—the ability to resolve the very important task of ensuring the state's defense capability. It is possible to take varying attitudes to this. If you reckon that, after our people were able to defend themselves for many centuries, they have no need of this now, then the question is decided with the utmost simplicity—it is possible not to be concerned about the fate of strategic offensive arms, for they can be not only reduced but also eliminated altogether, even unilaterally. But if this approach is unacceptable, ways should be sought to resolve the problem.

Such ways do exist. They certainly do not consist in abandoning the reduction of strategic offensive arms—may my possible opponents not accuse me of militarist propensities. Reductions of strategic offensive arms—even far deeper ones than are being made now—can and must be carried out. However, they must not—and this is possible—result in strategic offensive arms' losing their ability to defend the country. A number of measures can be proposed for this—both military-technical and political (diplomatic) measures. The former include the development and improvement of strategic offensive arms themselves in areas that ensure their survivability under conditions of enemy action. Measures in the second group include reaching accords with the United States and other NATO countries on unconditionally stopping all work on the creation of ABM systems; limiting and reducing all other types of arms in addition to strategic offensive arms; prohibiting actions against strategic offensive arms in the event of a nonnuclear military conflict.

'Disquieting Elements' Viewed

*PM0602112192 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 4 Feb 92 p 3*

[“Specialist’s Commentary” by Colonel D. Belskiy: “Is Security Ensured?”]

[Text] The Russian Federation increasingly sees its place as being in the existing system of collective security of

the world's developed states. Evidence of this is provided by Russian President B.N. Yeltsin's latest initiative—his statement “On Russia's Policy in the Sphere of Arms Limitation and Reduction.”

The initiative takes account of virtually all aspects connected with the former USSR's nuclear weapons and international commitments to reduce and eliminate them. After all, in the current situation it would have been impossible to ignore the West's concern over the future of the former USSR's nuclear potential.

Is this concern justified? Unfortunately, statements by CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] politicians sometimes provoke fears that their intentions could be changing. There was a certain vagueness displayed by Kazakhstan regarding the nuclear weapons deployed on its territory. There are quite a few people in the Ukraine who advocate retaining some form or other of nuclear potential to spite Russia. In the conditions of political instability, suspicions have even appeared: Would the nuclear button remain for long in one and the same hand?

Another factor provoking fears in the West is the threat of the “unsanctioned use of nuclear weapons,” whereby such weapons might fall into the hands of terrorists, “mad colonels,” or one of the sides involved in civil war. Concerning this problem, we should turn to the provision in the Russian president's statement which emphasizes the Russian leadership's commitment to ensuring the maximum security of nuclear weapons and all the facilities connected with the development [razrabotka], production, and use of such weapons.

Of course, one would like to believe that our military specialists have analyzed the new initiative with sufficient thoroughness to ensure the security both of CIS states and of Russia. However, the present steps in the sphere of disarmament are being taken in new conditions. Conditions which conceal a certain unpredictability in the sphere of security. For example, anxiety is caused by the fact that technical questions of eliminating nuclear arsenals will be resolved after the adoption of political decisions during the forthcoming talks. Will complications not arise at the talks and will concessions not have to be made which might contradict the proclaimed goals of our security?

There are other disquieting elements in the Russian disarmament program. This is primarily the proposal about joint development [razrabotka], and then creation [sozdaniye] and joint operation of a global system of defense from missile attack instead of SDI. It virtually coincided with a spate of successes in the creation [sozdaniye] of SDI systems. Will such a proposal be accepted in Washington? Will they share with us the results they have achieved already in their work in this sphere? About \$4.15 billion has been allocated in the Pentagon's budget for this year for the development [razrabotka] of strategic defense—significantly more

than last year. Next year the U.S. military department expects to receive more than \$5 billion.

It is possible to single out in particular the declared readiness to eliminate existing antisatellite systems and the desire to elaborate an accord on a total ban of weapons especially built to destroy satellites. This is a chronic problem. It is connected with the development [razrabotka], openly declared by the United States, of the ASAT antisatellite system. Again it is not clear how far our initiative corresponds to all aspects of security.

The steps which Russia intends to take in accordance with the program of nuclear and conventional arms reductions announced by President B. Yeltsin is being perceived worldwide as an important step toward strategic stability. However, skeptics and pessimists are justifiably asking the question: Following the implementation of all the proposals that have been put forward, will Russia be able to ensure for itself, and for the CIS states, a global or even a regional military-strategic role in the world that is of any real significance? After all, despite the lowering of the level of military confrontation between the former USSR and the countries of the West, and the reduced probability of nuclear conflict, other dangers at regional level are not disappearing. The conflagration in Yugoslavia, the conflict in the Caucasus, the tense situation in the Near East...

Ukrainian Defense Official Welcomes Yeltsin Initiative

*MK0602123092 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 6 Feb 92 p 3*

[Vladimir Skachko interview with Lieutenant General Ivan Bizhan, deputy defense minister of Ukraine: "Ivan Bizhan: 'I Welcome the Initiatives of Boris Yeltsin'"]

[Text] Lieutenant General Ivan Bizhan, deputy defense minister of Ukraine and leader of the Ukrainian group of experts at negotiations with Russia on a complete range of military issues, is convinced that Ukraine should create its own armed forces, but only to safeguard its own sovereignty, not in order to transform itself into a military monster.

[Skachko] On the eve of his foreign trip, Russian president Boris Yeltsin announced a major arms reduction initiative, to include nuclear arms. How do you, a representative of military leaders, regard this announcement?

[Bizhan] Positively. And this is why. The Ukraine's position on the issue of nuclear disarmament is well-known. By 1 July of this year we should be rid of tactical nuclear weapons, and we should be free of strategic nuclear weapons by the end of 1994. I welcome the initiative of Boris Yeltsin, as it coincides with the Ukraine's position. In addition, it would be much better if the tactical weapons removed from Ukraine to Russia

were not put into storage, but instead destroyed. It is beneficial for any state's security not to have a strong nuclear neighbor.

[Skachko] Do you have any information indicating that tactical nuclear weapons from Ukraine are being destroyed in Russia?

[Bizhan] There is no hard evidence. In accordance with the agreement, we are at present removing weapons from the territory of the Ukraine and leaving them at special bases before final destruction. Whether or not destruction has begun I do not know, as the issue of control over this process has not been fully resolved.

[Skachko] In accordance with the Ukrainian-Russian communique of 11 January 1992, the sides agreed to form groups of experts to work on military issues and committed themselves to refrain from taking unilateral steps in this area. Are these obligations being met?

[Bizhan] I can say with complete confidence on behalf of the Ukrainian side that we have not permitted a single such unilateral action. What is being done in Ukraine in the military sphere is in complete compliance with our legislation and with agreements on armed forces and border troops signed in Minsk on 30 December of last year.

[Skachko] Can one assume from this that you have some reason for reproaching your Russian colleagues?

[Bizhan] Yes, one can unfortunately do so. Let us take, for example, the Black Sea Fleet. As far as I know, people's deputies of the Russian Federation have already gone there and conducted business. We now have reports that even new recruits—Ukrainians—are being prevented from swearing allegiance to the Ukraine; disciplinary measures are being taken against them. There is pressure on naval officers who have sworn allegiance to the Ukraine or wish to do so. Ukrainian Defense Minister Konstantin Morozov has issued a special appeal on this to servicemen and commanders of the Black Sea Fleet.

[Skachko] There is now talk that Boris Yeltsin went to Novorossiysk to reach agreement on the issue of shifting the Black Sea Fleet there, where construction of new naval bases was begun a year ago.

[Bizhan] I would proceed from the fact that Novorossiysk is Russian Federation territory. The Black Sea Fleet is also there, not just in Ukrainian Sevastopol. But Yeltsin's visit does raise questions. For example, why was he escorted by CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] armed forces chief Marshal Shaposhnikov, and why was this done when our groups of experts are working on the issue of dividing the Black Sea fleet between CIS strategic forces and the Ukrainian fleet? I do not believe Yeltsin's visit will bring about a quicker solution to this complex problem. But it is difficult to tie this visit to shifting the Black Sea fleet to Novorossiysk. It would be nearly impossible within a short period of

time to build a base there for the Black Sea Fleet comparable to the ones in Sevastopol and Crimea.

Proper Discussion of Yeltsin Arms Moves Urged

*PM1002104692 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 8 Feb 92 p 2*

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA observer Aleksandr Golts under the "Topic of the Week" rubric: "The Yeltsin and Bush Initiatives: Who Is Discussing Them, and How?"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] As used to happen before, we first learned of important moves by our leadership in the security sphere from the foreign media (this was the case with B. Yeltsin's recent ABC television interview). Even when new initiatives finally become known, it is virtually impossible for us to clarify or find out additional details (which the Americans can do, with their hearings in Congress). Unlike Bush's proposals, Yeltsin's initiatives have not yet, in my view, been properly discussed in the Russian parliament.

It might be assumed that time is already allotted in the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet's work plans for examining all these problems. But for the time being it seems that the Russian president has decided to inform the public at large of his views via the mass media. Which was why he held a meeting with the chief editors of certain publications (unfortunately, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA was not invited).

But only NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA gave a more or less detailed account of the content of that meeting, rather than confining itself to a brief report. It was from this account that I learned of one important aspect of the Russian-U.S. talks: Apparently B. Yeltsin persuaded the Americans not to manufacture "Ohio" missile-carrying submarines any more. I also learned that what Russia means by a global defense system is merely joint tracking and notification, which, to be frank, is rather different from the tasks set for SDI. B. Yeltsin also informed G. Bush that the Union leadership had misled the Americans both on the question of manpower reductions, and on chemical and bacteriological weapons. Whereas the question of manpower is more or less clearly understood (it was decided to reduce not establishments, but actual numbers), questions arise with, for instance, chemical weapons. In what way were the Americans misled: Did we underestimate the quantity of chemical weapons, or did we give an unrealistic time scale for their destruction?

Here I would like to stress that it is time to put an end to the established tradition whereby those engaged in the analysis of military matters in our country are rather like paleontologists. That is to say, from a few excavated data, maybe a phrase in an official report or an item in an American newspaper, they try to put together a full picture of our own approaches to these very important questions.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's mail indicates that readers are not only worried about social problems, but also about questions of national security. Can the defense capability of Russia and the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] be ensured, given such large-scale reductions? Will these reductions be an additional burden on our economy? These questions require an answer. Otherwise those who see the abandonment of confrontation as some kind of betrayal of national interests will have plenty of scope for all kinds of speculations.

Thank heaven, the days of universal "approval" and secrecy taken to ludicrous extremes have gone. Today the public, to say nothing of the legislators, are entitled to know how the government intends to ensure the state's defense and how much money will be needed for particular projects, including the arms race.

GENERAL

Efficacy of Political Controls Over Nuclear Launches Questioned

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No 4, Jan 92 pp 20-23*

[Article by Aleksey Arbatov: "Security Problems: The Mysteries of the Nuclear Button"]

[Text] "Only I can start a nuclear war," Mikhail Gorbachev said in a French television interview shortly before his resignation. The former President's idea was not to scare but to reassure the world public: just rely on me, he implied, and I won't let you down. Can an important matter like that depend on the personal qualities of this or that leader? Obviously, more reliable safeguards are required. After all, nuclear arms control remains the key factor of global security. Information about the nuclear button in Moscow remains almost nothing. In the USA, which is no less security-minded than we are, this question is a subject of extensive press coverage and public discussion.

A Skeleton Key To the Electronic Lock

"The Button" is a journalistic image, of course, and it does not exist physically. The whole system is based on codes, ciphers, computers, various radio and telephone communication channels; the launching as such is done by a simultaneous turn of two keys.

Experts single-out two nuclear arms control principles which can be referred to, conventionally, as the negative and the positive one. The negative principle means the use of technical facilities, system and procedures designed to rule out bringing nuclear weapons into action without the government's authorization.

This system was arranged in such a way—both in the USA and in the former USSR—that neither the personnel of ground-based IBM control stations, nor missile carrying submarine and strategic bomber crews, nor the command posts of strategic units and fighting arms

could physically start a nuclear attack unless they received special codes from above. If sent to missile crews via special communication lines, the codes are supposed to "unlatch" electric "locks" on nuclear arms.

The accepted launching procedures call for synchronous actions by many links in the system as a precaution against error, evil intent or mental derangement. Commands issued by any command station will be fulfilled only if acknowledged by all the others. The units which guard and maintain nuclear facilities in depots are accountable to superiors other than those of the missile forces. Unauthorized attempts to launch missiles trigger an alarm signal and can be blocked from above. Regulations demand that if ordered by his immediate superior to launch a missile, an operator should do so only upon the Presidential confirmation of the order.

As to the positive control system, it comprises the ways and means of guaranteeing authorized use of nuclear weapons despite likely obstacles or opposition. These facilities include, above all, multiplexed channels of underground, underwater, ground, atmospheric and space communication channels connecting those in command with the missilemen. At the action level, the destruction of some launch control posts does not prevent the same missiles from being launched from the surviving posts. As a last resort, certain types of missiles can be launched directly by a command from the centre, by-passing local launch control posts.

In times of crisis, launch control posts can be authorized to act on their own if the country's leadership is eliminated by a surprise strike. In that case the very communication blackout may serve as a signal to launch ballistic missiles.

This probably explains what transpired after the August putsch: Gorbachev was not the only one to possess the "attache case"—the Minister of Defence and the Chief of the General Staff also had them. If only the three of them could sanction a nuclear strike together (i.e., shared the unlocking code among themselves), this arrangement strikes me as strange. After all, the President stands higher in the hierarchy than the heads of the Defence Ministry. The latter's job is not to confirm or cancel the decisions of the head of state but rather to execute them. The existence of three "attache cases" can be explained by the desire to have other buttons besides the President's.

Communicating Vessels

As a matter of fact, the control system is not divided into negative and positive ones. It is a single system of control and communications which comprises elements of negative and positive control. What's more, these elements are like communicating vessels: the higher the level in one, the less full the other. This means that the higher the guarantee of striking a retaliatory blow under the least favourable circumstances, the less reliable the insurance against a non-sanctioned launching or against a nuclear strike caused by an error or overreaction to a threat.

Here is an illustration. If elevated to the absolute, positive control would mean a direct connection of early warning satellites and radars and of nuclear blast pickups with missile launching sites. The system could be made fully automatic and launch missiles even upon losing contact with early warning systems and with the central leadership. In that case, retaliation would be fully guaranteed, but the risk of a nuclear war breaking out through a technical fault would be enormous.

The other extreme is to divide negative control among dozen or so officers and to make the unlocking of weapons at the launching site level practically impossible unless all the "attache case" owners sanction it. In that case an unsanctioned nuclear strike or one carried out by mistake would be extremely unlikely. However, if at least one of the leaders gets killed or otherwise unreachable, the retaliation potential will be paralyzed.

It should be pointed out for fairness' sake that even in the past decades of the cold war, both the USA and the USSR emphasized negative control for fear of causing a global holocaust as a result of unsanctioned actions by missilemen or a technical error. There were substantial differences between the two nations' systems, however.

Is There "Military-Political Leadership" in Washington?

Division of authority and the military command's unqualified subordination to the lawfully elected political leadership have also been the very basis of the American system of government. This finds its expression, above all, in the President appointing a civilian Defence Secretary who has an enormous staff under him, and in the National Security Council and Congress having control over all military matters.

The US Constitution has established the following sequence of power transfer in the event of the President's death or removal from office: the Vice-President; the Speaker of the House of Representatives; the Senate majority leader; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of the Treasury; the Secretary of Defence and so on. The "button" of the strategic forces control system changes hands in the same order.

Billions have been invested in ensuring political control over the use of strategic arms even after a multiple exchange of nuclear strikes. The only function assigned to the military—from the top level of the Joint Chiefs of Staff all the way down to the missile crews—is to execute orders.

In the Soviet Union, the control system mirrored the totalitarian and highly militarized nature of the political regime. Much attention was paid to the negative control over local action stations, and any division of authority or primacy of political leadership, let alone a legalized sequence of power transfer, were out of the question. Even the standard Soviet term, "military-political leadership," having no analogues in Western vocabulary, speaks for itself.

The leadership of the Party exercised control over Army generals through the Glavpur (Military Political Administration) and by personnel manipulations. The Army was counterbalanced, to some extent, by the KGB which, in particular, was responsible for government communications and had certain links of the nuclear forces' command and security system under its control. Outside that, the military were free to decide on the ways and means of waging a war and winning a "victory" in a global nuclear conflict.

If the General Secretary Oversleeps...

The USSR's strategic forces, in which stationary ground-based IBMs predominated, constituting up to 70 percent of the total in terms of warheads, were intended for a preventive strike and, in the 1970-1980s, for a so-called counter- or retaliative-counter strike. That is to say, they were to be launched before the war-heads of US missiles hit our launching sites and launch control posts. Why so? Because the launching of the missiles at signals received from warning systems would make it possible to drop seven thousand megatons of nuclear explosives on American territory. On the other hand, if American warheads had hit their targets before that, the attack would have left us with "only" a few hundred or one to two thousand megatons with which to retaliate.

The generals have always dismissed as nonsense the argument that several thousand megatons differs little from a few hundred megatons. The point is that 150 largest US cities harbour over 50 percent of the US population and ½ of industry.

As a matter of fact, our strategy amounts to depriving the political leadership of the right to make a decision to use nuclear weapons. The time parameters of a nuclear cataclysm are such that a counter-strike can succeed only if politicians are capable of a split-second reaction, and even then only if everything works smoothly. Besides, the politicians will have to depend wholly on signals—mysterious to them—coming in from satellites and warning radars, or rather on the interpretations of these signals by the military.

If a strike is delivered with a submarine-borne ballistic missile at a relatively short distance from the target, even the most efficient control system will be of no use. In anticipation of that, politicians may be asked to sanction a nuclear strike in advance on the grounds that there will be no time for drawing up new plans of operations if the existing ones are thwarted. The leader's role will be reduced to that of a chimpanzee used for testing: he will just have to push a button when a lamp comes on.

Now if the General Secretary has over-slept, become unreached or been removed from office, the go-ahead can be given without his authorization. All the codes are converted into action, and all the communication channels are maintained by military services for which instructions from their immediate superiors are law.

In other words, at the top level of leadership, positive control has always taken precedence over negative control. The monopoly of the military on working out the control system and operations plans (for a counter-strike, above all) has materialized in a concept which guards not against an accidental strike due to a mistake, a nervous breakdown or a technical problem, but against failure to respond to an attack promptly and on a massive scale.

This is a reflection of a typically militaristic mentality—the main goal is to crush the enemy, deterrence is just a sideline. For a politician, on the other hand, deterrence comes first. If deterrents fail to work and a nuclear attack is made, all the rest will make no difference any longer.

Many remain under the spell of military declarations like "an immediate and crushing retaliation" which "no aggressor will avoid." Even Yuri Rostov, the anchor man of a TV news programme whom I highly respect, has said recently that a nuclear attack should be "instantly" reacted to, otherwise catastrophe will ensue.

What does he mean by "catastrophe?" The prospect of us dropping fewer megatons on the US than planned by our General Staff? If we indeed come under a nuclear attack, this will be catastrophe in and of itself, and our fate will hardly depend in this case on how many million Americans we kill in retaliation. If we react "instantly" but mistakenly, we shall really bring catastrophe upon ourselves and upon the rest of the world.

In the past decades this system did work, however, probably for the reason that it never underwent a real test. The superpowers feared each other so much that after the Cuban missile crisis they never pushed the world to the brink. Nevertheless, our system has proved to be no good at all in the dramatically changing situation inside the country.

It's Against the Rules, But It Can Be Done

When we had the "military-political" leadership—the triumvirate of the CPSU, the KGB and the Military-Industrial Complex—our nuclear forces were under reliable centralized control (its reliability was not, thank God, given the acid test like the one failed by the Chernobyl nuclear power plant's control system). The deepening rift in our society and Gorbachev's prolonged vacillation between the Right and the Left led to the August putsch which, in addition to everything else, demonstrated the utter inadequacy of the old nuclear arms control system under new circumstances. Having colluded, the top brass and the KGB debarred the President from control over nuclear weapons with amazing ease.

The vague subsequent assurances to the effect that everything was in perfect order and that details are state secrets hardly make sense. It sounds incredible that without the President's sanctions and the codes there are no means of launching the missiles. The military know, of course, that they are not supposed to do that, but then

they are not supposed to stage coups, either. The important thing is that this is probably possible technically, otherwise the counter-strike strategy would be impractical. Surely, certain arrangements have been made to deal with a situation where the leader is no longer in control. And if it is technically possible to launch a missile without the President following a nuclear attack, then this can be done following a coup also.

It is not hard to guess who was, on those days, in charge of the services which make up codes and combinations and which maintain government communications with the strategic missile launch posts. Besides, there are facilities for launching missiles right from the centre, by-passing local triggering systems.

Some political scientists are trying to reassure themselves and others by reasoning that the conspirators—all of them top executives of the Gorbachev government—would have displayed a sense of responsibility in the matter of “button control.” What would have happened, however, if the putsch hadn’t failed so quickly? What if the White House had been taken by storm with all the consequences—civil war, a split of the Army, the warring factions’ attempts to win outside support? There are no answers to these questions, but one thing is clear—the old control system is unfit for the new reality.

The “Attache Case” Changes Hands

The breakup of the USSR after the August events, the formation of the CIS, the signing of the agreements on joint measures as regards nuclear weapons and on strategic forces—all this has lent special urgency to the “button” problem.

Matters have certainly been simplified by the agreement reached by the independent states to the effect that technical control is to be exercised by the President of Russia only. The heads of the other Republics which have strategic nuclear arms on their territories so far are to give oral consent to the use of these arms, if necessary. The sharing of the “button” among the independent states would contradict the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and on the reduction of strategic offensive arms.

There are quite a few problems, however. The President of Russia has control over all nuclear weapons, but other Republics maintain that the missiles deployed on their territories do not belong to Russia. By forbidding the withdrawal or elimination of these missiles without their knowledge and consent, the Republics claim certain rights to strategic weapons and do not recognize Russia as the nuclear successor to the USSR. However, they have no technical control over the use of these weapons.

Further, although the President of Russia does have control over the “Button,” the Commander-in-Chief and the joint command of strategic forces, obliged to take their instructions from political leadership, are subordinated not to him but to the Council of the CIS Heads of State. The other presidents are not in control of the

“button,” however, and their vetoes or sanctions are of a procedural character. Does that mean that strategic forces are subordinated to Russia after all? No, Russia has no army of its own, and nuclear facilities belong to the joint command within the framework of the CIS. At the same time, the Commonwealth has no central authorities, it is a union of states, not a state. It has its centre in Minsk, and its Defence Ministry and General Staff in Moscow.

It looks as if under the circumstances no political power is in control of the Army and, in particular, of strategic forces.

The “attache case,” it is true, has been handed over by Gorbachev to Yeltsin. They showed on television the other day how the military teach Yeltsin to handle his new “luggage.” This is probably the same “attache case” that was lost in Foros last August. This means that the control system, crowned with the “button,” remains actually the same. The President of Russia has probably not yet taken precautions against landing in his federal predecessor’s predicament.

The System in Need of Readjustment

The most logical and consistent thing to do would be to eliminate all the strategic weapons and tactical nuclear facilities on the territories outside Russia. A model for this is found in the Minsk agreement as regards Ukraine. The reduction of the nuclear potential in this way fits in with the obligations ensuing from the Soviet-American treaty on Strategic Arms Reduction signed in the summer of 1991, and from the exchange of the Bush and Gorbachev initiatives that autumn. Therefore, no “pumping over” of nuclear might from the Republics to Russia will take place: the arsenals on Russian territory will be reduced even further.

The missiles stationed outside Russia are to be deactivated in good time. In that case, everything—the deployment procedure, the right to ownership and use, the control system—will click back into place.

This is far from all. It is necessary to restructure the control system in Russia so as to get rid of the faults inherited from the totalitarian militarist structure of the USSR. Specifically, the working out of sanctioning codes and ciphers, putting them into the control post computers, installing the locking devices, maintaining special communications—all these functions should be handed over to a service independent of the Defence Ministry and the KGB and subordinated to the President only.

It appears that in our case “negative” control ought to be divided among the President, Vice-President and the Chairman of Parliament so that the sanctioning of a nuclear strike should call for the technical alignment of all three parts of the code. It is also necessary to determine, by a special law, the continuity of transfer of the authority over nuclear weapons from the three top executives to the subordinate civilian officials.

It is time we gave up the counter-strike strategy which reduces the political leadership's control over the Army to a fiction and leaves open the ways to by-pass the President's button in peacetime.

It is necessary to eliminate the facilities for prompt missile launchings in case of the President's death in a nuclear attack. Instead, we had better provide the technical means for a prompt and efficient transfer of his powers to his lawful successors.

Finally, in order to prevent an unconstitutional takeover of power, measures should be taken for the control system to be completely "switched off" in such an event—i.e., for making it technically impossible, for a lengthy period, to launch strategic missiles.

Military experts will argue, of course, that all this is bound to impede nuclear retaliation, to reduce its impact, to weaken deterrence. This is true, I agree, but military potential is not a thing in itself—the fundamental changes now in progress within the country and in the rest of the world call for its restructuring.

The potential of deterrence at the level of reasonable sufficiency should be preserved as an inalienable element of global strategic stability. The very criteria of sufficiency are to be revised, however. The USA is now less likely than ever to mount a surprise nuclear attack, and it is hard to think up convincing reasons why the situation should change in the foreseeable future.

At the same time, the danger of nuclear arms control loosening up as a result of ethnic strife and domestic social and political unrest in the former USSR has grown. In their turn, the radical transformations of society and the state call for a substantial readjustment of the nuclear weapons control system. Otherwise, events like the August putsch, dangerous to our country and to the whole world, may recur.

It stands to reason that no organizational or technical measures will make up for the absence of economic and socio-political stability in society and in the Army. The fact remains, though, that the USSR has built up a huge nuclear arsenal, so it is our moral duty to see to it that the mistakes we make at home should not put the entire civilized world in mortal danger.

Former Nuclear Worker on Weapons Dismantlement Problems

PM0602165992 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 6 Feb 92 p 2

[Article by V. Filin: "Nuclear Bomb Assembly Technology. Yardman Minayev Speaks"]

[Text] Once it became apparent that our new country did not particularly need a nuclear shield, various curious details began to emerge. What used to be a

virtual state secret was no secret at all, apparently, but a topic for discussion in the press for anyone interested in participating.

For obvious reasons, the interested parties were the countries of the former "likely enemy," and also the working people of the home nuclear-industrial weapons complex, and not just the scientists. From what one of them, Aleksandr Alekseyevich Minayev, former nuclear munitions assembly expert, now a military pensioner, says, it is clear, for example, that our nuclear shield is effectively hand-made, since it was and is being assembled mainly by hand, at several plants that formerly belonged to the USSR Ministry of Medium Machine Building. Five are well known: Sverdlovsk-44, Sverdlovsk-45, Arzamas-16, Chelyabinsk-70, and their counterparts in Penza. Servicemen and civilian experts were assigned to them to assemble aircraft bombs, warheads for cruise and conventional missiles, and nuclear torpedoes in special shops. They described themselves as engineer-fitters.

Aleksandr Minayev spent 14 of his 54 years assembling the contents of nuclear weapons. For example, the shop at Arzamas-16 where he worked employed around 30 people, including civilians, engaged in operations on the final assembly of bombs or missiles. From the first Soviet "Tatyana" and "Ivan" bombs to this day the assembly technology is basically the same. The bomb or missile warhead components and the container with the nuclear material—the uranium "pellet"—inside would be brought to the assembly point on cradles [stapel]. The assembly worker would remove the uranium pellet from the container with a special suction device and place it in a recess in the conventional explosive (the so-called "initiator" of the subsequent nuclear explosion), supplied with specially regulated needles to fix the position of the pellet. Whereupon the main operation was over. There was also the electronic part, of which the explosive detonator sockets are probably the most important elements.

Then came the tests. It is precision work. The fitters' protection facilities include rubber gloves and cleansing fluids—alcohol, benzene. Then again, there was the plan, as was customary at a socialist enterprise. Thirty items a month, on average. During the Caribbean crisis, for example, they churned out even more, for dispatch to the Cubans. They would occasionally be visited by the leadership: Sakharov, Zeldovich, Tsukerman. In response to complaints about the increased radiation level in the shop (as a rule the military representatives would inspect the "product" through a shielded aperture) they would say: You are military men, so you are expected to be stoical and endure any problems. After the shift they would return to the hostel, take a nap, brush the hair off the pillow, and then return to work. The pay at the time was 180 rubles [R] and dinner was free.

It is clear also from the account by A. Minayev, who assembled several thousands nuclear munitions in his time, that it is not that easy to get rid of our remarkable nuclear

shield. Withdraw and dismantle is easy to say. But if you add it up, it is not tens and not hundreds of items that have to be dismantled, but thousands. So you have transportation, safety, and other problems, which, given the present chaotic situation in the country and in the transport system, need close attention. Not to mention money.

Moreover, nuclear munitions can only be dismantled where they have been assembled, that is, at plants of the former Ministry of Medium Machine Building. And, obviously, by the same experts. According to Minayev, the technology has been known for a long time. At the munition storage facilities they will plug the detonator sockets and at the plant, on the cradles, they will remove the nuclear "pellets" or equivalent and place them in containers, while the remaining, nonnuclear part will be sent for destruction or dismantling.

Apparently we do not really need the West's proposals on technical assistance. What we need more is money to cover all the expenses. But, in any case, disarmament has to be handled by professionals, both scientists and "nuclear craftsmen"—the munitions assembly worker states.

A pensioner now, Aleksandr Alekseyevich earns some extra money at a scientific research institute. His total earnings are around R600. He is also forced to work as a yardman. Once he was called by a friend, a colleague in the nuclear industry, who asked him whether he had heard about the Libyans recruiting our specialists.

Navy 'Experts' Question Retargeting Program

PM1002144792 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 7 Feb 92 p 1

[Interview with "Navy long-term planning experts" by A. Orlov: "Where Have Our Missiles Been Retargeted? Plaudits for Politicians, Brickbats for Brass Hats"—first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Let me say straight away: We did not manage to find an answer to our question at any level. Staff in various qualified departments—from the Russian Foreign Ministry to the military department—listened and then replied merely with general phrases on the restructuring of our foreign policy. It was only long-term planning specialists from the Navy, which has a considerable nuclear potential, who offered to discuss specific issues. Furthermore, they did not so much answer the questions as pose new problems.

Captain First Class S. Kozyrev: We can only welcome any initiatives aimed at lowering international tension. Including those put forward by B.N. Yeltsin. But very many people today are worried by the question of where the former Soviet missiles will be retargeted.

From the specialist, military viewpoint I would like to say that when the state's top leader declares that the missiles will no longer be aimed at U.S. cities that is how it will be. But at the same time, it would be hasty to close

one's eyes to the fact that military bases, arsenals, command centers, and other purely military installations still exist on U.S. territory. This complex of military power can still represent a danger. This must be taken into account, clearly.

Rear Admiral V. Prozorov: It has already been stated that the United States and Russia no longer regard one another as opponents...I think that these statements are positive reciprocal political steps and evidence of many positive changes in the world. But at the moment these are only statements; work is needed if they are to become reality. Furthermore, there are now more questions than existed before the statements—throughout the world. There are different attitudes toward them in the developed countries, the former socialist countries, and the developing countries. If our missiles are no longer targeted on the United States and America's missiles are not going to be targeted on us (which, incidentally, no one has actually stated yet), will the former and latter missiles not be retargeted on third countries? Which ones, to be precise? Britain, China, Japan, or Iraq? This also requires explanation from the politicians today including not only for the governments of states but for their own peoples, and for the military on duty right by those missiles themselves....

S. Kozyrev: A strange situation has indeed been created today. Military people, not only in our country, are racking their brains, wondering: Just who is their potential enemy? The Armed Forces, an essential attribute of any state, are organized in such a way that they cannot exist without a specific concept of the potential enemy. But this concept is becoming increasingly vague.

The Americans worked out their position long ago. They have always said: Our main enemy is the USSR but we must be ready to avert a threat to U.S. interests in any region. So that even by "removing" Russia from the list of enemies they are not changing anything in their doctrine at all. Whereas we have to organize our doctrine anew. So, like all civilized countries, let us look at things soberly. That is, let us work on the basis that we have no permanent friends or enemies but we do have permanent national and state interests. By defining those interests and formulating them clearly, we will be able to discuss ways of achieving or protecting them, including by military means. But for the time being, it seems to me, many things are happening the other way around. Hence the questions, ranging from military reform to the targeting of missiles.

V. Prozorov: Unfortunately, the policy of recent years suggests that quite probably we will soon simply have nothing left with which to defend those interests. However difficult it may be, we must not try to overcome the economic crisis at the expense of defense and the Armed Forces alone. That is suicidal for the nation. The Army and the Navy are instruments for the preservation of the

country. After all, despite the U.S. and NATO statements that they have changed their attitude toward us, they still have their nuclear submarines in the Mediterranean and in the seas off Norway even now. In other regions they have multipurpose ships capable of tackling the same missions with cruise missiles as with strategic missiles. And, as is well known, NATO is examining the possibility of conducting naval maneuvers in the Black Sea. Why do you think that is?

Captain First Class V. Moiseyenko: The politicians exchange smiles but the world, it seems, changes little. Unfortunately, our country today is in a situation where it cannot influence world equilibrium in all spheres as it used to. But we continue to play a significant role in preserving the military balance and peace. However, instead of being supported, the fleet, which is going through hard times now, is being reduced to starvation rations—just 14 percent of the military budget last year and it will hardly be any better this year. Furthermore, several dozen obsolete ships have been withdrawn from service in the North and Pacific fleets. In the light of recent initiatives, let us add to that figure a further unspecified quantity, including six strategic vessels. What next? After all, these ships have to be dismantled, their reactors must be recycled. In other words, special capacities are needed. If ships stand idle at the bases a year too long without being stripped down, they will turn from being defenders of the fatherland to a direct threat to it. It will be dangerous even to touch the reactor cores.

S. Kozyrev: I am afraid that the military will end up as the culprits again.

V. Moiseyenko: In July 1991 we secured the adoption of a state program for the recycling of nuclear-powered ships which had completed their service and specific financing for this program. Today, unfortunately, it seems that everyone has forgotten about this except the fleet. The fleet cannot do this, but someone has got to—you cannot fool around with the environment.

S. Kozyrev: There is something else which alarms us—as people who not only study military prospects but also who think about national interests, too. Whether we like it or not, there are still two political centers in the world, two political poles—the United States and Russia. They will always compete—if not in the military sphere then in others.

The United States today particularly needs to win time. To gather its forces together and redistribute them. Whereas we are now obsessed with the idea of making the world homogeneous—for the sake of its harmony we are sacrificing our interests regardless of the cost.

But let us consider 1914. The world was quite homogeneous then. However, this did not save the country from the world carnage. The question is: Where are the guarantees that we will avoid world war three in a new, homogeneous but less stable society? What will make the world a safer place? Experience? Unfortunately, it is not an absolute guarantee. Queen Elizabeth is not Boris

Nikolayevich's sister, and Bush is not related to Kravchuk or Nazarbayev. I mention this because links of that kind existed back in 1914...

In short, it is still too soon for Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States to disarm recklessly. Balance in all things is good.

Problems With Treaty Obligations Seen

*924P0073A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 Feb 92 p 3*

[Article by Judicial Service Major I. Glebov, candidate of legal sciences: "Who Will Be Responsible for Our International Obligations? For Now, There Is No Answer to This Question in the National Legislation of CIS States"]

[Text] The Soviet Union has ceased to exist as a subject of international law. However, this is not to say that nobody is now responsible for the international obligations it assumed with regard to defense and military security.

The CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] which emerged in the stead of the former Soviet Union has become, in terms of its format, a derivative association of states which may have only the powers delegated to it by its founders. Having failed to confer the status of a legal entity on the CIS, its founding states in essence brought forth a commonwealth with impaired international rights, which does not have legal personality.

As a result, the independent states which formed on the territory of the former Soviet Union became its legal successors. On one hand this endows them with the entirety of the international rights and responsibilities of the predecessor. On the other hand, it raises the following issue: How can the share of each state in the common assets accumulated over seven decades be determined? If these assets consisted only of effects and promissory notes, everything would be clear: The norms of two international conventions, the 1978 Vienna Convention on the legal succession of states with regard to treaties, and the 1983 Vienna Convention on the legal succession of states with regard to state property, state archives, and state debts, should be used. Despite the fact that these conventions did not take effect for the former USSR, the parties may use them for reference. The general thrust of the norms of these conventions is that when a state is divided and independent successor states are formed on its territory, the latter inherit the rights and obligations of the predecessor state and all its responsibilities for international relations. They get state real estate located on their territories, whereas personal property is transferred "in fair shares, taking into account the contribution of a territory which is the subject of succession in interest."

However, the principle of dividing equally, which is good for disputes over assets, cannot be applied, for example, to the armed forces. This has to do with the fact that the Army and Navy are a unified social, economic,

and spiritual complex which may be destroyed but is virtually impossible to divide. The armed forces are the main instrument of security, which by its very nature is indivisible. We now see that the West European countries already have common security institutions and are setting up new ones, having by no means forsaken their national characteristics, national pride, or cultural and spiritual traditions. Should this example not be more important for the independent states of the Commonwealth than concerns about the "military attributes" of sovereignty?

In addition, international law does not at all include rules concerning the division of armies and navies. The spirit and letter of international law require that states settle their disputes peacefully so as not to endanger international peace, security, and justice. The 1978 and 1983 Vienna Conventions on legal succession contain special "military" reservations to the effect that, in particular, their provisions "do not prejudge any of the issues which may be entailed... by the military occupation of a territory." However, in our case, former Soviet republics which just yesterday considered themselves "occupied" are currently not averse to grabbing as much military materiel and weaponry from the "occupiers" as possible.

As of the moment of its disintegration the Soviet Union had obligations under approximately 16,000 international treaties and agreements. It had many obligations in the sphere of international security and disarmament. The world community structured its mutual relations with the USSR under conditions whereby the latter had a uniform military doctrine and a very definite security system and military infrastructure. All the states that are legal successors to the USSR will now have to prove to the world community on their own that they are faithful to the principles of the United Nations, the CSCE, and other universal and regional institutions of international security. They will have to ensure their own compliance with confidence-building and control measures in the military sphere on their territories, and stay within the quotas for strategic and conventional armed forces established by treaties. They should form and finance themselves special state organs and services for complying with various rules and procedures in the sphere of disarmament and control of nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological production. It will be necessary for them to take care of guarantees with regard to space and other areas which are demilitarized by virtue of international law.

So far, virtually no means to solve the problems in question have been reflected in the national legislation of the states that are legal successors to the USSR. After all, treaties which are accepted for execution should be translated into national legislation, specified, and addressed directly to citizens and officials responsible for their implementation. This means that, apart from other efforts, a tremendous legal and diplomatic effort is in store for each state legal successor to the former

Union. It will have to "comb through" all the international treaties to which the USSR was a party and set forth in its own state laws and procedures and conditions for compliance with them. However, most of the former Union republics have almost no experience in such work, in which there is a shortage of skilled specialists.

A joint and coordinated effort by all independent states provides the only opportunity to fulfill obligations contracted on behalf of all of our peoples. It may make sense to set up now an interstate military-legal center which will coordinate and conduct such work in a consistent and planned manner, on the basis of a unified legal philosophy and the latest juridical standards of the world community.

As the saying goes, there is no end of work in this sphere. First of all, uncertainty with regard to the military powers of the supreme organs of the states of the Commonwealth should be eliminated; the status of the supreme command of the Armed Forces and the Council of Ministers of Defense of the states of the Commonwealth, as well as of other continuously operating interstate working organs, should be clearly codified. It is necessary to immediately adopt a set of international law acts on the structure and operation of the strategic forces and general-purpose forces, and to regulate the unified systems of air and space defense, transportation and communications, rear services, military budget and financing, recruitment and training of military cadres, and law enforcement organs in the Armed Forces, and so on.

The need for legal regulation of issues concerning the socioeconomic situation of servicemen and their families is particularly acute. I believe that it is expedient to codify at the interstate level a uniform extent of legal guarantees for the status of servicemen and their families. Guarantees set forth in the national legislation of the parties should not be less favorable than common guarantees.

Naturally, the CIS should possess a legal mechanism capable of enforcing compliance with its interstate decisions. This may be a court, an arbitration panel, or some other organ. In addition, it is important that the Commonwealth preserve its ability to take resolute collective measures in the event of a threat to peace and security.

START TALKS

Kazakh President's Statement on SS-19 Launch
924P0081A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 22 Jan 92 p 3

[NEGA report: "Kazakhstan"]

[Text] In connection with the article in IZVESTIYA about the launch of an SS-19 ballistic missile on the territory of Kazakhstan, President Nazarbayev's press service has released the following statement:

"On 20 December 1991 a launch of the space rocket ROKOT was conducted from the Baykonur cosmodrome for scientific purposes as part of the conversion program. In this case, reports on the launch of a special ballistic missile do not correspond to the truth.

"Inasmuch as mutually acceptable approaches to the reformation of the Armed Forces of the USSR, including the operation of the space complex, have not been developed by Commonwealth members up to the present time (especially because a final decision on the so-called Commonwealth of Independent States was not yet worked out on 20 December 1991), we consider it superfluous to dramatize each case of space vehicle launch....

"The position of Republic of Kazakhstan President Nazarbayev on military questions and the use of space equipment is well known: preservation of unified armed forces, command and control of nuclear weapons from a unified center, dual subordination of general purpose forces, and operation of the Baykonur cosmodrome and the Kurchatov science center for the mutual benefit of all states of the Commonwealth."

The statement also notes that the article in IZVESTIYA is assessed in the republic as an attempt to pressure an independent state in deciding nuclear weapons questions and what line to follow in both the national and foreign press.

Reginald Bartholomew, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State for National Security Problems, arrived in Alma-Ata on 21 January.

A delegation of 16 persons, including U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Stephen Hadley, Brigadier General John Gordon, and representatives of the U.S. Department of State and weapons monitoring and disarmament agencies, is in the capital of Kazakhstan together with the high guest. Questions of monitoring the use of nuclear-space capabilities on the territory of Kazakhstan will be at the center of negotiations with the leaders of the republic (a meeting is planned with Bartholomew, President Nazarbayev, and Prime Minister Sergey Tereshchenko).

Missile Component Deterioration Considered

92UN0747A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 6, 5 Feb 92 p 2

[Article by Andrey Filippov: "The Status of Waiting for Doomsday: Is an Unauthorized Launch of Nuclear Missiles From Silos in the Ukraine Possible?"]

[Text] As is known, a trial launch of the new launch vehicle Zenit from the Baykonur space launch complex took place on 20 December last year. It will soon have to replace the famous "No. 7"—the Soyuz launch vehicle, which lifted Yuri Gagarin as much as 30 years ago.

This launch was not shrouded in any particular secrecy. As servicemen from space units assure us, they notified the American side in advance, but for some reason not the Kazakh side. Perhaps this is the reason the Western world was gripped by panic no sooner had Zenit separated from the launch silo. They said that an unauthorized launch of a combat missile, which the Russians missed in the hungry commotion of perestroyka, occurred at the space launch complex. In response, the space units finally clarified what is what through the mass media.

The editorial office of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA was inundated with calls from former and current missile specialists and common citizens who were not satisfied with the explanations offered. There were calls among those which may indeed rob one of peace of mind and sleep. A number of professionals and ex-professionals shared with us their concern in conjunction with a new problem. The guaranteed reliable service life of some missiles with nuclear warheads which are based in Ukraine, or more precisely, the life of their individual parts, assemblies, and systems, has expired or is about to expire.

In simple terms, these missiles are "falling apart." The assemblies and systems in question are so important in the sophisticated organism of intercontinental missiles that...in a word, some experts do not rule out the possibility of an unauthorized launch, which could occur before Bush and Yeltsin disarm their nuclear arsenals. In addition, according to rumors which are impossible to either confirm or refute, so far Ukraine has not even given thought to placing orders for exchanging the necessary equipment at Russian producer-enterprises, or paying for them.

A LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent who tried to verify these rumors called the press center of the former USSR Ministry of Defense and the State Committee of Russia for Defense Issues. The response was always evasive. They said that the data we were seeking are classified top secret. They said that had there really been something of this nature, the Americans would have raised the alarm long ago. In general, you may perhaps (!—note by Andrey Filippov) get a more accurate answer at this place or that place. They referred us to the former Ministry of the Defense Industry, the Strategic Missile Troops, and the Ministry of Defense of the Ukraine. It was nice of them not to refer us to the American Embassy.

Therefore, there is neither yes nor no.

Esteemed generals and colonels in uniform and in civilian dress! Through the newspaper I am appealing to any official (or officials) aware of the actual state of affairs. Reassure us and our children. We do not need to know which plants in Russia make gyroscopes, microchips, thyristors, cables, and whatever else is necessary for the control systems of strategic intercontinental missiles, where they make them, or how many of them are

made. However, we want to be certain that military men and diplomats in the Ukraine and Russia have not lost sight of the most important nuclear issue, given the nationality, food, monetary, territorial, and fleet problems. Give us an answer.

LITERATURNAYA GAZETA—A Competition of Reporters

In publishing this article by Andrey Filippov, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA is inaugurating a Competition of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA Reporters. We expect our readers and professional reporters to send in reports on unusual and sensational events and narrations about people dealing with emergency situations. The best articles will be published immediately. The best of the best will be awarded monetary prizes, in addition to honoraria.

Reports for the Competition of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA Reporters are received Monday through Friday, 1000 to 1800, at this telephone number: 208-82-44.

Committees To Prepare for START Ratification
*LD1702172192 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1612 GMT 10 Feb 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[Text] Moscow, 10 Feb (ITAR-TASS)—The Presidium of Russia's Supreme Soviet today instructed its standing parliamentary committees to prepare for ratification of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which was signed in July 1991 in the United States.

Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev gave a detailed evaluation of the clauses in the treaty. He commented that implementation of the treaty will greatly stabilize the world political situation. He stressed that "there are no unilateral concessions by our side in the treaty."

Other member-states of the Commonwealth of Independent States also approve of the treaty and commit themselves to ensure adherence to it. Andrey Kozyrev said that preliminary contacts with them show that the Commonwealth's nuclear states accept the desirability of Russia, as successor to the USSR, ratifying the treaty.

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Security, Economic Gains in Joining SDI Eyed
*PM1002090392 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 6 Feb 92 p 3*

[“Viewpoint” interview with Sergey Chernyshev, analyst at the Political Analysis Center headed by A. Bessmertnykh and president of the “Gumanus” intellectuals’ club, by V. Umnov; place and date not given: “Russia-United States: Who Has the Bigger Laser Gun?”]

[Text] [Umnov] What is SDI American-style?

[Chernyshev] There were various technical options for SDI implementation. The chief objective was to destroy all missiles with a mass salvo.

You could suspend a cloud of solid particles in the flight path—because of the massive difference in velocity, the missile turns into a sieve. The most primitive method is where “antimissiles” shoot them down as they enter the dense layers of the atmosphere or intercept them in orbit, although, in this case, defense is considerably more expensive than attack.

It was the appearance of laser weapons that gave substance to this idea. A missile can easily be picked up during its ascent by a tracking satellite from the heat signature in the atmosphere. As soon as it enters the vacuum of space the laser beam will burn it up.

[Umnov] They say the possessor of a missile can outsmart SDI....

[Chernyshev] What they have in mind is cruise missiles, or, for example, carrying a bomb in a suitcase.

The cruise missile argument is easily destroyed. It flies at low altitude. For goodness’ sake, let us arrange a laser “barrier” along the border, so that any unauthorized object that overflies it is automatically burned up by a sheaf of laser fire. Civil aircraft will send out standard signals.

As for the suitcase...There are various detectors at airports. But why should a person go to the lengths of carrying a very complex device in a suitcase in order to blow up New York? He could just as easily buy a missile and set it up on his own sovereign territory...It is much cheaper.

[Umnov] Could the Americans make an exclusively defensive shield?

[Chernyshev] It is technologically possible. But who would verify it? Saddam Husayn would not believe them.

But that is not the point. SDI has a fundamental feature that goes unnoticed. Laser weapons operate at the speed of light, and that is a fundamentally new feature in military history.

[Umnov] Eh?

[Chernyshev] In the history of armaments the warning system has always acted more quickly than the attack system. The Pershing missile reaches its target in eight minutes, an ICBM in half an hour, whereas the warning system operates at the speed of light.

As soon as the laser component appeared, the situation changed. For example, one side's tracking satellites blind or blow up the enemy's warning satellites. The enemy is totally disabled!

So we are forced from the outset to program our satellites in such a way that they react to an attack themselves, without waiting for a command.

Humans are totally excluded from the command and control cycle! This mathematical task was tackled by Academician Raushenbakh. He demonstrated that if there are two systems incorporating a laser component and if they are both truly geared to a defensive strategy, then the logic of the development of collaboration in the struggle between them is such that a suicidal conflict inevitably breaks out.

[Umnov] So there should only be one space shield?

[Chernyshev] Exactly. It is the kind of property that cannot be private property! Facilities of that kind must be public property. They must have one owner—a third party.

Back in 1985 we proposed that this middleman should be formed on the basis of existing structures—for example, the nonaligned movement or United Nations—and represent the interests of the world community.

[Umnov] Who, us?

[Chernyshev] In 1985 I and my friend Viktor Krivotorov—he now works at our embassy in the United States—met with Bruce Weinrod, director for questions of foreign policy and defense at the "Heritage Foundation"—brain trust of the then U.S. administration. He was directly involved in the conception of SDI.

After our conversations we drew up a memorandum. Gorbachev received our file in February 1987. Mikhail Sergeyevich took 10 days' leave outside Moscow studying the proposals. Then he gave instructions that they should be actively promoted.

By that time we had abandoned all our efforts to approach the leadership—not because we were in despair, but simply because we had decided to go a different way, through the press.

[Umnov] What were you proposing?

[Chernyshev] If there is international control, if there is no need to create a parallel "SDI" the situation is greatly simplified.

Phase one: Anything that flies out of the dense layers of the atmosphere and fails to emit the standard signals is automatically burned up. The problem of ballistic missiles disappears.

Phase two: The laser sheaf protects against tactical weapons.

Phase three: Smaller weapons, those "suitcases." Perhaps in 20 years' time there will be a half- or 1-megaton pocket bomb. But it does not exist yet.

But it was not simply a matter of SDI as far as we were concerned. In our view, the joint development of the space shield was the only possible way of solving our economic problems, of entering the world economy. That was the route our conversion would take.

[Umnov] Could the Americans have cooperated with us at that point?

[Chernyshev] ...Reagan officially proposed that we participate in the development of a space shield and share technology. Although, you will recall, he also saw us as the empire of evil.

It was advantageous as far as the Americans were concerned. They would immediately banish the problem of protection against the massive launch of thousands of missiles. Indeed, if you have to defend against 10, there is no problem today, the task is massively simplified.

[Umnov] Conversion via SDI does not provide us with an immediate return....

[Chernyshev] Not so. The states participating in the creation of the space shield would give, say, one-third of the military budget to the international community fund. This third would not go into space, but turn into expanded reproduction of capital. The money would come back to us in the form of hard currency pay for our scientists.

[Umnov] How would the Americans react now to our proposal?

[Chernyshev] A joint institution could emerge, in fact they too are frightened that our specialists might go off to third countries to make bombs. But that is a half-measure.

However, if we succeed in taking steps toward conversion via SDI as a way of entering the world economy it will be virtually the last chance for us.

Reporter Views Krasnoyarsk Radar Station Destruction

*LD0902015792 Moscow Mayak Radio Network
in Russian 0350 GMT 7 Feb 92*

[Text] We now return to one of the first sensations of perestroika. A few years ago, the world's news agencies reported on a top-secret installation in Siberia, a gigantic space surveillance station, the so-called Krasnoyarsk radio communications station [radiolineynaya stantsiya]; it was established as a counter-balance to the American Star Wars program. After lengthy negotiations, a political decision was taken to stop construction of the station.

But what next? What is the future for this installation, in whose construction hundreds of millions of rubles have

already been invested? Our correspondent in Krasnoyarsk Kray, Yuriy Sisoyev, is at the station now and is on the line:

[Sisoyev] This is the first time that a Mayak correspondent has been admitted to the former top-secret installation, so I will hasten to tell you what is happening here at this moment. Although it has been two years since the (?Krasnoyarsk) radar surveillance station was handed over to the civilian SibirEnergo joint-stock company, I can now understand why the military have not allowed journalists to enter before.

I am sitting in what used to be the office of the site's clerk of works. All around, covering hundreds of hectares of tayga, are the ruins of the former military installation of the Krasnoyarsk Radar Station. By the way, Krasnoyarsk is only its conventional name. It is further north, on the territory of Yeniseyskiy Rayon.

The picture all around gives a depressing and nightmarish impression. We seem to be in the middle of a set for a fantasy film about a battle with spacemen. But, unfortunately this is not a film set. The whole gigantic site of the radar station looks as if it has just suffered an air raid. It is not just the main blocks that have been destroyed but also the housing and even the kindergarten. The military department is continuing this barbarous process of destruction even now. From the windows of clerk's office I can see the military construction units destroying yet another building at this moment.

Yeniseyskiy Rayon Executive Committee has on several occasions appealed to the Defense Ministry, to Shaposhnikov, and to the government of Russia to cease the destruction of civilian buildings. But they receive only silence in reply. You know, it is difficult to calculate the damage which the military has done and is still doing to the land of Yenisey Rayon. Just imagine a production area equal in size to the Moscow University buildings on the Lenin Hills. Now these ferro-concrete boxes are being razed to the ground with pneumatic drills and bulldozers.

Yeniseyskiy Rayon Executive Committee tearfully begged—to no avail—that at least the bottom five stories should be left intact and that these buildings should be used to accommodate a furniture combine and that the combine's workers should be housed in the townlet. According to the most modest estimates, as a result of such a conversion the tayga inhabitants and, by the way, all of us, are losing construction components, main services and housing worth over 500 million rubles.

That is the situation now on the former Krasnoyarsk Radar Station military installation for space surveillance. Its fate must be resolved, and most urgently. Otherwise everything will be razed to the ground and that will be the end of it. Then you will not find out who was right or who was wrong. I am sorry that your correspondent has come on the air with such alarming news this morning. But that is life.

[Announcer] I find it difficult to know what to call this site. There are construction sites, there were great...

[Sisoyev] It is a construction site.

[Announcer] No, I was going to say that there used to be great construction sites of socialism and communism but this is a great destruction site.

Skrunda Radar Site Problem To Be Discussed

*OW0902163692 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1554 GMT 9 Feb 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] A meeting of Latvian MPs Mikhail Stepichev and Juris Dobelis with representatives of the Russian Federation to discuss operation and the status of a radar located in Skrunda are scheduled to take place in Moscow on February 10.

These issues have been dealt with by a special subgroup within the framework of the Latvian-Russian negotiations, Mikhail Stepichev told BF [BALTFAX]. The problem is that the Russian side insists that the Skrunda radar may become an integral part of a European security system, while Riga rejects the idea.

Stepichev does not rule out that "the Skrunda problem" may be discussed at a meeting of the Nordic Assembly scheduled to take place in Brussels on February 11 to 14.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

Missile Designer Hits Decision To Eliminate SS-23's

*924P0068A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
7 Feb 92 p 3*

[Article by S. Nepobedimyy, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Hero of Socialist Labor, Lenin and State Prize Laureate: "How Haste and Incompetence End Up: The Story of the Destruction of the 'Oka' Missile Complex Should Not Be repeated"]

[Text] In November of last year a long article was published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA about how "in order to be healthy" they destroyed the "Oka" operational-tactical missile system, not only thoughtlessly casting to the winds billions of the people's money and causing great harm to the defense capability but also striking a moral blow against our army. As the chief designer of the "Oka" operational-tactical missile system familiar with every detail of its development, production, and operation and the struggle to save it, it is quite obvious to me that the newspaper correctly understood the question of the well-considered and qualified approach to cutbacks in our military equipment on the basis of international treaties and agreements. It is

essential that the people be aware of why a particular military weapon that cost them billions of rubles is being destroyed.

Why am I returning once again to this theme? On the eve of the realization of the treaty on reducing and destroying nuclear and conventional arms and the start of new talks in connection with the latest initiatives of the presidents of Russia and the United States, in my opinion it is of great state importance. The example of the fate of the "Oka" is very typical and instructive here.

Let me remind you that the army's "Oka" operational-tactical missile system (known by the NATO designation of SS-23) was put into service in 1980, and in terms of its combat and operational specifications would still be the best in world of its class. Suffice it to say that its range was 400 kilometers and it required only one vehicle to launch; it could be aimed in the horizontal position (offering good camouflage), was a solid-fuel missile (always ready for launch), and operated without any kind of thermal control across the entire ambient temperature range at ground winds of 20 meters per second; it could independently cross water obstacles, be transported by air, was totally automated for preparation and launch processes, and required a crew of only three men. This missile also had a reliable system for penetrating enemy antimissile defenses.

In terms of its specifications and performance characteristics the "Oka" operational-tactical missile system should not have been included in the INF Treaty. However, it was included in the list of Soviet missiles to be eliminated. As a result, in 1989 some 360 "Oka" missiles were destroyed (239 combat missiles and 121 training missiles), along with 106 combat vehicles and as many transport-and-refueling vehicles and all the facilities used to service and maintain them both among the troops and at bases and arsenals, and also the training centers, including equipment and materials in the missile forces schools and on the proving sites. Finally, the technical equipment and the technical parts of the enterprises engaged in series production, and at the proving grounds, and much else, were destroyed. The labor of hundreds of thousands of people and more than 4 billion rubles [R] went up in smoke.

In addition, we essentially presented the NATO countries with a gift of \$100 billion because they rid themselves of the need to develop and deploy a European SDI. A leading Western expert in this field spoke about this openly in the journal NATO'S SIXTEEN NATIONS.

Why did this happen? It happened because of lack of competent preparatory work. The decision was made by M. Gorbachev and E. Shevardnadze during a meeting with the U.S. secretary of state. Marshal S. Akhromeyev later said at an authoritative meeting: "I give you my word as the chief of the General Staff and as a communist that I learned about the 'Oka' reduction as you did—from the newspapers."

The question of the destruction of the operational-tactical missile system was likewise resolved in an incompetent manner. Several hundred millions of rubles were spent to eliminate the missiles and other elements of the system. And a number of crucial people among those who executed the destruction of "Oka" were awarded orders. Strange, but a fact.

And this at a time when those who had developed the "Oka" were proposing that it be withdrawn from service and used in the interests of domestic and world science for geophysical research at altitudes up to 300 kilometers. For this it would have been necessary to replace most of the front section with a section specially designed for atmospheric studies, and software. The system would have been in great demand abroad. However, the "top people" disagreed with this proposal.

It would seem that the gross errors in choosing the object for destruction and the methods used to eliminate it would have taught us something. But we are reluctant or unable to draw the lessons from the mistakes we have made. I fear that with the major new arms reductions we can expect a repetition of the fate of the "Oka" system. Even the specialists are poorly informed about how the upcoming reductions will affect our security. There are no calculations on the adequacy of our cutbacks with the American cutbacks and no optimal technology has been devised for their destruction, nor proposals for the rational use of cutback military equipment in the national economy.

We are just rushing toward destruction. But the Americans are not doing this. They have considered everything well—how to derive political, economic, and military advantage.

Each major arms reduction should be carefully considered, giving due consideration to political and economic factors, trends in the development of science and technology, and concepts for development of the armed forces. But at this time, despite the catastrophic domestic situation and the poor position of working people, it is planned to destroy enormous new batches of weapons without even sensibly assessing the costs involved. But we should.

Take the following fact. Under the terms of the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty we have a cutback of 8,500 tanks. We have tried to make an approximate estimate of the cost involved in dismantling and demolishing them. It will take about R500 million (in 1991 prices). Moreover, the destruction of the tanks, and also of artillery pieces, will lead to the need to eliminate the basic load of ammunition for them. This is a million shells. If the destruction of the ammunition is carried out as it was with the "Oka" system, that is, using the method of explosion, this will do enormous harm to the environment. The detonation of one shell leads to a significant reduction of oxygen in the 10-meter layer across an area of 150 to 200 square meters. In the

detonation of a million shells this will correlate to an area the size of a state like Syria.

If we assess the entire program of planned destruction, then just in accordance with the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty alone it will cost about R80 billion, again in 1991 prices. In order to ensure all the necessary work by the inspection groups it will be necessary to spend additionally tens of millions of dollars. Can we permit these expenses at this critical moment for our state, when the people are enduring great deprivations? We need to do what is advantageous for us, not the Americans.

So what is the solution, if there is one? Yes, there is a solution. It is necessary to abandon the concept of destroying weapons. Plans should be worked out for their utilization on the basis of waste-free, environmentally clean technologies having maximum economic effect, and this must be done systematically, not under pressure of particular political obligations.

The Americans have defined precisely a concept to develop their weapons during the coming years. It is common knowledge that the question has been carefully discussed in the U.S. Congress. It has been noted that the new conditions require constant innovations in military affairs in terms of developing highly accurate weapons, improving target-acquisition facilities, realizing Stealth technology, developing the Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) system, and for troops to master new operational concepts. It is also being proposed that henceforth major funding be found for scientific research and test-and-design work. In contrast to us, in solving the problem of conversion the United States believes it is necessary to maintain a powerful military scientific research base in order to develop fundamentally new, dual-purpose technologies that will ensure national security and serve the interests of the national economy.

No, it is not a sense of insult about what happened to my child—the "Oka"—that has prompted me to take up the pen. It is a profound alarm about our future, when I see the offhand manner and the lack of any serious groundwork when very important questions of arms reductions are being resolved.

In this connection I would like to draw your attention to yet one more factor. Today we possess first-class strategic missiles. They still remain the basis of our security. It has become clear that the United States will be unable within the foreseeable future to develop a reliable system against our grouping of ICBM's, as was the original intention of the SDI program. Therefore, American politicians and diplomats are making every effort to achieve the elimination of our multiple-warhead strategic missiles. This idea is the cornerstone of G. Bush's latest proposals.

We, unfortunately, now have a "tradition" of not asking the opinion of the people and their deputies, and not relying on publicity for the legislative organs of power, and of putting forward initiatives that sometimes meet

the demands of the United States halfway, and, moreover, expressed in terms of ultimatum or even moving ahead of it. This is what happened, for example, with the plans to develop a unified global system to provide protection against nuclear weapons. It is not happenstance that in Washington they have a very cautious attitude toward these plans, obviously believing that they have not been well worked out at all.

There is no doubt that arms reductions, both strategic and conventional, is the dictate of the times. Under present-day conditions it is objectively necessary. But it must be pursued on a truly equal footing with other participants in this process. It is not a game of give-away, not leaving ourselves naked in our own house, but concerns the real interests of the people of the entire Commonwealth; this is what is required of the politicians. Now it has seemed appropriate for me once again to remind people of this publicly through the pages of a newspaper.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Talks on Future of CIS Troops in Baltics Held

Joint Communiques Adopted

LD0402122592 Moscow POSTFACTUM in English
1723 GMT 3 Feb 92

[From the "Military News" section]

[Text] Moscow—The Russian state delegation visited Vilnius, Riga and Tallinn between January 31 and February 2, where it held talks about the terms of deployment and withdrawal of troops from the territory of the Baltic region.

Although meetings between the Russia delegation, led by Sergey Shakhray, deputy head of the government and adviser to the Russian president for legal policy, with state delegations of Lithuania and Latvia were of a working character, the sides regarded them as the beginning of talks on working out inter-state agreements. This was recorded in the joint communiques, adopted in Vilnius and Riga.

Both documents say that it has been decided to stipulate in the future agreements the dates and order of the troop withdrawal, as well as their legal status for the period before the final withdrawal. The sides decided to start immediately the working out of the agreements. Understanding was reached that the withdrawal of Army units from Lithuania would begin in February this year, and from Latvia—in March.

Admiral Ivan Kapitanets, first deputy commander of the Navy of the Commonwealth of Independent States, who took part in the talks as an expert-adviser, told PF [POSTFACTUM]:

The work of the Russia delegation was based on the assumption that the troops of the North-Western Army

Group [NWGF] (former Baltic Military District) and the forces of the Baltic Fleet deployed on the territory of the Baltic states, have been taken under the jurisdiction of Russia. This is why the Russian delegation assumed a tough stand with regard to the claims of the Baltic states to the property of the Army and the Fleet in that region. The Russian delegation is ready to discuss only those property claims to the military, which refer to the period before 1940. The Russian delegation discussed problems dealing with the withdrawal of the Army and the Navy from the Baltic region in the context of creating conditions for their redeployment. It will be carried out along with creating proper conditions for the servicemen in the new areas, providing them with housing, social and cultural facilities and ensuring social protection. According to the information obtained by PF, the communique deliberately does not specify the date of the termination of the troop withdrawal. In the opinion of Shakhray, which he expressed at a meeting with officers and men at the headquarters of the North-Western Army Group, the date and schedule of the troop withdrawal depend on numerous factors, for example, those dealing with security, the social protection of servicemen and pensioners of the Defence Ministry, as well as a real estimate of financial and other resources needed for carrying out the withdrawal. According to some information, the documents point out that the sides intend to discuss the terms of the turning over by Russia of certain amounts and types of armaments, military hardware and ammunition to be used for the equipment of defence units of the Baltic states.

The texts of the communiqes, signed by the Russian delegation with the delegations of Lithuania and Latvia, are very much alike. However, some items are different. For example, the problem of the property of the Armed Forces of the former Soviet Union became the subject of a keen discussion at the talks with the Latvian delegation. The thing is that the Latvian authorities have already adopted unilaterally some resolution on this problem. The Russian side recognized the inalienable right of Latvia only to the part of property of the Armed Forces of the former Soviet Union, which belonged to the Latvian republic before 1940. The future of the remaining part of the Army property should be subject for talks. The Tallinn working meeting did little to clarify the future of the Army and naval units of the former USSR, deployed on the territory of the Estonian republic. Observers believe this was the result of the recent crisis in the Estonian Government. In Tallinn the sides just exchanged views with the republican leadership, instead of holding talks. It is planned to hold a meeting of the Russian and Estonian delegations late in February—early in March. According to PF information, Russia and Estonia agreed that many acute problems, connected with the withdrawal of troops of the former USSR from Estonia, should be resolved promptly on the government level, as well as through embassies.

NWGF Commander on Withdrawal

*LD0402173592 Moscow TASS in English
1641 GMT 4 Feb 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Zaytsev]

[Text] Riga February 4 TASS—The specific timetable for the pull-out of Soviet Army units from the Baltic states depends on how the sides will define the withdrawal procedure, Colonel-General Valeriy Mironov, the commander of the North-Western Group of Troops [NWGF], told journalists today.

Mironov, who is also the plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation for issues of the temporary stay and the withdrawal of troops from the Baltics, said following talks of the Russian delegation led by Sergey Shakhray in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, held last weekend, an agreement was reached that troops will begin leaving Lithuania in February and Latvia - in March.

As for Estonia, this issue was not discussed in full in view of the government crisis in the republic. Mironov emphasised the entire range of problems involved in the stay of the Armed Forces would be solved mindful of the security interests of both the Russian Federation and the Baltic states and also the guarantees of the security and social protection of servicemen and their family members.

The date for the completion of the troop pull-out from the Baltic states was not stipulated deliberately. "We have already encountered problems generated by the rashness with which troops were moved out of East European countries. We cannot allow a situation where officers and men live in tents in the open field," Mironov said.

According to Mironov, statutory instruments infringing upon servicemen's rights have been unilaterally adopted in all Baltic republics recently and incidents involving national defence forces that could stir confrontation have occurred in Latvia and Estonia.

Mironov approached the republics' leaders with the demand that such actions should not be allowed to take place. Otherwise, "servicemens' cup of patience can overflow", he said.

Appointed Army Withdrawal Commissioner

*LD0602155892 Riga Radio Riga Network
in Latvian 0530 GMT 5 Feb 92*

[Text] Today at the Baltic Military District Headquarters there was a news conference. Answering correspondents' questions was Major General Mironov, who on 25 January, by order of Russian President Yeltsin, was appointed commissioner on questions of the presence and withdrawal of the Army in the Baltic Military District. Mironov reported that at the moment the Army is in difficulties with supplies for the units in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, because customs are forbidding

the transfer of food products and fuel. To the question whether the resolution by former USSR President Gorbachev on the transfer of the former headquarters of the Baltic Military District to Adazi was still in force, Mironov replied in the affirmative, but it would require 35 million rubles and a huge communications structure. Therefore this question has been shelved for the time being.

Experts To Begin Planning

*LD0702221392 Riga Radio Riga International
in English 2130 GMT 7 Feb 92*

[Text] On Monday, 10 February, talks will begin between a group of experts from the Baltic States and representatives of the High Command of the Soviet Army aimed at planning a project for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territories of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania.

Latvian Parliament Asks CIS Troop Withdrawal 'Without Delay'

Riga Radio Report
*LD0502204892 Riga Radio Riga Network
in Latvian 1700 GMT 5 Feb 92*

[Text] The Supreme Council today adopted an appeal to the parliaments and governments of the states of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

The Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia appeals to the parliaments and governments of the Commonwealth of Independent States to recall without delay those officers, noncommissioned officers, their families, and soldiers now in the territory of the Republic of Latvia who have been drafted into the former USSR Armed Forces.

Moscow Radio Report
*LD0902025692 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 1000 GMT 7 Feb 92*

[Text] Latvia's Supreme Soviet has appealed to the parliaments and governments of the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] states to recall without delay the officers and soldiers called up to the Armed Forces of the former Soviet Union from the territories of the CIS countries and doing their military service on Latvia's territory. This is reported by the (?RIKA) agency.

Belarus Planning Heavy Military Manpower Reductions

Parliamentary Experts' Recommendations
*LD0702152492 Moscow TASS in English
1233 GMT 7 Feb 92*

[By BELTA-TASS correspondent Vladimir Gold]

[Text] Minsk February 7 TASS—Troop numbers in Belarus should be reduced to 50-80 thousand men in order to achieve a West-European civilians-to-servicemen ratio, according to a group of parliamentary experts.

Currently, there are 160,000 troops, stationed in the republic, a third are working on contracts.

Within the next two years the number of troops will be reduced to 80,000 men.

Defense Minister Comments

*LD0902095192 Berlin ADN in German
0847 GMT 9 Feb 92*

[Text] Minsk (ADN)—Colonel General Petr Chausov, acting Belarusian defense minister, regards a transitional phase "lasting for an, as yet, unforeseeable period" as necessary for the distribution of the former USSR's Armed Forces among the individual republics. Drastic changes are dangerous, he said in an ADN interview. In the transitional phase, an army strength of 70,000 men is desirable in order to safeguard the republic's independence, which is striving for neutrality and wants to be a nuclear weapons-free state. This will take into account Belarus' capacity; subsequently the number can be reduced to 50,000 or 60,000.

Chausov said the timetable for the removal of all tactical nuclear weapons from the territory of Belarus is being followed. Up to the end of the first six months, they will be taken to Russia and destroyed there. He sees no serious obstacles to an agreement which guarantees Belarus' control of that procedure.

The general said the politicians still have to reach a decision on the strategic nuclear weapons stationed in Belarus. "I don't think we want to be too hasty," he said. The present stage, when the Army is also disintegrating after the dissolution of the Union, poses particular difficulties for the military. "Previously, cadres were deployed on Union territory wherever the military leadership deemed it necessary, regardless of whether they were Ukrainians, Kazakhs, or Belarusans. Now that the formation of national armies is on the agenda, the cadre issue is the most complicated affair. Only about 10 percent of Belarusian officers are serving in their own republic, 90 percent are in other regions, often in crisis areas such as in the Caucasus." The great majority of soldiers want to serve in their homeland but at present there are no vacancies. Many more want to return than go away. The ratio is about 1:100. There is a lack of training facilities, production centers for military technology, equipment, and food in Belarus. The Armed Forces stationed on Belarusian territory—with the exception of the strategic armed forces—were made subordinate to the country's government by parliamentary decree in mid-January.

Withdrawal of Forces From Poland Detailed

LD0802052792 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0105 GMT 8 Feb 92

[Text] Moscow, 8 February (ITAR-TASS)— All combat units of the Northern Group of Forces (NGF) will leave Poland before 15 November 1992, Colonel-General Viktor Dubynin, Commander of the NGF, said in an interview to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, the newspaper reports today. The 6,000 servicemen of the NGF who are remaining in Poland to guarantee the passage of the Western Group of Forces through the country, will be withdrawn before the end of 1993 even if the Polish side has not signed a withdrawal agreement by then.

According to data given by the commander, to date, over 23,000 servicemen have left Poland. There are 35,000 men remaining in the NGF. Over this time, 10,250 units of arms and materiel and 250,000 tonnes of various supplies have been withdrawn.

As of 1 January 1992, 97 military bases, 11 garrisons and eight aerodromes have been handed over to Poland. However, a treaty on the withdrawal of the NGF and a protocol on settling property, financial and legal questions in which the conditions for mutual settlements should be agreed, still have not been signed.

Polish Stance on Economic Issues in Troop Withdrawal Hit

92UM0557A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Feb 92 p 4

[Interview with Colonel General V. Dubynin, commander of the Northern Group of Forces, by PRAVDA correspondent Anatoliy Starukhin; in Legnica, Poland, date not given: "How Much Is the 'Zero Option' Worth: Negotiations Concerning Terms for the Withdrawal of the Northern Group of Forces From Poland Are at an Impasse"]

[Text] *I remember how we bade farewell to the first military train of a guard missile brigade heading home from the northwestern corner of Poland on a rainy day in April of last year. This was the beginning of the regular withdrawal of the Northern Group of Forces, which has been stationed in the territory of the neighboring country for 45 years. About 23,000 soldiers, warrant officers, and officers have gone home; 35,000 continue to serve far from home. However, a great many problems in the agreements concerning the redeployment of our troops still have not been resolved. Colonel General V. Dubynin, commissioner of the government of Russia and commander of the Northern Group of Forces, discusses these problems in a conversation with a PRAVDA correspondent.*

[Starukhin] Apparently, by now the main aspects of the return of our troops from the territory of Poland have been clarified.

[Dubynin] Unfortunately, the 14 rounds of negotiations already held between our side and the Polish side have

brought about the coordination and initialing, in November, of just one document on a schedule for the withdrawal of army units. According to this document, we must redeploy all combat units until 15 November of this year. By the beginning of 1993 we will have up to 6,000 personnel there, and by the end of the year virtually all units of the Northern Group of Forces will have crossed the border and the group will have been liquidated.

However, it is possible that in 1994 a small contingent of servicemen will remain, whose strength has not yet been specified, to support the transit of the Western Group from Germany through Poland, if there is such transit. For now, there is none. As is known, our colleagues to the west are effecting withdrawal by sea. I would like to establish right away that we are not interested in extending the duration of our service on the land of a foreign state. There are at minimum two aspects involved in this. The first aspect is political. There is no longer any need for our troops to be based abroad. The second aspect is economic. Ours are "hard-currency" troops, and their maintenance here costs the people dearly.

This particular problem is the most difficult because it calls for resolving financial, ownership, and legal problems on a bilateral basis. Sad as it is, not a single item has been agreed upon to date.

During almost half a century in Poland we have erected residential buildings, barracks, technical and other facilities totalling about 3 billion rubles [R]. Naturally, we do not have the right to be negligent and abandon all of this. However, so far we have not been in a position to sell real estate and movable assets. Neither party wishes to compromise. The Poles recognize only one "concession"—the "zero option." What is this? Our hosts continuously play the trump card by demanding compensation for ecological damage done by our troops.

Initially, they evaluated this at R3 billion. The thrust was clear: You should leave all your assets to us free of charge in payment for damaging the land and polluting the water and air. Quite recently, our negotiating partners quoted a quite different number—\$4.5 billion! Which one is true? The number is clearly unacceptable to us. Damage was evaluated unilaterally, and the interests of only one side were taken into account. I even doubt that the above "hard" billions originated from precise calculations or some kind of methodology. Most probably they were pulled out of a hat, as the saying goes.

[Starukhin] What is our side undertaking? For example, notes such as the following one have surfaced in the Polish press: "A garrison of the Northern Group of Forces stationed in Stargard Szczecinski transferred 28 apartments to the local authorities. The premises have been transferred free of charge." In Swinoujscie, a naval garrison transferred 34 apartments to the city. Major repairs were done in all apartments; the garrison refunded the costs, and the apartments were transferred

free of charge. Viktor Petrovich, is this a payment of sorts for the damages inflicted or simply a gift?

[Dubynin] As I see it, this is wishful thinking. First, we leased these apartments. Indeed, we did major repairs in them. We asked the Polish authorities to refund the outlays to us, but we did not get anything. Then, in turn, we refused to pay for repair of a dock carried out by the Poles. As you can see, conflicts are still underway. Both participants in the negotiations and the Polish mass media took offense at me after I blurted out at the last press conference: "We did not count money when we helped the fraternal people of Poland after the war with foodstuffs, clothing, and footwear, and built houses and plants free of charge..." I recall 600,000 Soviet soldiers who died on Polish soil. In response, they mention the Polish officers who were shot at Katyn and produce an invoice. I am not against submitting bills, but they should be calculated and coordinated throughout.

[Starukhin] What stands in the way of us making such calculations?

[Dubynin] Confusion at the top, the low rank of the participants in the negotiations, and the absence of specialists... The head of the delegation is not endowed with any powers. The former Union Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not argue for our positions during negotiations. Its representative was merely in attendance and considered his task to be the signing of a final document as soon as possible, regardless of its content. I met with deputies of the Russian parliament and officially requested that the jurisdiction of Russia be extended to our group of forces. Finally, this was done in mid-January. I keep hoping that greater progress is now possible. The level of the negotiations should be increased immediately. Representatives of the supreme authorities, the government, should head the negotiations. After all, what kind of a situation are we in at present? The group of forces is in arrears on payments for electricity, foodstuffs, and leasing of premises to Poland. I hope that we will pay the money soon. They have already begun to use sanctions against us. On 25 January electricity was turned off in five settlements, and in residential buildings, schools, and kindergartens into the bargain. Subsequently the lights in another 10 settlements went out. We are helpless in counteracting such measures. I believe that this calls for the firm will of the leadership of Russia. Incidentally, Poland purchases substantial amounts of electricity to the east of the Bug. They turn around and charge us, the military, a dollar per 10 kilowatts, or three times more. Also, let us look at ecology. I have asked many times that a group of experts, authoritative specialists with instruments and equipment and in possession of relevant normative acts, be assigned from our side. Together with Polish specialists, they should work out a different method for defining, counting, and evaluating losses inflicted on the environment. In this case, we would not go through the motions at the next session of our meetings but would proceed from specific conclusions. How can we do without this when several billion dollars are at stake?

[Starukhin] We may conclude from what you have said that our side was not quite ready to prepare agreements.

[Dubynin] I believe it was so. For example, it was set forth in the 1956 treaty that "we must transfer houses in good repair." However, what is good repair? Is it after cosmetic repairs or after major repairs, which may ruin anybody? The agreements are hopelessly obsolete; they have not been revised for decades; they were signed under absolutely different political and economic conditions. Here is another issue: At present, we do not have an opportunity to trade in our assets. This should also be resolved at the level of governments. Our group of forces may sell to the Polish Army spare parts, some combat materiel, and ammunition. All of this costs a pretty penny. Otherwise, things will happen which are already happening: The amounts of payments for damage done to nature will be artificially adjusted to equal the extent of value of assets and military materiel. The notorious "zero option" will be implemented, or still harsher terms will be offered.

[Starukhin] Finally, my last question: One might conclude that the servicemen of the Northern Group of Forces are in a less advantageous situation than their colleagues from the Western Group of Forces, for whom Germany is building residential settlements.

[Dubynin] Of course, they are in a worse situation. We are leaving with a burden of unsolved problems, and uncertainty lies ahead yet again. We proposed that housing be built simultaneously for the cadre personnel of the Northern Group of Forces and the Northwestern Group of Forces based in the Baltic states. Perhaps they will heed our call...

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

Kozyrev in Geneva for Disarmament Conference

Various Meeting Noted

LD1202191792 Moscow TASS in English
1830 GMT 12 Feb 92

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondents Lyudmila Alexandrova, Sergey Sedov, and Boris Shabayev]

[Text] Geneva February 12 TASS—Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev spent a hectic one-day visit to Geneva on Wednesday [12 February].

In his address to the plenary session of the Disarmament Conference here he set forth a number of specific proposals for implementing recent Russian initiatives concerning strategic offensive weapons and called for a radical re-evaluation of the world's military-strategic situation and a revision of nuclear military doctrines.

The U.N. Human Rights Commission, holding a session in Geneva, listened with great attention to Kozyrev's

presentation of the Russian Government's and parliament's stance toward the entire set of problems relating to human rights.

Later, Kozyrev spoke in the Geneva International Research Institute on Russia's new image on the international arena.

He used up the remaining time on talks with the leaders of the U.N. European Department, the Disarmament Conference and the conference's special chemical weapons committee.

Later in the day, Kozyrev left Geneva for Moscow.

Address to Conference Summarized

*LD1202160492 Moscow TASS in English
1500 GMT 12 Feb 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Lyudmila Aleksandrova, Sergey Sedov, and Boris Shabayev]

[Text] Geneva February 12 TASS—An entirely new political context has emerged for the Disarmament Conference. A "disarmament game" of political opponents trying to outwit each other has ended, and now the conference can and must become a forum of like-minded people, who are facing the task of removing the obstructions left by confrontation, Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev said today at a plenary meeting of the Disarmament Conference in Geneva.

He read President Yeltsin's message to participants in the conference and submitted a number of proposals dealing with the putting into effect of the recent Russian initiatives on strategic offensive armaments.

These include the proposal to examine a possibility of fully removing from stand-by alert the strategic forces of Russia, the United States and other nuclear powers trained at each other's territories and facilities, thus achieving a sort of a "zero-option combat alert" of nuclear weapons. In his opinion, separate keeping nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and warheads could be useful in this respect.

The Russian foreign minister called for a radical reassessment of the world strategic situation and, consequently, of the nuclear military doctrines.

He suggested that the parties concerned should "analyse a possibility of all nuclear powers exchanging information about the quantity and types of the warheads they possess, the amounts of fissionable materials, as well as their facilities for the production, stockpiling and elimination of nuclear weapons." Agreement on this subject may be reached at the Disarmament Conference.

According to Kozyrev, Russia and the United States should make a major contribution to the settlement of all nuclear disarmament problems. "Other nuclear powers might join the nuclear disarmament process later, when

nuclear arsenals of all the countries possessing them reach comparable proportions," he said.

The problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has acquired some new characteristics, Kozyrev continued. Russia is taking measures to prevent the disintegration of the former Soviet Union from triggering nuclear proliferation and from promoting the creation of several nuclear powers to replace the USSR. It proceeds from the assumption that Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan will join the nuclear non-proliferation treaty as non-nuclear powers.

The nuclear non-proliferation issue has a human dimension as well. We share the concern of some countries over a possible emigration of our specialists, who work on the development of dangerous types of armaments, and believe that measures to settle this problem should be taken in due time, which should not run counter to the international human rights standards. The drawing of scientists and specialists from Russia and other CIS member states into the implementation of major international conversion projects would be the most effective solution.

Touching upon the arms trade problem, Kozyrev stressed that Russia is no longer guided in this respect by ideological considerations or categories of military-power confrontation with other major arms producers. It is ready to take part in supplying information about arms trade to a corresponding international register, which is being created in accordance with a U.N. resolution, starting from the next year.

The Russian Federation continues to be a staunch supporter of the prevention of arms race in outer space and comes out for the preservation of the anti-ballistic missile treaty with the United States, Kozyrev stressed.

Speaking about President Yeltsin's proposal to create a joint global ABM system to replace SDI, Kozyrev pointed out that the proposal included a programme of joint research which, among other things, could help resolve the problem of brain drain from the defence complex of nuclear and space powers.

Kozyrev described the completion of talks on a full chemical weapons ban and elimination as the most important and urgent task facing the Disarmament Conference. He said that 40,000 tonnes of toxic agents, which are difficult to destroy, are deployed on the territory of his country, and their elimination poses a very serious problem for Russia.

According to Kozyrev, Russia has at its disposal the technology of the elimination of chemical weapons. The most important thing is to get the consent of the population for the construction of corresponding facilities. In the opinion of Kozyrev, a certain aid from abroad could be used for guaranteeing the ecological safety of the elimination process.

Further on Proposals

*LD1202201692 Moscow TASS in English
1829 GMT 12 Feb 92*

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondents Ludmila Aleksandrova, Sergey Sedov, and Boris Shabayev]

[Text] Geneva February 12 TASS— A number of specific proposals to implement recent Russian initiatives regarding strategic offensive arms were advanced by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev. He addressed a meeting of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on Wednesday [12 February].

Kozyrev proposed to discuss the removal from combat duty of the strategic forces of Russia, the United States and other nuclear powers targeted at each other's territories and thus to achieve "zero combat readiness" for nuclear weapons.

Kozyrev believes that separate storing of nuclear delivery vehicles and ammunition would also be ensuring the same. The ICBM would be kept at launch pads without warheads. Submarine-launched ballistic missiles and sea-launched cruise missiles would be unloaded from submarines. The submarines would be stationed at their ports. Nuclear arms for heavy bombers, including air-launched cruise missiles, would be kept at centralized places of storage.

The Russian foreign minister called for the reassessment of the entire military strategic situation in the world and, specifically of military doctrines. He suggested that all nuclear powers should exchange on a reciprocity basis the data about the number and types of nuclear charges in their possession, the amount of fissionable materials, as well as on the facilities for the manufacture, storage and elimination of nuclear weapons. Agreement to this effect could be reached at the Conference on Disarmament.

Kozyrev said Russia and the United States should make the main contribution to the solution of all tasks related to nuclear disarmament. He said other nuclear powers could join in nuclear disarmament later, when the nuclear arsenals of all nuclear states become comparable.

The question of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has been posed in a different way, Kozyrev said. Russia is taking measures to ensure that the disintegration of the former Soviet Union should not promote nuclear spread, and that several nuclear states should not arise in place of the USSR. Russia proceeds from the view that Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan will join the nuclear non-proliferation treaty as non-nuclear states.

The non-proliferation problems also has a human dimension. "We share the concern of a number of countries over the possible drain of specialists developing most dangerous kinds of arms. We believe that timely steps that would not contradict international standards in human rights should be taken regarding this problem", the minister said.

It would be the most effective solution to draw scientists and specialists from Russia and other CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] countries into large international projects for converting military facilities to civilian uses. This would mean applying their knowledge, intellectual potential and energy to a peaceful constructive purpose, the minister said. He favoured the exchange of information that was regarded as sensitive in the past.

Regarding trade in arms, the minister said that Russia is no longer guided in this matter by ideological approaches or notions of military confrontation with other large arms manufacturers. From next year Russia is prepared to supply information about trade and arms to an appropriate international register being formed in accordance with a United Nations resolution.

Kozyrev said Russia remains a confirmed supporter of preventing the arms race in space and declares for preserving the ABM Treaty concluded with the U.S.

Regarding Russian President Yeltsin's proposal for a joint global security system to replace SDI, the minister said that a programme of joint research is being worked out. This programme could also help deal with "brain drain" from the defence complex of nuclear states.

Kozyrev said that concluding the negotiations on total ban and elimination of chemical weapons is the chief and most urgent task facing the conference on disarmament. He said that 40,000 tonnes of toxic agents difficult to eliminate have accumulated on the country's territory and that Russia faces very complex problems connected with their elimination.

Russia has the technology for the destruction of chemical weapons. The main thing is to secure the population's consent to the construction of required facilities. Kozyrev believes that certain assistance from abroad could be used to ensure guarantees of ecological purity of the elimination process.

Yeltsin Sends Message to Disarmament Conference

Adversaries May Become Allies

*LD1202194392 Moscow TASS in English 1857 GMT
12 Feb 92*

[Text] Moscow February 12 TASS—Russian President Boris Yeltsin has sent his greetings to participants in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

Russia will honestly and openly cooperate with other countries to achieve lofty goals facing the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, Yeltsin said.

He said his recent talks with Western leaders and the results of the U.N. Security Council session create new friendly relations between former adversaries, which may soon become allies, and encourage joint efforts to disarm the world.

Yeltsin stressed the need to work out an international convention to ban chemical weapons this year.

Ready To Cooperate 'Honestly'

*LD1202155192 Moscow TASS in English 1501 GMT
12 Feb 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Ludmila Alexandrova, Sergey Sedov and Boris Shabayev]

[Text] Geneva February 12 TASS—Important results have been achieved over the years of multilateral negotiations at the conference on disarmament. Of special importance are the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and other agreements worked out in its framework. This is said in a message by Russian President Boris Yeltsin to the conference on disarmament in Geneva. Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev on Wednesday [12 February] read out the Russian president's message at a meeting of the international forum.

The message says Russia hopes that the drafting of the comprehensive convention prohibiting chemical weapons will be completed this year and counts on the assistance of the entire world community in the destruction of a large arsenal of these weapons which it inherited from the former USSR.

The Russian president believes the conference on disarmament must help remove the legacy of the cold war—arms stockpiles, huge armies and whole branches of industry that worked for military purposes and employed millions of people. Yeltsin assured the conference of Russia's readiness to cooperate honestly and openly with other countries for the sake of achieving this lofty purpose.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Novaya Zemlya Nuclear Waste Dumps Listed

*924P0071A Moscow SOBESEDNIK in Russian
No 5, Jan 92 p 6*

[Unattributed report: "Secret Sailing Directions, or, Second Discovery of the Archipelago"]

[Text] Since the nuclear proving ground was created on Novaya Zemlya and the first nuclear-powered ships appeared in Arctic waters with navigational charts of this region of the Arctic, the traditional names have started to disappear—Chernaya Bay, Cape Sukhoy Nos, Abrosimov Bay, and so forth. They have been replaced by faceless names like "Zone A," "Region No. 1," "Area D," "Gallery A-31"...

Without claiming completeness and academic exposition, we are risking giving the secret sailing directions for the archipelago. Perhaps it will prove useful to fishermen and mariners...

Regions in Which Solid Radioactive Waste Is Dumped

[Article accompanied by a map of Novaya Zemlya, on which numbers corresponding to the following are placed.]

1. The Novaya Zemlya Deep: A total of 1,450 containers, a barge with a damaged nuclear reactor (170,000 curies), a lighter containing liquid radioactive waste.
2. Neupokoyev Bay: Solid radioactive waste with a total activity of 3,400 curies.
3. Tsivolki Bay: A total of 4,750 containers, the lighter N. Bauman, the central section of the icebreaker Lenin with three damaged reactors and shielding assembly.
4. Oga Bay: 850 containers.
5. Stepovoy Bay: A total of 1,850 containers and a damaged nuclear submarine—two reactors with their nuclear fuel.
6. Abrosimov Bay: A total of 550 containers and sections from four damaged nuclear submarines (a total of eight reactors of which three still contain their nuclear fuel).
7. Blagopoluchiye Bay: A total of 650 containers with radioactive waste.
8. Techeniya Bay: A damaged reactor (without nuclear fuel). Total activity—1,856 curies.
9. A region of the open sea: 400 containers.
10. A region of the open sea: 250 containers.

Sites Where Nuclear Tests Were Conducted

11. The area of Cape Sukhoy Nos: Site of the most powerful nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere. A restricted zone.
12. The area of Matochkin Shar Strait: Site of the last nuclear tests on Novaya Zemlya (in the galleries). A restricted zone.
13. The region of Chernaya Bay: Site of the first under-water and above-ground tests and the first underground (in bore holes) nuclear tests on Novaya Zemlya. Place where the experimental vessel Kit foundered; assumed burial site for the nuclear submarine Komsomolets (in the event she is lifted). A restricted zone.
14. Assumed region of the site for a regional radioactive waste burial site.
15. The southwest sector of the south island of the archipelago: Assumed region for the development of the long-term program of nuclear testing on Novaya Zemlya.



Paper Urges Permanent Test Moratorium
924P0071B Moscow SOBESEDNIK in Russian
No 5, Jan 92 p 6

[Article by Aleksandr Yemelyanenkov: "To Novaya Zemlya: SOBESEDNIK's Ecological Press Marathon"]

[Text] Problems are pressing in on us from all sides. The struggle for the survival of the individual, who since the dawn of history has known no law except the "law of the jungle," when the strongest is always right, has at the end of the second millennium of the new history grown into global confrontation between man and the technology he

has created, and the environment. And among the many threats in our rapidly changing world, the greatest urgency attaches to those associated with the development and improvement of nuclear weapons and the radiation and medical and biological consequences of the use of the atom for "military" and "peaceful" purposes.

During the 45 years since that day of 16 July 1945 when in the Alamogordo desert the United States tested the first atomic bomb, more than 1,830 nuclear and thermonuclear explosions have taken place in the earth's atmosphere, underground, and under water. Essentially, every 10 days there has been a new explosion urging on the arms race and bringing slow death to every living thing...

The closure of the Semipalatinsk proving site and the one-year moratorium on nuclear testing unilaterally announced by the president of Russia gives the world a chance to believe that the senseless rivalry between the nuclear powers will finally be halted and that a reverse process will start—nuclear disarmament and conversion of the test sites. It would be possible to direct their powerful scientific and technical potential and the funds that are freed up into medical and social rehabilitation of a population affected by the radiation, cleaning up territory that has been contaminated with radioactivity, and solving other urgent tasks. Strictly speaking, today this is the patriotic and professional duty of nuclear scientists and those who developed and tested nuclear weapons. And conversion does not mean a loss of their skills: the safe operation of nuclear power engineering facilities, and the total rehabilitation of stricken people and territories are not simple tasks. It is much more complicated to push the nuclear genie back into his bottle than it was to let him out.

This problem must be resolved at the interparliamentary level and at the level of the governments of the independent states of the Commonwealth, but we also want to place it under independent public control—with your help, of course, dear reader. Starting with the issue that you now hold in your hands, the SOBESEDNIK ecological press marathon "To Novaya Zemlya" is starting. It was under this symbolic motto that numerous environmental groups in the northwest oblasts of Russia joined last year in the broad popular movement known as "To a New Earth." Our common and immediate goal is to insure that the one-year moratorium announced by President Yeltsin stands, and that Russia's example will be followed by other nuclear powers.

The call—"To a New Earth"—should not be taken to mean that we intend to move to the Arctic archipelago and heroically take the boundaries of the proving ground and its secret facilities by storm from sea and air. Let any such suspicions be dissipated. We are not waging war against those who are obeying their orders and carrying out their military duty on Novaya Zemlya. On the contrary, we have an attitude of the greatest respect for their service in the extreme conditions of the Arctic, and we value everything that has been built by their intellect

and by their hands. We believe that the labor of these people should also be given its proper due in the future, and that the entire social infrastructure of the archipelago should be developed on a priority and intensive basis regardless of plans for the further use of Novaya Zemlya. In exchange we want just one thing—to be correctly understood.

"For a New Earth" means a renewed planet on which it is safe to live, a new world order based on the principle of good-neighbornliness and cooperation, and the exclusion of force and the military threat as an argument in politics.

The road to NEW EARTH is not an easy one, and along it there are more ice hummocks than there are in the Arctic. But we must go along it. We invite those who are persistent, those who are not indifferent, to come along that road. Tel. 285-37-11.

P.S. The headquarters of the "To a New Earth" movement can be contacted at the following address: 163061, Arkhangelsk, Prospekt P. Vinogradov, 29; telephone—9-61-34. Introductory contributions from individual or collective members of the movement, and also voluntary donations, are being accepted in account number 100609924 at the Pomorskiy Commercial Bank, Arkhangelsk city, Financial Department 103015. The charter and program documents of the movements will be sent C.O.D. on application to the headquarters.

USSR Carried Out Nuclear Tests in Ukraine

*LD1302144192 Moscow TASS in English
1948 GMT 12 Jan 92*

[By UKRINFORM-TASS correspondent Sergey Balykov]

[Text] Kiev February 12 TASS—Part of the Ukrainian territory was used by the military command of the former Soviet Union as a nuclear test range. One of the nuclear explosions was carried out in 1979 in the "Yunkom" mine in the city of Yenakiyevo in the Donetsk region, Ukraine, according to a press release issued by the anti-militarist commission of the Ukrainian Ecological Association "Zeleny Svit" (Green Light) and the Ukrainian Peace Committee, and distributed today among Ukrainian journalists.

In the course of the news conference, members of the ecological association presented maps of ecological disaster regions where military objects were located, documentary photographs and samples of drinking water. According to a spokesman for the Goskompriroda (State Committee for Environmental Control), military objects in Ukraine occupy about one million hectares of land, which is either poisoned now or turned into dumps for damaged military equipment and waste.

The association appealed to the Ukrainian parliament and government with a statement demanding guarantees for proper environmental protection, strict ecological

control in the military sphere and investigations of all ecological crimes by the procurator's office.

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Report on BW Research Facility

924P0080A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Feb 92 p 6

[Article by Vitaliy Kaysyn: "Visiting a Caged Beast"]

[Text] Biomedical means of protection against some kinds of weapons of mass destruction are being developed in many countries of the world in the framework permitted by the international convention of 1972, this being an integral part of state defense programs. The establishment of a reliable protective potential against the spread of infectious diseases of man is a priority matter. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, the coordinated actions here remind one of the well-known riddle: How can you catch a black cat in a dark room?

I understood from the first minutes of the conversation with N. Urakov, the general director of the scientific research institute, that it was not without reason that approval was given for the visit: the situation in the country could not help but reflect on the fate of the scientific complex with which he had been entrusted. But necessity is the mother of invention, as the saying goes. They permitted me to visit the laboratory building, a nine-story glass building where they develop effective therapeutic and prophylactic medicines against different pathogens of infectious diseases. The list of diseases includes tularemia, legionnaire's disease, pestilence, and anthrax.

We approached the main building with deputy director A. Stepanov. The building is surrounded by a concrete fence with an electronic warning system. The checkpoint requires a permit with a number. On the floor, a woman attendant notes the time of arrival, takes the permit, and checks to see whether you went through the morning medical examination and whether you have a certificate for the appropriate inoculation.

And then there is the disinfection center. Here the scientist removes all of his clothing, passes into the "clean" cloakroom, and there he receives a work "uniform." Through the "dirty" room, which is closer to the working zones of the laboratory, you reach the so-called air lock. After closing a massive metal door behind you, you find yourself in the "safe." A similar door is in front of you.

I was uncomfortable at first. But my guide casually opened the door and pointed out the overhead air vent. "On the way to work," he explained, "you are accompanied by a flow of clean air. On the way back, you go against it."

"But if...."

"Everything is provided for," Aleksey Vyacheslavovich said, dismissing my fears. "In the event of the slightest disturbance of the air exchange, these vents are hermetically sealed, not allowing air to escape from the work zone. We have hermetic doors."

We crossed the threshold and went out into a second corridor, which, just as the first one of glass, encircles the perimeter of the building. The entrance to the laboratories is from there.

What was I able to see in the "holy of holiest"? I saw a sealed refrigerator and a work table located in a hermetic box with a glass window and protruding rubber mittens.

"You see," the deputy general director pointed to a special receptacle attached to the side of the table. Cultures of microbes, contaminated organs of animals and their blood samples, and other infectious specimens under investigation are delivered here in a sealed metal box. The scientist inserts his hands into the mittens with oversleeves, takes the box from the interior side, and sets it on the table. He works under a directed flow of clean air.

"And where do the organs of contaminated animals come from?"

"Work with especially dangerous infections is done only on three floors. Each one of them has its own vivarium. Cells are kept in metal cabinets—also under a flow of air. Here is where the animals are kept that have first been infected with pathogens of the diseases under investigation to check the effectiveness of therapeutic medicines and vaccines. All of the solid waste material goes through an autoclave to the institute crematorium and the liquid wastes pass through special pipes to thermal treatment. As you see, it is not only the air that goes out processed. This is why we were not able to photograph the vivarium. We were saving the photographic equipment, for it would also have to go out through the autoclave."

The observance of the appropriate conditions in the performance of the work with infectious materials makes it possible to guarantee the complete safety of the research and also to protect the environment against the accidental discharge of contagion and simply filth.

"From the vivarium," concludes A. Stepanov, "the experimenter obtains samples of organs and tissue of infected animals perishing as a result of diseases."

That which evokes associations with death in my imagination is for some here only a specimen—working stock, so to speak. Although I understand very well that the work of the experimenter primarily benefits my health, my fellow citizens, and all of us. This research can become an iron curtain between us and our diseases. Nevertheless, I am concerned about the fact that a force for good as well as evil is concentrated in this building—in the form of pathogens of diseases. In my imagination, they are associated with an apocalyptic beast that according to the legend is still confined. In addition, the

country is in a mess now. Fundamental programs have ceased to be a priority of the state. Will they not attract the attention of more interested circles? For the institute is getting less and less financing and accordingly its scientific output is declining. Where can one find an application for the unique intellectual potential, knowledge, and experience gained by the scientists of Obolensk near Moscow and similar science towns? Possibly where this is appreciated more—in other countries?

If we really do not need vaccines or therapeutic or prophylactic medicines against infectious diseases, then would it not be better to close the institute, which cost the state 150 million rubles? And on its basis to open a profitable reinforced concrete or cement and mortar plant?

Obolensk has existed for two decades in a picturesque location between Serpukhov and the city of physicists Protvino. Here they have long had an excellent school with an observatory and a swimming pool, a polyclinic and everyday services, a store, and a youth center. The housing problem has been resolved almost completely. The institute has an up-to-date complex in which they can perform unique research that even includes the use of bacterial aerosols. It was built taking into account the international standards for work with highly dangerous biological materials. It is dangerous to forget this and it is not the best thing that the state is capable of doing with its government.

Although he understands the need for concrete and mortar for the economy, Doctor of Medicine N. Urakov, general director of the research institute and winner of the State Prize, sees the activities of the science complex somewhat differently.

"The history of the fight against infectious diseases," he says, "has had victories and defeats, ups and downs. We eradicated smallpox and then Aids appeared. There is still a danger of cholera, pestilence, and other previously unknown infections, whereby the most frightening thing is their manifestation in new variants. It is precisely for this reason that we must have diagnostic, therapeutic, and prophylactic medicines capable of preventing misfortune. It is sad to realize that a unified system in the country for the prevention of infectious diseases, which for years was one of our major achievements, has practically collapsed."

"It is also well known that in a time of war and natural disasters," Nikolay Inokentovich goes on to relate, "most loss of human life occurred from the massive spread of infectious diseases. Thus, at the time of the Ashkhabad earthquake in 1948, many died because of the lack of effective medicines. Children died of infectious and intestinal diseases, for they are most vulnerable. I do not think that there is anything in the world that can outweigh a human life, especially that of a child."

Later on in our lengthy conversation, a completely unexpected subject of a different nature arose.

"Many kinds of bacteriological weapons are known," N. Urakov said as I was leaving, "that are based on pathogens of particularly dangerous infections. There are countries where they secretly perform research in this area. Unfortunately, the events of recent years have shown that these countries are not averse to demonstrating their armor. But this does not mean that our country, in violation of the Geneva Convention, must develop weapons of mass destruction. But we are obligated to have effective biological medicines and vaccines against them. Until quite recently, our country and our institute in particular could be proud of the results of their research. Today, however, we are hopelessly behind the developed countries. This is doubly vexing, inasmuch as the convention on the prohibition of the development, production, and stockpiling of bacteriological weapons and on their destruction provides for the necessity of carrying out national scientific programs to combat infections."

The United States allocated \$95 million for a similar program in 1990. Here they think that we should find our own way out of our troubles. For this reason, to avoid unemployment and destitution at a time of raging inflation, the scientists in Obolensk established 10 small enterprises for the production of medicines that are in very short supply. But even they did not provide more assurance about tomorrow. Just as in a mirror, the business of science is reflected in the same food store where there is a line even for bread. There I heard uneasy voices: Will they close the institute? For once it is deprived of the support of the research institute, the settlement will immediately find itself in trouble.

Many towns, just like Obolensk, decided to unite in an alliance of science cities to survive. It includes Zhukovskiy, Kaliningrad, Pushchino, Protvino, and many others. On 23 December, the alliance decided to take the youngest member—Obolensk—under its wing. Perhaps together it will be easier to overcome the economic disorder? After all, it is precisely the close ties between an enterprise and its social infrastructure that make it possible to establish optimum conditions for the full uncovering of human talent and intellectual capacities.

When this material was prepared, a scientist from Obolensk called me and reported two bits of news: work is successfully proceeding on a fundamentally new compound—"the tumor necrosis factor." Its effectiveness is being tested on laboratory animals infected with cancerous tumors. The results are impressive.

The second news is that scientists from the town of Zhukovskiy decided to establish a shoe factory to save their cause. The first news brought joy but the second was bitter. For if our domestic scientists start to sew boots and the rulers do not take note of this, then I fear that within a few years the scientists and the shoe factory and the rulers themselves will all disappear.

It would be better for the shoemaker to make shoes, the doctor to concern himself with our health, and the politicians to be involved in politics—real politics.

Intergovernmental Chemical Arms Pact Viewed
PM1002110592 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 5 Feb 92 p 2

[ITAR-TASS report under the "One-Line Telegrams" rubric: "Who Will Destroy Chemical Weapons?"]

[Text] "In pursuing a course of banning and destroying chemical weapons, the Russian Federation will inevitably come up against considerable difficulties inherited from the former Union," Colonel General Stanislav Petrov, chief of the Commonwealth of Independent States Armed Forces Chemical Troops, believes. A draft state program for destroying chemical weapons was formulated two years ago. However, since then no specific decisions have been made. The draft needs to be more precise and it needs to be amended. In his view, it would be more logical to sign an agreement at intergovernmental level on sharing the material and financial losses associated with the destruction of chemical weapons.

NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES & PEACE ZONES

Proposal for North Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone
OW1202140792 Tokyo KYODO in English 1303 GMT
12 Feb 92

[Text] Kyoto, Feb. 12 KYODO—A senior Russian expert on Japan and the Pacific region has proposed making the northern Pacific nuclear-free to reflect drastic changes in international relations at an international symposium in Kyoto.

Vladimir Ivanov, head of a Study Center on Japan and the Pacific at the Russian Institute of World Economics and International Relations, explained his proposal Wednesday in an interview with KYODO NEWS SERVICE.

In the symposium last week on promoting exchanges in the Japan sea rim, sponsored mainly by the National Land Agency, he called for establishing a nuclear-free Northern Pacific, saying that a precondition for economic development in the area is detente in Northeast Asia.

Ivanov, currently an advanced research fellow of Harvard University's U.S.-Japan Relations Program, told KYODO, "for the first time in the history of Russo-Japanese relations, Moscow and Tokyo can be good partners, and can cooperate in fostering a new world order, non-violent and free from nuclear weapons."

"Joint efforts have to be made by Russia, the U.S., and Japan to alter the security environment in the North

Pacific, which will eventually allow the treatment of Russia as a partner," he said.

Ivanov added that there is now an historic chance for Russia to reduce its military and nuclear forces in the Pacific and also an opportunity for the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty to be revised so as to make it less dependent on a military component and not directed against Russia.

But Ivanov said the territorial dispute between Moscow and Tokyo "still overshadows this strategic perspective."

He stressed the necessity of a real territorial settlement with Tokyo "in order to create conditions for economic assistance critical for the Yeltsin administration's survival and the success of Russian reforms."

He suggested the United Nations be involved to help settle the dispute.

"Japan and Russia have an opportunity to initiate a new, voluntary proposal for a U.N. role based on cooperation, new thinking and readiness to think beyond national borders, territories and sovereignty—something which we inherited from the previous generations," he said.

"Such a solution will enhance the role of the United Nations," Ivanov added.

"As a Russian, I would like to propose we develop a positive attitude toward the northern territories, and instead of dividing territories again and again, attempt to make these islands the common ground for cooperation and interdependence to meet the 21st century as good neighbors and responsible members of the international community."

REPUBLIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

Tactical Nuclear Weapons Removal From Kiev Military District
92UM0573A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
28 Jan 92 p 1

[Interview with Colonel Anatoliy Ivanovich Koryakin by Lieutenant Colonel V. Shvyrev; place and date not given: "The Removal of Tactical Nuclear Weapons From the Territory of the Kiev Military District Is Going Ahead Strictly According to Schedule"]

[Text] Under the terms of the agreement signed by the leaders of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Minsk, the removal of tactical nuclear weapons from the territory of Ukraine, and in particular from the storage bases in the Kiev Military District, for subsequent destruction, has started. This operation is being carried out by highly trained experts, with strict observance of safety measures. The first nuclear warheads from tactical missiles and nuclear artillery shells have already been dispatched to their designated point.

Our correspondent met with Colonel A. Koryakin, chief of staff of missile forces and artillery in the Kiev Military District, and asked him to respond to some questions concerning the removal of nuclear weapons from district territory.

[Shvyrev] Anatoliy Ivanovich, there is obviously no need to show how crucial and complex the operation to remove nuclear warheads and nuclear artillery ammunition is. A great deal must be considered and provided for here. So my first question is this: What has been done in the area of training people and preparing equipment, and indeed, the nuclear weapons themselves, before shipment?

[Koryakin] There is no doubt that the removal of the nuclear weapons is a far from simple task. It requires first and foremost the experts' compliance with the strictest safety measures, and precise and agreed actions at all stages of execution. Proceeding from this, an enormous complex of measures was carried out whose main purpose was to check the readiness of servicemen to work with nuclear weapons, and their ability to cope without error with their duties. As a result, people who understand each other just from the uttering of a single syllable were selected for the packaging and shipments of the articles. And as the last days and weeks have shown, everyone who has been involved in dispatching the first batch of nuclear warheads has demonstrated a high level of professional technique.

In parallel with the check and the training for personnel, work has been done to bring nuclear warheads and nuclear artillery ammunition to a lower degree of readiness, ensuring their safety during shipment. All measures planned for this were also carried out in a good-quality manner and according to schedule.

[Shvyrev] If it is not a secret, what kind of transport is being used to ship the nuclear warheads?

[Koryakin] They are being removed from the territory of the Kiev Military District exclusively by rail, and none of our soldiers is being used to accompany them. Others are carrying out that mission.

[Shvyrev] From the reportage shown on Ukrainian television, many of our readers have calculated that nuclear warheads are being held directly in the combat units and subunits. Is this in fact so?

[Koryakin] No, of course not. The nuclear warheads from tactical missiles and nuclear artillery ammunition are located at storage bases where strict conditions of temperature, humidity, cleanliness, and much else are maintained. Experts who, apart from anything else, are engaged in servicing the warheads and doing scheduled work on them, are monitoring all this.

In the nature of a digression, among people who have nothing to do with nuclear weapons the opinion prevails that a person can come into contact with nuclear weapons only when wearing special protective gear. This

is not at all the case. Nuclear weapons are so safe in terms of health that our servicemen work with them in ordinary coats.

[Shvyrev] Anatoliy Ivanovich, let us imagine the day when all nuclear weapons have been removed from the territory of the district. What will then happen to the people, many of whom have been serving and working at the bases for some years? Will they be discharged from the Army?

[Koryakin] Today, this question is not being raised. Although without shifts and changes in the staffing structure, we shall, of course, not be able to get by without some cutbacks. And we are preparing for that. At the same time, the complete removal of the nuclear weapons will still not entail elimination of the storage bases. They will remain, since today it is not only nuclear warheads that are stored in them but also the missiles, which, as is known, are not going to be destroyed. Eventually they will be fitted with conventional warheads, and these also need unremitting attention from people. It will therefore not be sensible to dispense with the services of those who are today serving at the bases, even less to waste money on training new specialists. So that the problem of the further use of highly trained military personnel who have an excellent knowledge of their business is easily solved.

[Shvyrev] So it turns out that the fate of the missile complexes now located at combat units and subunits will also be resolved positively, is this not so?

[Koryakin] Quite correct. Let me clarify just one point. Among the missile troops in the district, along with the models of new equipment there is also equipment that has reached the end of its service life, or, to put it another way, is obsolete. Use of the latter involves enormous material expenses to maintain, repair, and operate it. Accordingly, these old kinds of missile complexes will be withdrawn from service and written off.

[Shvyrev] A final question. Anatoliy Ivanovich, are any difficulties arising with respect to coordinating the removal of nuclear weapons from district territory, and what is the schedule for completing the operation?

[Koryakin] From the first days of the removal of nuclear warheads and nuclear artillery ammunition all work has been done strictly on schedule, without any complications. Personally, I see this first and foremost in the in-depth understanding and elevated sense of responsibility on the part of the people who have been assigned to carry out this historic task. I also apply these words fully to the officers in the district headquarters of the missile forces and artillery—lieutenant colonels V. Reznikov, V. Anufriev, N. Khakimov, and many others.

As far as dates are concerned, the last nuclear warhead is scheduled to leave district territory by 1 July this year. And there can be no doubt about the reality of this.

[Shvyrev] Thank you for the interview, and permit me on your behalf to assure NARODNAYA ARMIYA readers that throughout the entire period of removal of the nuclear weapons they will constantly be receiving interesting information.

[Koryakin] We are not about to keep any secrets from the newspaper's readers. We promise to provide regular information on all the measures being carried out and show everything to the people for whose sake we are taking the first steps toward a nuclear-free Ukraine.

Ukrainian President on Tactical, Strategic Arms Status

*OW0602204692 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1916 GMT 6 Feb 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Excerpt] Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk says half of tactical nuclear warheads have been removed from Ukrainian territory. Addressing newsmen in Kiev this Thursday [6 January], the Ukrainian leader added the strategic weapons had not been taken off combat alert yet and, contrary to what President Yeltsin said, it was unknown what targets they targeted. [passage omitted]

Russian Official on Arms Withdrawal From Other Republics

*OW0702141692 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1312 GMT 7 Feb 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] According to a disarmament expert in the Russian Foreign Ministry, "almost one half" of Ukraine's tactical nuclear arsenal has been withdrawn. The rest will be transferred to Russia under an appropriate agreement before July 1. The withdrawal of strategic systems from Ukraine will be complete in 1994.

All tactical nuclear arms will leave Belarussian soil before July 1, and strategic missiles by 1997, "and possibly earlier," the expert said.

As far as Kazakhstan is concerned, the question of tactical arms withdrawal has not been raised because that republic "has deployed practically no weapons of this kind on its territory." The Foreign Ministry official said that the future of Kazakhstan's strategic arsenals was still unclear, since "Kazakh leaders have been heard making most controversial statements on the subject lately."

Shaposhnikov on Reassurances to French Over Comand, Control

*PM1002140492 Paris LE FIGARO in French
8-9 Feb 92 p 2*

[Interview with Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the Commonwealth of Independent States Armed Forces, by Laure Mandeville; place and date not given]

[Excerpt] [Mandeville] Did your conversations with French Defense Ministry representatives (the minister, Pierre Joxe, is at present visiting the United States—LE FIGARO editor's note) enable you to reach any specific decisions on security matters?

[Shaposhnikov] We reaffirmed the foundations of the bilateral agreement that France and the Soviet Union signed in 1991. But our military cooperation will no longer be confined solely to meetings between ministers. Starting in March our officer cadets will come here on training courses, and French soldiers will join our academies. This is essential to an understanding of our joint interests. The dialogue will thus become easier than that which I have with Pierre Joxe, for instance. We barely know one another, so we have spent some considerable time in assessing our respective personalities.

[Mandeville] Were you able to reassure French leaders on the nuclear issue?

[Shaposhnikov] My French counterparts are very anxious about nuclear launch control. We clearly explained to them who is in charge of this. I repeat: Strategic nuclear weapons are under a single control.

[Mandeville] Under the control of President Yeltsin and yourself?

[Shaposhnikov] Yes. As for tactical nuclear weapons, they are not about to disappear. Nobody is about to hand over nuclear weapons to the highest bidder. We are not crazy; we are aware of the dangers that exist.

[Mandeville] You seem somewhat reluctant to accept France's proposals for storing and destroying these weapons.

[Shaposhnikov] A distinction must be drawn. When somebody proposes helping us to protect and store tactical weapons and to organize their transport to Russia, we are rather surprised, because we have some experience in this field. We have already brought back

many of the missiles from Eastern Europe and the Baltic. We can handle this delicate matter ourselves.

On the other hand, we are willing to cooperate with the French and others in recycling the missiles' plutonium for civilian purposes.

[Mandeville] Do you support Francois Mitterrand's proposal of a conference of the four major nuclear powers?

[Shaposhnikov] Definitely. We are willing to discuss a drastic reduction of nuclear weapons anytime.

[Mandeville] On 14 February you will be attending a meeting crucial to the Red Army's future. What do you expect from this meeting? Are you not worried about the demands of certain republics such as Kazakhstan, which seek the right to veto the use of the nuclear button?

[Shaposhnikov] I myself have not read the whole of the Kazakh statement, except in the press. So I remain cautious. Because many statements have been distorted by the past [par le passe—possible misprint for par la presse, by the press, or dans le passe, in the past].

[Mandeville] Did you not clarify this point with Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev?

[Shaposhnikov] No. I have not spoken to him since that statement.

[Mandeville] Not even to plan the 14 February Minsk meeting?

[Shaposhnikov] No.

[Mandeville] Would you accept a Kazakh right of veto?

[Shaposhnikov] If we want to live together in a Commonwealth, I consider this undesirable. It is better for nuclear launching to remain under a single control. However, the issue can be examined if the Kazakh president so wishes. [passage omitted]

Poll on Probability of Nuclear Arms Use

*OW1002064492 Moscow INTERFAX in English
0608 GMT 10 Feb 92*

[From the "Viewpoint" feature; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Has Nuclear Strike Become More Probable?

38% of those questioned in Russia, 24% in Ukraine and 11% in Kazakhstan said the collapse of the Soviet Union has increased the probability of an occasional or deliberate use of nuclear arms.

24% in Russia, 24% in Ukraine and 29% in Kazakhstan believe nothing has changed in this sphere.

27% of respondents in Kazakhstan, 5% in Ukraine and 4% in Russia said such a probability has lessened.

The rest were undecided.

Tactical Arms Withdrawal From Belarus 'Coming to an End'

*PM1202094992 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
11 Feb 92 p 1*

[Report from roundup of PRAVDA, ITAR, and TASS reports under the "Newsbeat" rubric]

[Text] The Army should not be a political force or used by any parties or movements to forcibly impose regimes and governments, Colonel General Anatoliy Kostenko, commander of the Belarussian Military District, said during a speech on republican television. The general reported that the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from the territory of Belarus is being implemented in strict accordance with the accord of the heads of states of the Commonwealth of Independent States and is coming to an end.

AUSTRIA

Chancellor To Link Nuclear Arms Cut, CIS Aid

AU1002135492 Vienna NEUE KRONEN-ZEITUNG
in German 10 Feb 92 p 3

[Peter Gnam report: "Chancellor Vranitzky Sounds the Nuclear Alarm: The Arms Arsenals in the Former USSR Must Be Removed"]

[Text] Vienna—Mass demonstrations in Moscow on 9 February, unstable political conditions, including hunger and chaos in most of the new countries of the former USSR, and, on top of all this, their nuclear potential, which is difficult to control: That explosive combination made Chancellor Vranitzky sound the nuclear alarm yesterday and suggest new international initiatives.

In an exclusive interview for NEUE KRONEN-ZEITUNG, the government head said that "millions of people in the East are afraid of hunger, chaos, and a new kind of dictatorship. Millions of people in the West are afraid of uncontrolled nuclear resources in the former USSR. This raises a great, and fairly new, danger. In this situation it is not enough to hold conferences or draw up programs; it is time for action."

That is why Vranitzky will contact U.S. President Bush and Russia's Yeltsin and outline his proposal, according to which the reduction of the nuclear weapons arsenals in the former USSR should go hand in hand with Western economic aid. Vranitzky also plans to hold talks with the head of the East-West bank in London for the financing of the reconstruction of the East. Moreover, Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, the master of 2,000 (!) nuclear arms, is due to come to Vienna for talks in the near future. Vranitzky said: "One must take action so that this nuclear craze ends. Many people are worried about what may happen. I know that many mothers are terribly worried about their children. It would be irresponsible to stand back and do nothing."

Vranitzky's plan also includes the West having to be ready to pay a certain price for more security in the former USSR, including for the destruction of the nuclear arms. After all, if nuclear arms were to get into the hands of the wrong people, the West would have to invest even more money in its own arms production to ward off the danger.

CSCE Military Database To Be Installed

AU1902094392 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German
19 Feb 92 p 2

[Report by "b.b.": "Military Database in Vienna"]

[Text] Vienna—The Consultative Committee of the Vienna Conflict Prevention Center has formally decided to install a database where military data from all CSCE member states will be stored. The software for this database was developed in Russia and will be made

available free of charge. Access to the database will be confined to the representatives at the CSCE security negotiations who are resident in Vienna.

The database installment was decided at the CSCE summit in Paris in November 1990. Computers for the Conflict Prevention Center were purchased some time ago, but it took some time for the CSCE members to agree on who should have access to the data and what data should be stored. The CSCE members accepted the Russian offer to make available the required software because, Western experts said, it is free of charge and it is "excellent."

The database will enter a testing phase soon, after which a decision will be made on how to develop it further.

At the recent meeting of the Conflict Prevention Center committee, the downing of an EC helicopter by a Yugoslav helicopter gunship was also discussed. Western delegates rejected a Belgrade representative's statement that it was an "accident." A Western European representative spoke about a "clear act of aggression."

FRANCE

Defense Minister: No Change in Nuclear Policy

LD0602144392 Paris Antenne-2 Television Network
in French 1200 GMT 6 Feb 92

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] On the subject of disarmament, which has been discussed at length during the Mitterrand-Yeltsin talks, one may note this phrase uttered in Washington by French Defense Minister Pierre Joxe: We did not take part in the nuclear arms race. We will not take part in the disarmament process. Mr. Joxe was thus stressing that France did not intend to revise its nuclear armament policy.

Mitterrand-Yeltsin Talks in Paris Deal With Nuclear Arms

Conditions for French Arms Cuts

LD0702141492 Paris Antenne-2 Television
Network in French 1200 GMT 7 Feb 92

[Excerpts] Yesterday, it was economic cooperation that was at the heart of the second day of Mr. Yeltsin's visit. [passage omitted] Another important subject tackled was disarmament. A few moments ago at the news conference, Francois Mitterrand specified the conditions laid down for France to take part in possible negotiations on reducing strategic weapons. Listen:

[Begin Mitterrand recording] We will join your movement toward reduction. What will be the signal for it be? The moment at which the quality, in other words the strength, and the quantity of the arms have been reduced to a point where there will not be too great a gap. The moment at which France will join the negotiations remains in accordance with what I announced at the

United Nations in 1983. It will be necessary that there be certain comparisons possible in the potentials. We are not constantly going to sit on a perch and implement a policy of military programming that goes in exactly the opposite direction of what is being applied by our main partners who possess nuclear arms. As for negotiations, which would mean that we would be laying our armaments, and in particular our submarines, on the table, we will wait until we note concrete reductions by the other countries. [end recording]

In response, Boris Yeltsin said that he understood and respected the French position of not reducing the level of its strategic nuclear armaments for the time being.

Discusses Joining START

AU0702121992 Paris AFP in English 1207 GMT
7 Feb 92

[Text] Paris, 7 Feb (AFP)—France could eventually join U.S.-Russian talks on strategic armaments reductions, but only after “considerable progress” is made, French President Francois Mitterrand said here Friday [7 February].

Mitterrand, speaking at a joint press conference with Russian President Boris Yeltsin, said, “France could join the (U.S.-Russian) negotiations on strategic arms, once considerable progress has been achieved and the reductions have reached a certain level.”

Yeltsin, who had said during his three-day visit here that he hoped France would not increase its nuclear arsenal, said he “understands and respects” the French position.

“Naturally,” Yeltsin said, “we cannot today compare the numbers of launching pads and warheads” between Russia and France.

The four “nuclear” republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States have a total of 12,500 strategic warheads, and Yeltsin, who has overall control of them, has proposed to reduce their number to 2,500.

France has about 500 nuclear warheads.

GERMANY

Nuclear-Free World Seen as Unlikely

AU0702172392 Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German
7 Feb 92 p 3

[Theo Sommer editorial: “In the Disarmament Spiral”]

[Text] For four decades, the world has lived in the shadow of mutual deterrence. The two superpowers created huge nuclear arsenals, thought up increasingly crazy strategies and operational doctrines, and invested larger and larger sums in increasingly complicated weapons systems. Finally, excessive nuclear armament corrupted the sound idea of deterrence that nuclear powers could only venture an attack on other nuclear

powers or the countries they protected if they were ready to risk their own destruction.

That was already obvious when East and West were still deeply involved in the Cold War. At that time, many people called for a completely nuclear-free world or were at best prepared to tolerate minimal deterrence. Robert McNamara, who as U.S. secretary of defense invented the concept of mutual assured destruction, has long advocated an arsenal of a maximum of 1,000 missiles on either side.

As long as the East-West confrontation lasted, no one listened to such proposals. The logic of the conflict between the systems called for abundance, if not superiority. But now that the Cold War has been officially ended, communism has broken down, and the old fear of a threat has decreased and even disappeared both in the West and the East, everyone accepts all of a sudden that disarmament is possible—and not only possible, but necessary.

The former Soviet Union’s economy, which was largely a military economy, has been ruined by the efforts of the weapons race. The United States, which is the winner of the Cold War, has, however, also been driven into economic and social insolvency. Both the winner and the loser must now reach for the war coffers, if they want to cope with the devastating legacy of the conflict. The inevitable consequence is that they have to focus on domestic problems. Just as the Cold War did in the past, the new peace now also sets priorities.

Initially, Washington and Moscow were trying to channel disarmament in diplomatic negotiations. That led to the first INF treaty, under which the two superpowers bound themselves to remove their intermediate-range weapons from Europe; to the CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] treaty of November 1990 on the reduction of conventional forces between the Atlantic and the Urals; and to the Soviet-U.S. START Treaty of July 1991 on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons. The necessity of cutting back on expenses, however, and the logic of disarmament, which the military apparatuses were unable to resist, soon started a spiral of unilateral disarmament measures that replaced the old spiral of armament.

It began in September 1991 with President Bush’s first voluntary offer to go beyond the INF and START treaties—scrapping all tactical nuclear weapons that were deployed in Europe; lifting the state of alert for many intercontinental aircraft and intercontinental missiles of the Strategic Bomber Command; and removing the tactical nuclear weapons based on warships. On Tuesday of last week [31 January], the President announced yet another measure. He intends to cut back defense spending within the next five years by another \$50 billion—by unilaterally reducing the number of B-2 Stealth bombers to 20; canceling the Midgetman missile program; discontinuing the production of warheads for

Trident nuclear submarines; and, on the basis of reciprocity, by eliminating all multiple warheads; renouncing the railroad-based Peacekeeper missiles; and reducing the number of warheads for the Minuteman III.

Boris Yeltsin responded the next day with his own unilateral program: Lifting the alert readiness for 600 land and sea-based missiles; deactivating 130 missile silos; dismantling missile launchers on six submarines; and stopping production of heavy bombers, strategic Cruise missiles, and tactical nuclear weapons. In addition, on the basis of reciprocity, he offered to the United States to stop the development of new Cruise missiles and to destroy those that are based on the Red Fleet. All this must be viewed against the background of the fact that the former Soviet Union reduced its weapons procurement budget by 30 percent last year; it will be reduced by another 50 percent in 1992.

The statements from Washington and Moscow reflect the change in the geopolitical situation, as well as the necessity for the leaderships to cut down on expenses. For the time being, however, these are mere statements. There have not been any credibly confirmed reports of execution. So far, the START treaty and the CFE treaty have not even been ratified. Nor have any specific measures been taken to verify disarmament. Unilateral steps alone will not be enough. Detailed negotiations are required, if reliability is to be guaranteed.

In addition, the technical requirements and cost of the destruction of nuclear weapons are more than the Russians can afford—reportedly about \$16.6 billion. If it had to be done without Western aid, nuclear disarmament would take 10 to 30 years. (Bonn and Washington are currently quarreling about their share in the costs. The United States argues that because Germany does not dispatch Bundeswehr units to take part in NATO out-of-area missions, it will have to pay the lion's share.)

The dream of a nuclear-free world will not materialize so soon. That is attributable to the problems that are connected with disarmament even if the will to disarm exists. It is, however, also attributable to the caution exercised by George Bush and Boris Yeltsin, as long as the other nuclear powers, Great Britain, France, and China, jealously guard their arsenals, and a number of ambitious would-be nuclear powers in the third world are just waiting to get a ticket for the nuclear club.

Bundestag Supports Tactical Nuclear Ban

LD1402112392 Hamburg DPA in German 1030 GMT
14 Feb 92

[Excerpt] Bonn (DPA)—The party groups in the Bundestag gave their unanimous support today to the Federal Government's call for a global abolition of tactical nuclear weapons. In a debate on disarmament, which centered upon the dangers of the disintegration of nuclear protection in the 11 republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS], members from all

groups pushed for the prevention of the further proliferation of nuclear science and weapons by unemployed nuclear experts. Friedbert Pflueger (Christian Democratic Union) proposed the creation of nuclear dumps in Siberia, the re-employment of those affected (presumably by the closure of nuclear research facilities) in making nuclear power plants safe, and the dispatch of staff for active participation in the work of the UN atomic supervision authority (IAEO) in Vienna.

Helmut Schaefer, minister of state in the Foreign Ministry, stressed the topicality and urgency of ratification of the agreement on conventional disarmament by the CIS republics. He announced the conclusion by the end of this year of the Geneva Convention on the worldwide prohibition of all chemical weapons, which has been the subject of controversy for years. Like Olaf Feldmann (Free Democratic Party), Schaefer also questions the necessity of "missiles in our immediate neighbor states". That addresses the issue of the Hades French short-range missile. [passage omitted]

SWEDEN

Foreign Minister States Disarmament Policy Goals

92EN0234A Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER
in Swedish 18 Jan 92 p 7

[Article by Kaa Eneberg: "New Disarmament Policy; Joint Nordic Action Expected"]

[Text] The government plans to continue to pursue an active policy aimed at disarmament and control of armaments. The new security-political situation in the world implies that this will take place among new international constellations consisting of more "like-minded countries" than was previously the case, within the United Nations and the CSCE, for instance.

This was said by Foreign Minister Margaretha af Ugglas last Friday when she presented an overview of the disarmament policy and the agenda for control of armaments that she initiated last October. Among other things, the situation has become more open for joint Nordic action within the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The previous agenda with the nonaligned states is no longer of interest.

As an area where urgent measures needed to be implemented immediately, she mentioned increased Swedish expert assistance for improving the security of nuclear power plants in the Soviet Union, primarily in Ignalina in Lithuania.

In cooperation with other countries and after consultations with the former Soviet republics, Sweden should also be able to assist in the efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons. The foreign minister said that she had received

assurances by both Ukraine and Belarus that they plan to do without nuclear weapons.

Sweden is also going to work for international control of the weapons. The former Soviet experts, who are now more or less without jobs, must be motivated to participate in this effort.

Shows Conciliatory Spirit

The foreign secretary indicated a certain conciliatory spirit towards the social-democratic opposition during the press conference at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by asserting that the committee did not plan to revise existing policy but to adapt it to the great changes in the world around us.

The committee, headed by Henrik Salander, is in many ways in opposition to the old policy, but it also emphasizes the importance of cooperation, and outlines an important role for the Riksdag in designing the new policy with the help of the foreign affairs committee. Other members of the committee are Ingemar Dorfer, a researcher at the Defense Research Institute, whose credibility has been questioned by the social-democratic opposition, and Johan Thunberger, a section head at the Defense Department.

Want Respect

The foreign secretary emphasized that the government is striving for a policy for disarmament and control of armaments that will be both effective and worthy of respect. The goal is to participate in the building of new security structures in Europe, aiming at lower levels of armaments and reduced nuclear weapons arsenals. On a worldwide basis, Sweden wants to work for increased efforts towards the prevention of the spread of weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical and biological weapons and missile technology.

Swedish efforts are also expected in the area of building international mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts. This will become an important question during the follow-up meeting of the CSCE in Helsinki this spring, and is a given Swedish agenda in case of election to the UN Security Council.

Swedish Interest

There are various reports concerning the nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union. Around 27,000 tactical and strategic nuclear weapons are spread over an unknown number of republics. It is of great interest to Sweden not only that these weapons be placed under satisfactory control but also that the opportunity is grasped for a massive reduction of nuclear weapons.

Henrik Salander pointed out that information on nuclear weapons is quite unclear. Only the Soviets and the Americans might know how many there really are. As far as the three Baltic states are concerned, there are conflicting reports. Some say that the Soviets have withdrawn nuclear weapons from these states, others maintain that they are still there.

Dangerous Reactors

There is also worry about the nuclear power plants. According to a German report last fall, all of the former empire's 58 Soviet-built reactors in Central and East Europe are lacking in security. The most dangerous is the Chernobyl-type which can be found in Ignalina and in St. Petersburg.

A large uncertainty factor is the degree to which the agreement on reduction of conventional forces in Europe will be carried out. The matter is complicated by the fact that the partner to the agreement, the Soviet Union, no longer exists.

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